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The purpose of this research is to construct a comprehensive, analytic framework to 
clarify the construct of white ignorance and then illustrate how the framework can be applied to 
education research, theory and practice.  
To develop the framework, I consolidate and synthesize the extant literature around white 
ignorance, delineating a typology and conceptual vocabulary for the three core elements of the 
construct: 1) doxastic white ignorance, 2) active white ignorance, and 3) meta-white ignorance.  
Then, I show its application. First, I illustrate how researchers can use the framework to 
guide investigation into the ways that mostly white schools operate to reproduce and sustain 
white ignorance. Next, I illustrate how teachers can use the framework to combat and undermine 
the proliferation of white ignorance in their school and classroom. Toward that end, I develop a 
conception of wokeness, conceived not as the absence of ignorance but as the recognition of 
one’s own ignorance and the capacity to neutralize its effect on one’s judgment.  
Finally, I show how teacher educators can use the framework to transform the way we 
prepare teachers for social justice education. Ultimately, my project conceptualizes an approach 
called "racially responsive pedagogy," which serves to formalize a common diagnostic and 
pedagogical methodology between culturally responsive/sustaining pedagogies and anti-white 
ignorance pedagogies. 
In mostly nonwhite schools, white supremacist patterns of practice promote subtractive 
schooling and cultural erasure. In response, culturally responsive/sustaining pedagogies are 
warranted to reincorporate indigenous epistemologies back into the classroom. In mostly white 
schools, it’s the inverse. White supremacist patterns of practice promote white ignorance, which 
educators should work to resist and exclude. 
A racially responsive pedagogy elevates racial analyses, inviting educators to decode 
white supremacist patterns of practice, so they can activate a response and confidently advance 
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“This Great, Red Monster of Cruel Oppression” 
—W.E.B. Du Bois 
 
 
When I started this project, I believed the concept of white ignorance explained a lot 
about how racial inequality could survive for so long in a country that avows “liberty and 
justice for all.”  But, when I started this project, Donald Trump hadn’t yet announced his 
candidacy. Now, more than two years into Trump’s presidency, I’m not sure the white 
ignorance construct explains nearly as much as I once believed.  
When we identify certain ideas and behaviors as instances of “white ignorance” we 
assume a certain degree of sincerity and good intention. Ignorance often reflects a kind of 
naivete and limited experience, and sometimes even reflects a genuine desire to know. Even 
where people exhibit more active and motivated ignorance, we must assume they act in good 
faith, not out of malice, but instead because of fear or maybe anxiety. They don’t want to 
know the truth because it’s too hard to face.  
But now I’ve watched millions of people wholeheartedly support a political 
movement that is nakedly and unreservedly racist. They want to erase the first black 
presidency; they want to ban Muslims; they want to expel and fortify against brown 
immigrants; they equivocate about Neo-Nazis.  
Trumpism is not ignorance. Trumpism actively desires to preserve and reify the status 
quo of white racial domination. Trumpism wants white people in charge. They don’t want 
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liberty and justice for all; they want liberty and justice for white people. Everyone else can go 
fuck themselves.  
I’m not talking about a small number of people either. I’m talking about millions: 
Your colleagues and neighbors, your friends and your family. They’re not ignorant. They see 
what Trump is doing—and they like it. They like all of it and they want more of it.  
It’s not ignorance when they say it out loud. It’s not ignorance when it’s all out in the 
open. It’s not ignorance — but malice, hostility, animosity and ill will. 
So, that’s where we are and that’s where my project is. I see now white ignorance 
simply doesn’t explain as much as I imagined. Likely, it’s because of my own ahistorical 
perspective. Trumpism is not new. We might even say Trumpism is the norm in the history 
of American political culture. This time it’s just under a different banner, a different slogan. 
So, I probably should’ve recognized the reality we confront even before Trump’s candidacy. 
In any event, I didn’t.  
W.E.B. Du Bois describes a similar perspective shift in an autobiographical essay, 
“The Shadow of Years,” which first appeared in a collection titled Darkwater: Voices from 
within the Veil. Reflecting on his past work, he says that when he wrote The Philadelphia 
Negro, a landmark sociological study of black communities in the eponymous city, he was a 
“cold and scientific investigator, with microscope and probe.” This approach to scholarship, 
he implies, caused him to miss crucial aspects of our social reality. Then he recounts an 
awakening: 
“It took but a few years of Atlanta to bring me to hot and indignant defense. I saw the 
hatred of the whites as I never dreamed before—naked and unashamed! The faint 
discrimination of my hopes and intangible dislikes paled into nothing before this great, red 
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monster of cruel oppression. I held back with more difficulty each day my mounting 
indignation against injustice and misrepresentation.”   
Du Bois captures it better than I ever could. I fear now that the problem we face is not 
ignorance, but malevolence—this great, red monster of cruel oppression. So, a dissertation 
geared toward disrupting white ignorance feels increasingly ignorant in its own right. Feeble. 
Misguided. Comically limited. – Just a few descriptions that come to mind. 
At the same time, however, this project is principally about education and children. 
And it’s hard to ascribe malice to children. Therefore, I believe this project still has some 
purpose and application, however limited in scope. Educators fundamentally assume—for 
good or ill—that children are mostly ignorant and that it’s the job of education to help young 
people manage and overcome that ignorance. Indeed, it’s the basic assumption that 
underwrites this project. Education, on this account, is about epistemic revelation, helping 
young people confront and understand reality in richer, more accurate ways.  
To be sure, we conceptualize education in other ways too. Sometimes we say it 
involves socialization or liberation or actualization or character development or professional 
preparation and so on. The enterprise of education can make room for plural and varied—
even sometimes conflicting—aims. But it’s hard to quarrel with a conception of education-
as-epistemic-revelation.  
On this account, the project that unfolds in the following pages is firmly in line with 
our liberal tradition. I think often of Plato’s Cave Allegory: It’s the work of educators to help 
turn white children away from shadows on the wall to perceive and more directly confront 
aspects of our social reality. This project is thoroughly Socratic too. My main contention is 
that pedagogy designed to disrupt white ignorance should aim toward helping persons 
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recognize and awaken to their own ignorance. Wokeness doesn’t mark a lack of ignorance; 
wokeness instead is the recognition that one is ignorant. Wokeness also involves the 
reflective aptitude to name and identify the ways in which one is ignorant, so one can 
recalibrate their judgement toward more accurate conclusions.1  
In summary, I drafted this preface because I don’t want this project construed as 
excuse-making for white people. Lots of white people are bad, not ignorant. And for them, a 
different diagnosis and response is warranted. But, if you ascribe the problem exclusively to 
malice, then there is no promise for education, no possibility for hope. At least the next 
generation always renews the hope that education matters—and that epistemic revelation can 





























A significant body of research across the theoretical and empirical sciences 
documents malignant epistemic patterns mostly (but not exclusively) associated with white 
people, which Charles Mills calls “white ignorance” (2007; 2015). The empirical evidence 
makes clear that white ignorance is a widespread phenomenon that operates to distort the 
interpretive faculties of white people everywhere, preventing them from seeing the true 
character of American history and contemporary society. White ignorance infects and 
influences the way white people understand social, political and economic realities, and 
provides epistemic reinforcement for ongoing racial injustice and material inequality 
(Medina, 2013).  
Despite the deep and ongoing impact of white ignorance on American society, we 
don’t really know how schools fit into the larger social-epistemic processes that function to 
reproduce and sustain those patterns of ignorance across white communities. Why not?  
Schools are sites that, among other things, facilitate the systematic reproduction of 
epistemologies (Apple, 2004; Dewey 1991). And we know that patterns of practice in 
schools are organized according to the supremacy of whiteness (Embid, 2016; Vaught, 2011; 
Leonardo 2004; 2009). Given these twin realities, it seems uncontroversial to hypothesize 
that mostly white schools2 must play some role—perhaps even a significant role—in helping 
 
2 Throughout this paper I refer to mostly white schools, by which I mean schools and classrooms that are 
“intensely segregated” (Reardon & Owens, 2014), specifically 90-100% white. According to Orfield & 
Frankenberg (2014), despite increasing enrollment diversity nationally, racial segregation is accelerating. 
Consider only 15% of white students in the United States attend a racially mixed school (where at least two 
other demographic groups represent 10% of the school population). In more than twenty-six states, mostly 
across the north, 80% of white students attend a school that is 90-100% white. Nationwide, the average white 
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to proliferate and sustain white ignorance across white communities. If schools are sites of 
epistemic reproduction and mostly white schools are organized according to the supremacy 
of whiteness, then it’s logical to hypothesize that white schools likely contribute to an 
epistemology of white ignorance.  
In fact, it would be strange to observe widespread patterns of deep ignorance across 
large groups of white people and imagine that schools are not playing a role in that social-
epistemic process. Where ignorance is pervasive, it makes sense to ask how schools fit into 
that wider phenomenon. At best, mostly white schools are simply ignoring the problem. At 
worst, mostly white schools function to actively invigorate patterns of white ignorance 
among white children and within white communities. Either scenario represents a serious 
problem. And both warrant response. 
The good news is that we already benefit from a transformative body of scholarship 
in education research that provides a model we can use to help guide inquiry into mostly 
white schools—and theorize a meaningful response.  
What we might broadly describe as culturally responsive and sustaining pedagogies 
investigate the extent to which white supremacist patterns of practice in schools operate to 
disadvantage children of color. Ethnographic studies like Angela Valenzuela’s Subtractive 
Schooling (1999) and Ann Arnett Ferguson’s Bad Boys (2001), for example, persuasively 
demonstrate how systems and patterns of practice associated with white “culture, 
epistemology, values, linguistic and somatic styles, and interests silently iterate and 
legitimize white supremacy in the seemingly neutral guise of ‘the norm’” (Perry & Shotwell, 
2009). The scholarship convincingly describes how white normativity, or “whiteness” 
 
student attends a school that is 72% white. And, even in more desegregated schools, mostly in the south and 
southwest, tracking practices generate apartheid-like conditions between classrooms. 
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(Doane 1997; Dyer 1997; Frankenberg 1997; Perry 2002; Roediger, 2005), saturates 
educational practices in a way that promotes the cultural subtractive erasure of nonwhite 
students’ unique background and denies access to equal educational opportunity, both of 
which serve to erode social and economic mobility (2003; Ortiz, 2000; Tate, 1997).  
In the last twenty years, mostly in the wake of Gloria Ladson-Billings’ seminal text, 
The Dreamkeepers (1994), education researchers and practitioners have generated a wide 
variety of important educational responses designed to undermine unjust schooling practices 
that stem from these white supremacist processes. Ladson-Billings, for her part, first 
articulated a theory of culturally relevant pedagogy (1995) to conceptualize teaching 
practices that are especially effective with African American students. Since then, other 
scholars have built on her basic framework, revising the vocabulary to shift the pedagogical 
emphasis.  
Some frameworks, for example, have described culturally “responsive” pedagogy 
(Gay, 2010; Villegas & Lucas, 2002), which emphasizes that an educator must be responsive 
to the unique cultural background(s) of thier students. Other research has described culturally 
“congruent” (Au & Kawakami, 1994; Howard, 2001) pedagogy, which in part emphasizes 
the way teaching practices and especially the curriculum must mirror the way students learn 
and understand the world. More recently, scholars have developed a concept called culturally 
“sustaining” pedagogy (Paris & Alim, 2014; Paris, 2012), which underscores a need for 
schools to operate as sites of cultural reproduction in order “to perpetuate and foster — to 
sustain — linguistic, literate, and cultural pluralism as part of the democratic project of 
schooling” (Paris, 2012, p. 95). Each of these approaches share a similar set of motivations in 
that they reject deficit models of students in favor of “additive” (Bartlett & García, 2011; 
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Jensen, 2014; Reyes & Vallone, 2007) or “resource-based” pedagogies (Moll & Gonzalez, 
1994, 2004), where educators draw on students’ “funds of knowledge” (Moll & Gonzalez, 
2004). All of these frameworks aim to address the same general question: How can we make 
schools more equitable for nonwhite students?  
It’s difficult to overstate the impact this research has had on educational theory and 
practice. Ladson-Billings’ “Toward a Theory of Culturally Responsive Pedagogy” is the 
second most cited article in the history of the American Educational Research Journal (by 
most measures, the flagship education research journal in North America). And her signature 
book, The Dreamkeepers (1994), is cited twice as many times (according to Google Scholar 
analytics). Django Paris and Arnetha Ball have said this tradition represents a “golden age” 
of educational research (2009, p. 382). Though no systematic studies exist to confirm or 
disconfirm the following, I don’t believe it is controversial to say that nearly all teacher 
preparation programs in the United States today include some coursework and training that 
emphasizes some form culturally responsive pedagogy (if only in a peripheral way). And 
although it is reasonable to debate the extent to which culturally responsive pedagogies have 
been translated into successful practice (Brown-Jeffy & Cooper, 2011; Gay, 2010; Young, 
2010), one thing is certain: the literature has prompted many schools of education to 
completely rethink how to educate nonwhite students and how to prepare aspiring and 
practicing teachers for that service.  
 
Project Thesis  
Despite volumes of important research and the significant and profound changes 
made to the way we conceptualize education for nonwhite students, there has been no 
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commensurate reconfiguration of the way we conceptualize education for white children.  
During a time when the academy has actively worked to reshape educational practices for 
children of color, the status quo prevails in almost-all-white schools.  While some of the best 
research has documented the pervasive and deleterious effects white supremacist practices 
across and within mostly nonwhite schools, very little research3 has aimed to conceptualize 
and investigate how and in what respect white supremacy affects the education of white 
children. In short, educational researchers have developed no comprehensive framework 
designed to help educators orient justice-focused practice in mostly white schools.  
To help remedy this gap, this dissertation invites education researchers and teacher 
educators to imagine what research, theory and practice might look like if we adopt the same 
model that underwrites culturally responsive and sustaining pedagogies and apply it to white 
children in white schools in white communities. The model I have in mind follows the 
diagnosis-response approach outlined above. Education researchers diagnose how a school’s 
white supremacist epistemic infrastructure—that is, the constellation of curricula, textbooks, 
policies, images, narratives, vocabularies, teacher beliefs, etc.—impacts educational practice 
and student learning. Then, they conceptualize a range of pedagogical aims and design a host 
of complementary strategies that can help educators confront and undermine those 
counterproductive educational practices. Stated more concretely, the approach taken across 
culturally responsive and sustaining pedagogies first investigates how a school’s white 
supremacist epistemic infrastructure operates to discount and disadvantage nonwhite 
students’ unique ways of knowing. Then the research considers how educators can displace 
those white supremacist epistemologies and replace them with epistemologies that validate 
 
3 Some noted exceptions include Lewis, 2003; Perry, 2002; Castagno, 2014; Chandler, 2015. I describe their 
influence in subsequent chapters.  
10 
 
indigenous ways of knowing—and incorporate those unique epistemologies into classroom 
practice.   
In broad outline, this is the basic approach I follow here—except I theorize how this 
would work for white children in white communities. To focus my inquiry, the guiding 
research question is this: How can white schools in white communities operated mostly by 
white educators and attended mostly by white students function to disrupt and mitigate the 
reproduction of white ignorance? I suggest we need a sustained, systematic approach to 
ameliorating white ignorance that mirrors the kind of approach we see in culturally 
responsive and sustaining pedagogies (CRSP4) vis-à-vis nonwhite children. In other words, 
we need a comprehensive, wholesale revision to the way white children are educated in the 
United States.   
Toward that end, the purpose of this dissertation is to consolidate and synthesize the 
relevant literature around white ignorance in order to construct a comprehensive theoretical 
framework and vocabulary that can potentially guide future research and practice. My project 
in this way joins an increasing number of philosophers of education who have employed 
philosophical methods of critique and normative analysis to inform and guide the empirical 
research agenda in education (Schouten & Brighouse, 2015). The framework I elucidate will 
clarify what white ignorance is and how it works to shape the way white people perceive 
reality. Then I show how the framework itself can be used to: 
 
4 To prevent reader fatigue, I will use the acronym CRSP as shorthand for the body of research described above. 
Though I recognize that not all scholarship cited here would identify as culturally responsive or sustaining, I 
need a simple convention that refers to the diagnosis-response approach encapsulated across the research.   
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• Guide empirical research into mostly white schools, so that we might identify 
how and in what ways mostly white schools function to proliferate white 
ignorance in white communities.   
• Develop a conception of wokeness to clarify the aim of a pedagogy that can 
interrupt and mitigate the reproduction of white ignorance in mostly white 
schools.  
• Propose one possible pedagogical strategy that could help achieve that aim.  
Ultimately, I envision a path toward what I call “racially responsive pedagogy.” In 
broad terms, a racially responsive pedagogy requires that educators acknowledge and take 
seriously the idea that their students’ distinct racial identities are relevant to how they should 
be educated (in all classrooms—perhaps especially in white classrooms), and further that 
educators should work to teach in a way that is responsive to those identities. So far, this 
tenet has largely only applied to teaching practices targeting nonwhite children (typically via 
culturally responsive and sustaining pedagogies). White children’s education has generally 
not been viewed as something that should be informed by their distinct racial background.5 
Against these trends, a racially responsive pedagogy insists that white children are raced 
subjects and that their race is deeply relevant to how they should be educated.  
In practice, I show that a racially responsive pedagogy can serve to formalize a 
common diagnostic and pedagogical methodology across both CRSP as well as anti-white 
ignorance pedagogies. In general outline, a racially responsive pedagogy elevates racial 
analyses, inviting educators to decode white supremacist patterns of practice, so they can 
 
5 White classrooms and white schools are typically viewed as race-free zones (Lewis, 2001, 2003). 
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activate a response and confidently advance their social justice mission regardless of the 
context in which they teach. In mostly nonwhite schools, white supremacist patterns of 
practice promote subtractive schooling and cultural erasure. In response, culturally 
responsive and sustaining pedagogies are warranted to reincorporate indigenous 
epistemologies (Embid, 2016) back into the classroom—and sustain (Paris and Alim, 2012) 
them across generations. In mostly white schools, it’s the inverse. White supremacist patterns 
of practice promote white ignorance. In response, educators should work to resist and 
exclude epistemologies of white ignorance. A racially responsive pedagogy, I argue, unifies 
this basic approach under one simplified umbrella.  
 
What is white ignorance? 
“White ignorance,” according to Mills (2007), is an inverted “epistemology of 
ignorance,” which is “linked to white supremacy” (p. 15), that “precludes self-transparency 
and genuine understanding of social realities” (p. 84). In my definition, white ignorance 
refers to a cognitive-affective group-based epistemic condition with perceptual, doxastic and 
characterological dimensions, caused either directly or indirectly by white supremacy, in 
which —  typically white — persons misapprehend or misjudge the ways that racial 
phenomena structure the world and one’s perception of the world.   
There are three primary components of white ignorance: 1) Doxastic white ignorance, 
2) active white ignorance and 3) meta-white ignorance. Doxastic white ignorance involves 
ideas (or the absence of ideas) that influence how persons make sense of reality. Active white 
ignorance involves behaviors, discourses and attitudes that function to insulate persons from 
revising their beliefs and ideas about the world. And meta-white ignorance involves 
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ignorance of white ignorance itself. More specifically, meta-white ignorance prevents one 
from recognizing how and in what ways flawed epistemic practices affect their judgement. 
Each of these concepts are greatly expanded on in chapters two through four.  
 
 Key concepts and terms 
White normativity (Mills, 1997; Ward, 2008), or “whiteness” (Chubbuck, 2004; 
Frankenberg, 1997; Sleeter, 2001) tends to be the principal framework by which scholars 
conceptualize many of the core problems associated with, or that cause, racial injustice. The 
concept of whiteness, however, can sometimes be mystifying or confusing, particularly 
because there is no conventional usage across the literature. “Whiteness” has been used to 
refer to anything from identities, ideologies, and institutions (Dyson 1996; Castagno, 2014) 
to attitudes and “actions of racism in practice” (Chubbuck, 2004). Additionally, associated 
concepts like “white supremacy” (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Gillborn, 2006; Leonardo, 2004; 
Mills, 2003, 2005) and “white racial domination” (Mills, 2007) tend to be used 
synonymously with whiteness. Because the terminology can be difficult to pin down, this 
section explains how I intend to use these different concepts throughout the rest of the 
project.  
Recently, some scholarship has drawn on the work of Anthony Giddens (1984) and 
the theory of social structuration to conceptualize “whiteness” as a process of racialized 
structuration or whiteness as a “structuring property” of our social system (Geuss 2006; 
Owen, 2007). This framework and attendant vocabulary represents a welcome addition to the 
scholarship because it can clarify some of the difficulties involved in conceptualizing 
whiteness. I plan to follow this line of scholarship to aid in illuminating key concepts that 
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underwrite the racially responsive pedagogy framework I eventually develop.   
Social structuration, according to Giddens (1984), refers to the sum total of social 
micro-interactions that are organized according to tacit procedure, regulation, and shared 
practice. Social structures are produced by agents doing things, knowingly or unconsciously, 
according to standardized regulatory schemes and rules that delimit the plausible spectrum of 
sanctioned action. These regulatory schemes permit and facilitate (but also constrain and 
prohibit) specific activities, all of which are rendered intelligible in reference to the shared 
conceptual scheme. In short, social structuration refers to the institutional practice-based 
rules and regulations, tacit and explicit, enacted by and to which actors are subject, that 
organize social life.  
We might say, then, that “whiteness” refers to a specific type of social structuration, 
what we might call racialized structuration, whereby systems of social structuration are 
organized along racial dimensions. Race refers to a socio-symbolic category, traced to 
phenotype or ancestry, constructed in specific historical and social contexts, involving 
patterns of behavior and social expression, which is generally mistaken as a biologically or 
genetically grounded construct (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2009, p. 336). Race, as Paul Taylor 
(2013) describes it, is a conceptual vehicle through which we assign generic meaning to 
human bodies and perceived bloodlines, and from which we draw inferences about more 
distant, often non-physical matters (p. 17).  
In the context of the United States, these processes of racialized structuration operate 
according to the logic of whiteness, or white supremacy (or, if it is the same, the supremacy 
of whiteness) whereby a fundamental category by which human bodies are assigned meaning 
is “white” or “nonwhite,” and whereby the distribution of material and social goods and 
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resources is organized in a way that privileges or advantages “whites as a group with respect 
to nonwhites as a group” (Mills, 1997, p. 36). Whiteness, in this scheme, then, refers to the 
normative regulative logic, or racial logics, that underwrite processes of social structuration. 
Whiteness, in this respect, is the underlying regulative logic, not the system itself (the system 
itself is racialized structuration; conceived as one kind of system of social structuration, 
among others). Put differently, we might say whiteness, or the supremacy of whiteness, 
refers to the normative racializing logic of modern social structuration (David Owen, 
personal correspondence). And racial structuration operates to produce the extant condition 
of white racial domination. 
I think the concept “whiteness” still carries too much conceptual baggage (largely 
owing to its varied use across different literatures), so I don’t use the term in this project. 
Instead, I will mainly employ three terms I introduced above: “racial logics,” “racial 
structuration,” and the “supremacy of whiteness.” To prevent reader fatigue, I alternate 
between these terms, and all are meant to be used interchangeably. For each, I am referring to 
systems of social structuration organized according to the normative regulative logic of 
whiteness, which serves to produce extant conditions of white racial domination. When I 
employ the terms in what follows, I mean to signal the ways that contexts and behaviors are 
organized, constituted, and regulated along racial lines in ways that produce and sustain 
conditions of white racial domination and material inequality. The core idea that animates 
this project is that, among other things, racial structuration generates a specific epistemic 
orientation — an epistemology of ignorance — inhabited by those groups that 
characteristically benefit from the supremacy of whiteness. White ignorance, at its most 
basic, refers to an inability to recognize how those racial logics operate in the world.  
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Why White Ignorance? 
One important question is: What does the white ignorance framework bring to the 
table? After all, there are myriad pedagogical models and frameworks—usually designed for 
the college level—that address questions of race, racism and racial identity in the classroom. 
Most prominently, these include “critical whiteness pedagogy” (Allen, 2004; Matias & 
Mackey, 2016), “white privilege pedagogy,” (McIntosh, 1990), “white complicity pedagogy” 
(Applebaum, 2010), “anti-racist pedagogy” (Schick, 2000),  and “white racial literacy” 
(DiAngelo, 2012a; Rogers & Mosley, 2006). Importantly, the white ignorance framework 
isn’t designed to replace any of these. Rather, I believe the value-added of the white 
ignorance construct is that it provides a more comprehensive framework, in which these 
other approaches can be logically situated and contextualized.6  My goal is simply to 
articulate a shared vocabulary capable of naming constituent features of structural white 
ignorance. Hopefully, then, we can take these plural and varied approaches, identify the 
relevant parallels, and show how they complement one another toward a shared end.   
Additionally, I believe the white ignorance framework can help draw attention to an 
intuitive aim of education: We want to help students become more cognizant of their 
epistemic activities so they can learn to monitor and improve them over time. In other words, 
many other approaches to anti-racist education focus on the substance of white ignorance, 
but not the phenomenon itself. In my view, we can’t solely teach about racial advantage and 
injustice. We also need to advance a self-referential, self-reflective analysis of the ways in 
 
6 For example, “white privilege pedagogy” seeks to address one aspect of doxastic white ignorance, what I call 
“obliviousness”—namely, white people tend not to notice their social advantage. The “white fragility” 
framework, which has rightly garnered enormous publicity in the last few years, focuses chiefly on active white 
ignorance—namely, white people tend to express behaviors, attitudes and emotions that preclude them from 
participating in meaningful conversations about race and racism. “White complicity pedagogy,” meanwhile, 
helps students address both doxastic white ignorance “obliviousness” and active white ignorance “evasion”—
namely, white people actively resist learning about how their behaviors contribute to racial injustice. 
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which social-epistemic processes impact one’s interpretation of the world. The key is to 
employ analyses common to various approaches of anti-racist education in order to promote 
self-monitoring and self-assessment; not solely to ensure that students “know” about how 
racial logics organize society, but to help students perceive their own limitations, blind spots 
and epistemic lacunae. The goal should be to encourage students to hesitate, pause, and think 
about what they’re doing, how they’re thinking, and why. 
It’s not just thinking about how race organizes the world “out there.” It’s not just how 
racial logics disadvantage nonwhite persons and groups. It’s not just about how racial logics 
confer privilege on me or others.  It’s not just about how racial logics can structure and 
constitute white identity. But, more importantly, anti-racist and social justice education 
should be about helping students understand how racial logics organize one’s field of 
perception, one’s interpretation of the world, one’s habits, attitudes, and dispositions, their 
vocabulary, the way they employ that vocabulary, and how it’s bound up in one’s emotions 
and one’s way of being with others in the world.   
 
Theory of Social Change 
In The Color of Our Shame (2013) Christopher Lebron describes a pernicious 
contemporary problem: How is it possible that almost everyone in mainstream American 
society explicitly endorses and affirms the ideals of equality, liberty, and justice for all, and 
yet nonwhite persons and groups in the United States are nevertheless subject to exhausting 
injustice and inequality? In other words, why is there such a pronounced mismatch between 
our shared ideals and extant social realities?  
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This question is particularly important because it underscores a feature of 
contemporary racial inequality in America. As Lebron (2013) writes “What makes the 
problem of racial inequality peculiar is that there is almost no disagreement that inequality on 
account of one’s race is morally unacceptable” (p. 20). Our core problems around race, in 
other words, are not evidently traceable to philosophical or normative differences. We all, 
except for a few on the margins, agree on and share the same set of fundamental ideals, 
namely racism is bad, and inequality on account of skin color is wrong. So, what’s going on? 
How can so many people endorse the same set of ideals and yet so many people fail to 
advance those ideals?  Why can’t people — white people in particular — apparently “see” 
the degree to which social conditions for persons of color depart from our highest ideals? 
In my view, the concept of white ignorance helps explain this problem.7 White 
ignorance represents an epistemic aberration that diminishes white peoples’ ability and 
motivation to see the degree to which racial logics organize the world and the degree to 
which racial injustice pervades.  I agree with Medina who writes, “Social injustices breed 
epistemic injustices; or rather, these two kinds of injustice are two sides of the same coin, 
always going together, being mutually supportive and reinforcing each other” (2013, p. 11). 
It’s difficult to determine how, exactly, white ignorance operates to reinforce the material 
conditions of white racial domination. One common explanation (Anderson, 2010) is that 
white ignorance has emerged as a kind of post-hoc epistemic infrastructure that functions to 
validate, rationalize, justify and, commonly, ignore extant material and social inequality that 
tracks racial lines. According to Anderson (2010) historical processes of social closure 
served to consolidate economic resources, creating the conditions of group-based material 
 
7 But as I said in the Preface, it may not explain as much as I once thought. 
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inequality. An epistemic infrastructure emerged after the fact to explain and justify the 
presence of group-based material inequality.  
 Alternatively, it is also plausible that the view of the world that is anchored in white 
ignorance serves to motivate and guide behavior in particular ways — ways that are 
productive of greater material inequality. Policies and legislation are passed, institutions are 
arranged, and activities are regulated on the basis of a view of the world that is 
fundamentally inaccurate and backward. On this account, we might say that white ignorance 
came first, and persons and groups started making decisions and acting based on an inverted 
racial epistemology.  
My view, however, is that irrespective of how we conceptualize the causal arrows, 
either case warrants intervention and remedy. Either white ignorance motivates behavior that 
causes material injustice, or it justifies material injustice after the fact. Neither is acceptable; 
and both represent mechanisms that exacerbate extant racial injustice. Both represent 
problems about which anyone who is committed to racial justice should be concerned.  
The intuitive idea that animates this project is that advancing racial justice and 
dismantling patterns of white racial domination requires, in part, disrupting and eliminating 
white ignorance. If people gained clarity on the ways in which institutions and patterns of 
practice do not remotely approximate core democratic ideals, I believe they’ll be more 
inclined to pursue projects that remedy racial injustice. But it should be emphasized, as a 
preemptive caveat, that I believe people will be more likely to pursue racial justice, not that 
they necessarily will. 
George Lipsitz’s seminal book, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness, persuasively 
argues that whiteness has a “cash value” (2006, p. 10). As he writes, “nearly every social 
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choice white people make about where they live, what schools their children attend, what 
careers they pursue, and what policies they endorse is shaped by considerations involving 
race” (Lipsitz, 2006, viii). In other words, there are material and economic structures that 
make certain kinds of behavior fundamentally rational, even where white people are 
cognizant of the ways that their behavior reinforces racial inequality. The point is that 
increased consciousness and clarity about the way that race structures the world and 
individual behavior may not necessarily motivate institutional or structural changes, 
especially where racist conduct still carries a “cash value.”   
Joseph Heath (2000) makes a similar point in different terms, highlighting that critical 
theorists historically ascribe to “ideology” what we might better conceptualize as a 
“collective action problem.” He argues that just because people know something is wrong or 
counterproductive that doesn’t mean they will necessarily change their behavior, especially if 
others do not also change their behavior—or if it benefits them in some other way.  
What both Lipstiz and Heath make clear is that merely raising consciousness and 
eliminating ignorance does not on its own achieve material equality. I highlight this potential 
objection up front to clarify an important point about this project: I do not believe that efforts 
to erode and eliminate white ignorance should replace the myriad political, economic, and 
social projects designed to disrupt, undermine, and eliminate racial inequality. This project 
does not, for example, directly theorize ways to meliorate inequitable school funding; tackle 
asymmetric access to quality healthcare; increase access to, and preparation for, higher-
status, better-paying jobs; locate ways to minimize white racial terrorism perpetrated by the 
state; end Jim Crow incarceration; increase retirement security; or improve life expectancy. 
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Instead, this project represents merely one modest part of any larger strategy or set of 
strategies needed to achieve racial justice.  
At the same time, however, I do have confidence that working to systematically 
undermine white ignorance across mostly white populations can make some difference, 
perhaps even a big difference. In this respect, I don’t mean to sell this project short; but I also 
do not mean to overstate its capacity to achieve racial justice on its own.   
 
Methodology 
Meira Levinson’s (2015) recent account of “action-guiding theory” accurately 
captures the method I employ in this project. Like non-ideal theory, action-guiding theory 
begins in the here-and-now with manifest injustice, but places emphasis on, as the name 
implies, developing an actionable game plan that can be implemented in the real world. 
Several principles Levinson identifies are especially relevant to my project.   
First, Levinson says that action-guiding theory must include “a realistic set of aims 
for the world as it is” (p. 6). In line with this principle, my project targets the same 
organizing forces and voices that have already made serious waves in and across the 
educational landscape, and who have put CRSP at the center of many teacher education 
programs. The following does not, therefore, contain an argument that will persuade the kind 
of voices that are already opposed to, say, multicultural or anti-racist education. I am not 
going to defend the merits CRSP in general. My project merely aims to elucidate a 
framework that can inform the practice of educators — and, by extension, leverage extant 
educational institutions — already participating in similar work.  
Second, Levinson argues that “fact-sensitivity” and “domain specificity” are sine qua 
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non to action-guiding theory. In this vein, I focus on the unique and very specific challenges 
facing white educators in mostly white school contexts, in particular. Yet, despite the 
emphasis on fact-sensitivity, another principle of action-guiding theory, according to 
Levinson, requires research to “address uncertainty and ambiguity” given that “many of our 
most challenging decisions . . . are taken in contexts in which we know less rather than more 
. . . in which we are agonizingly aware of crucial deficiencies in our knowledge” (p. 12). For 
Levinson, accordingly, action-guiding theory must give us guidance under conditions of non-
knowing. Indeed, since this project is specifically about how white educators should orient 
themselves to their practice given their own as well as their students’ ignorance, this 
principle remains at the center of my research. The very thing I aim to theorize is how white 
teachers can ethically proceed under conditions of group-based ignorance.   
Finally, and I believe most importantly, Levinson says that action-guiding theory 
must be “capable of fostering judgment” by describing the “method” of how agents in the 
world ought to approach a problem of action (2015, p. 10). Although the final chapter 
develops an account of racially responsive pedagogy, it will not furnish specific pedagogical 
prescriptions about how to “do” racially responsive pedagogy. As the title of this project 
suggests, my aim is more modest. By inviting educators to move towards a racially 
responsive pedagogy, my goal is merely to exposit the general architecture of what I believe 
a racially responsive pedagogy should involve. The rest of the project furnishes the rationale 
for the approach. Thus, the aim of this project, at bottom, is to elucidate the framework and 
set of questions that can help guide and inform the professional judgment of educators as 




Project roadmap and target audience  
This dissertation can be separated into two parts of approximately equal length. The 
first part consists of chapters 1-4. In these early chapters, I consolidate and reconstruct a 
unified framework based on the extant research around white ignorance, describing in each 
subsequent chapter one of three major components of the construct (viz. doxastic, active and 
meta-white ignorance). Compiling insights from across the research, I try to amass a single, 
cohesive framework and typology that can be used to inform research and teaching.  
The final three chapters of the dissertation work to show how the framework and 
typology itself can be applied to research, theory and practice. In Chapter 5 I illustrate how 
education researchers can use the framework to identify and diagnose patterns of practice in 
white schools that may contribute to the reproduction of white ignorance. To this point, there 
is very little research that specifically explores how white schools operate to sustain white 
ignorance across society. If we agree that white ignorance is a major social problem, then it’s 
incumbent on researchers to understand how mostly white schools contribute to that problem. 
Each section in Chapter 5 concludes with a hypothesis to guide future research.  
Next, Chapter 6 illustrates how the framework might be used by educators to interrupt 
and resist the reproduction of white ignorance in white schools. Toward that end, I build on 
the normative framework developed in Miranda Fricker’s research (2007). Expanding the 
concept of “testimonial sensitivity” (Fricker, 2007) I develop a model of wokeness, where 
wokeness is understood not as the absence of ignorance but the keen awareness of one’s own 
ignorance. Further, I provide several reasons why the educational aim isn’t necessarily to 
eliminate white ignorance, but to help students learn to live with white ignorance in more 
ethically responsible ways. As long as society is organized according to the supremacy of 
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whiteness, it will be impossible to altogether eliminate patterns of white ignorance. 
Racialized processes of socialization are powerful and mostly inescapable. Educators should 
therefore focus more on helping young people learn to monitor, regulate and manage white 
ignorance, so they can minimize its impact on their judgement and interpretation of the 
world. In short, the educational approach for which I advocate invites educators to 
operationalize the framework to help students perform a self-referential, self-reflective 
analysis of the ways in which processes of racialized socialization distorts their day-to-day 
sense of reality.  
Finally, in Chapter 7 I envision a path toward a racially responsive pedagogy. The 
purpose is to show how teaching for wokeness requires the same diagnosis-response model 
central to CRSP. Both models seek to displace white supremacist epistemologies. Both 
models seek to promote more just epistemological practices. By unifying the two under the 
same umbrella, I argue we can simplify teacher education and give educators a streamlined 
framework they can use to advance their social justice mission regardless of the context in 
which they teach.  
On this score, I want to emphasize that the aim of this project is not to pile another 
“pedagogy” or framework onto educators who are already overworked and overburdened. I 
appreciate that the pressures and constraints on teachers are immense. Accordingly, this 
project simply aims to provide a conceptual framework for teachers who have already 
committed their lives and professional practice to the cause of social justice. In this respect, 
racially responsive pedagogy does not represent a major shift in theory or practice. In fact, 
because it builds on the diagnosis-response approach integral to CRSP, I’m confident this 
framework represents only a subtle expansion of the work educators are already doing.  
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More than anything I hope this project can help shift the research agenda and 
interrupt the logic that underwrites so much of the conversation around education in 
America. Too often the implicit assumption is that white schools are the paragon of 
educational excellence, and so the aim of social justice education should be to make all other 
schools work like the white schools. This project can hopefully illuminate the idea that white 
schools should not represent the paragon of educational excellence. Most of these schools are 
deeply flawed both in conception and in practice. If there are indeed educational deficiencies 
to identify, if there is a tangle of pathology to unweave, if there are broken schools and 


















Chapter One  
Foundations of White Ignorance  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of the core 
features, dimensions and elements of white ignorance. This chapter is divided into three 
sections. The first section provides a literature review to map the scholarly conversation and 
situate the white ignorance construct. Then, in Section 2, I build explicitly on Mills’s 
research to articulate a formal definition of white ignorance and explicitly introduce the 
constituent components. Finally, Section 3 discusses preliminary background concepts to 
further clarify what white ignorance is and is not. Ultimately, the aim of Chapter 1 is to erect 
a skeletal framework that I will eventually fill in across chapters 2-4. So, if Chapter 1 feels 
somewhat vague, stick with me—it’ll become more concrete in subsequent chapters. 
 
Literature review 
In the last decade or so there has been a burst of research investigating “ignorance” 
(Gross & McGoey, 2015; Smithson, 2012 & 2015), “epistemologies of ignorance” 
(Malewski & Jaramillo, 2011; Sullivan & Tuana, 2007), and what is often called 
“agnotology” (Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008), a term that refers to “ignorance studies” in 
general. The simplest way to conceptualize ignorance studies is to contrast it with its 
converse: epistemology. Historically, epistemology involves theorizing what knowledge is, 
how subjects can have knowledge, and — in the case of social epistemology — why some 
groups possess knowledge and others do not. The research in agnotology in effect retrains 
this focus, and instead of investigating “knowing,” investigates “non-knowing” (Proctor & 
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Schiebinger, 2008): what not-knowing is; how subjects don’t know; and why some groups 
don’t know and others do.  
The field of ignorance studies has been described as “interdisciplinary, 
multidisciplinary, and transdicisplinary” (Smithson, 2015), encompassing an array of 
methodologies and approaches, and examining everything from the social sciences (McGoey, 
2012; Stocking & Holstein, 2015) to economics, history (Trouillot, 1995) and even the hard 
sciences (Kourany, 2015; Firestein, 2012). Despite increasing interest, the scholarship around 
ignorance remains comparatively minimal, and most of the research is preliminary, 
programmatic and experimental (Gross & McGoey, 2015). According to Proctor and 
Schiebinger (2008), however, a few patterns in the literature are apparent.  
First, ignorance research tends to focus on the “conscious, unconscious, and structural 
production of ignorance, its diverse causes and conformations, [and] whether [it is] brought 
about by neglect, forgetfulness, myopia, extinction, secrecy or suppression” (Proctor & 
Schiebinger, 2008, p. 4).  And, second, these areas of focus and inquiry have coalesced into 
three main conceptual domains: ignorance as a native state (where not-knowing stems from 
lack of exposure or experience), ignorance as “selectivity” (Elliot, 2015) or choice (i.e. the 
pursuit of one kind of inquiry can leave another in the background [see also: Townley, 
2006]), and ignorance as deliberately engineered and strategic ploy (or active construct) 
(Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008, p. 7).   
In philosophy in particular, ignorance research (most of which is in the analytic 
tradition) has historically focused on modes of native ignorance, examining questions like the 
value and virtue of ignorance (Driver, 1989; Flanagan, 1990; Townley, 2011; Franke, 2015; 
Vitek & Jackson, 2008), the relationship of modesty to ignorance (Driver, 1999), the role of 
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ignorance in everyday life (Smithson, 1985; Zimmerman, 1997), and the relative epistemic 
productivity of different kinds of ignorance (Haas & Vogt, 2015). But more recently, 
significant philosophical scholarship that stems from, and is informed by, the research in 
social epistemology has turned attention to the structural dimensions of ignorance. This trend 
is a consequence of the influence of critical feminist methodologies, many of which 
emphasize contextualized epistemologies and theorize situated epistemic agents (Haraway, 
1988), highlighting how the circulation of knowledge is always bound up in social matrices 
of power, domination, and privilege (Alcoff, 2007).  
Gender ignorance has thus been the dominant locus of investigation into structural 
group–based ignorance, with scholars like Loraine Code (2014a; 2014b), Linda Alcoff 
(2007), and Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (Tuana & Sullivan, 2006; Sullivan & Tuana, 
2007; Tuana, 2006) tracing the manifold dimensions of gender ignorance and its social and 
political consequences. It is important here to note that these thinkers (among others) draw 
mainly on resources present in “standpoint theory” (Collins, 1990; Hartsock, 1983; Harding, 
2009; hooks, 1990), a framework without which, I believe, research on structural group-
based ignorance would be unintelligible. Standpoint theory, in simple terms, holds that one’s 
identity and one’s social location will strongly influence what one knows (and doesn’t know) 
and how one knows (or doesn’t know) (Walby, 2001).  
But, as Mills rightly points out, although feminist social epistemology has become 
almost mainstream (with standpoint theory enjoying considerable purchase beyond 
traditional philosophy), the role of race in social epistemology remains seriously 
undertheorized (2007, p. 15). Mills was the first philosopher to explicitly name and diagnose 
structural white ignorance in The Racial Contract (1997), a text that elucidates a “global 
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theoretical framework” (p. 17) that can describe and conceptualize the political, economic, 
and epistemological dimensions of white racial domination. Here’s how the Racial Contract 
(1997) describes white ignorance:  
 
On matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an 
inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized 
and global  cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and social functional), 
producing the  ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the 
world they themselves have created (p. 18). 
 
Since the publication of The Racial Contract, a small body of scholarship on white 
ignorance has followed. Shannon Sullivan’s book, Revealing Whiteness (2006), for example 
investigates what she calls “white privileged ignorance,” which she says is an “unconscious 
habit” whereby privileged white populations tend to ignore their racial privilege. Some 
scholarship has tried to work out conceptual problems in Mills. Congdon (2015) for example 
explores plausible ways to reconcile Mills’s evidently inconsistent twin commitment to 
conceptualism and realism; Steyn (2012) tries to correct what she believes is Mills’s 
overemphasis on white populations by investigating how racialized epistemologies of 
ignorance also saturate nonwhite communities (a concern Mills takes up in Mills [2015b]); 
and Smith (2015) tries to remedy the under-theorization of “white responsibility” (p. 91) in 
Mills.  
Bonilla-Silva (2012), for his part, uses Mills’s research to analyze the “racial 
grammar of everyday life.” Burroughs’s (2015) recent study also uses a white ignorance 
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framework to analyze Hannah Arendt’s confused and potentially dangerous views about 
black communities, represented in her essay “Reflections on Little Rock.” A small set of 
papers (Fricker, 2013; Medina, 2012; Mason, 2011) explore the relationship between white 
ignorance, epistemic injustice, and hermeneutic injustice, with Mills adding to the 
conversation (Mills, 2013). In this vein, Jose Medina’s recent book The Epistemology of 
Resistance (2013) uses a white ignorance framework to diagnose epistemic vice and 
epistemic injustice. His book, in my view, contains the most systematic treatment of white 
ignorance outside of Mills; much of what follows in this project will draw from and critique 
Medina’s approach.   
The most prominent account of white ignorance is found in Race and Epistemologies 
of Ignorance (2007), a collection of essays that emerged from a workshop at Penn State 
University in 2003. In this volume philosophers work to thematize key elements of white 
ignorance; some contributors include: Hoagland (2007), who argues that part of what causes 
white ignorance is an inability to adequately conceptualize how we are related to others; 
Alcoff (2007), who furnishes a typology of different kinds of structural ignorance by drawing 
from key concepts in feminist epistemology; Bailey (2007), who describes ways that 
nonwhite populations have historically leveraged white ignorance for economic and material 
gain; Outlaw (2007), who argues that successive generations of white children have been 
“nurtured systematically with both knowledge and ignorance to grow into confirmed, 
practicing racial supremacist white adults” (p. 197); and Sullivan (2007), who worries that 
education can be influenced by larger patterns of ignorance. Together, these voices provide a 




Section 1: Building on Charles Mills — A formal definition of white ignorance   
Mills writes in his most recent essay, “Global White Ignorance” (2015), that white 
ignorance, at bottom, should be understood as a “particular optic, a prism of perception and 
interpretation, a worldview . . . which incorporates multiple elements into a [citing Feagin 
2013, p. ix] ‘holistic and gestalt  . . .  racial construction of reality’ (p. 218), in which the 
supremacy of whiteness plays a decisive causal role.” In my view, his recent descriptions 
provide the most succinct way to think about the phenomenon. But the challenge is that terms 
like “optics” and “prisms” can sound more like metaphors than concrete analytic concepts. 
So, it requires some work to give these concepts additional meat.  
At its most basic, white ignorance refers to an interpretive failure, an inability to 
accurately read context, from very global features of the world to narrower and more 
immediate. In particular, white ignorance refers to an inability to accurately appraise how 
racial logics organize a given context. In the introduction, I described how systems of social 
structuration, organized according to the normative regulative logic of whiteness, serve to 
produce extant conditions of white racial domination. Importantly, these racial logics 
organize not only social, political and economic dimensions of our shared world, but they 
also organize and train our interpretive faculties in specific ways.  
As Mills writes, whatever one perceives “it is the concept that is driving the 
perception” (2007, p. 22). I understand Mills to mean that racialized structuration generates a 
specific epistemic orientation — an epistemology of ignorance — that serves to distort and 
constrain the way one interprets reality. White ignorance is activated at moments when 
conceptual schemata, organized by racial logics, occlude one’s capacity to accurately 
appraise and interpret a given situation. The “situation” in question can be just about 
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anything, and may include judgments related to global concerns, including very broad social, 
political and economic phenomena. I don’t mean to use the term situation in a narrow, 
localist sense.  
Based on the literature, I have identified three primary components of white 
ignorance: 
• Doxastic white ignorance   
• Active white ignorance  
• Meta-white ignorance 
This triad comprises the basic framework that I develop in Chapters 2-4 (and which 
drives the conceptual work for the rest of the dissertation). Together these elements of white 
ignorance include ideas and behaviors that serve to limit the epistemic vista according to 
which white people encounter and make sense of reality.  
Doxastic white ignorance includes ideas, schemata and narrative frameworks that 
operate to distort and occlude one’s perception. Doxastic white ignorance doesn’t necessarily 
include false believe per se, but it does increase the likelihood of falling on false belief. In 
general, doxastic ignorance is problematic because it limits epistemic possibilities and drives 
snap judgements and hurried evaluations. In other words, doxastic white ignorance makes 
false, incomplete and incorrect judgements just pop into one’s head without conscious 
reflection or notice.    
Active white ignorance, meanwhile, is a form of ignorance that presents as a set of 
behaviors, attitudes and habits. We say someone or some group displays ignorance not 
simply because they express false ideas or because there is an apparent absence of salient 
true belief, but also because they act in ways that inhibits the acquisition of true belief or the 
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elimination of false belief.  White ignorance thus refers not simply to false utterances, 
inaccurate conceptual formulations or erroneous discursive formations, but also to behaviors 
that mark the ignorant as such: An active inclination to ignore, dismiss, evade, misrepresent, 
silence, not listen, discredit, shut down, etc. We say these behaviors, attitudes and habits are 
ignorant because they inhibit one’s capacity to access and interpret the kind of knowledge 
needed to accurately appraise reality. 
Finally, white ignorance involves a meta-ignorance too. Persons don’t merely inhabit 
white ignorance, but crucially they’re also ignorant of the very fact that they inhabit white 
ignorance. And, by extension, they’re ignorant of the ways in which epistemic practices 
associated with white ignorance affect and influence their judgment. Meta-white ignorance is 
a particularly sticky problem in that you can’t address a problem you deny exists.  
Taken altogether, here’s a formal definition of the overall phenomena: White 
ignorance is a cognitive-affective group-based epistemic condition with doxastic, behavioral 
and meta-cognitive dimensions, caused by racial logics organized according to the 
supremacy of whiteness, in which —  typically white — cognizers misapprehend or misjudge 
the ways that processes of racialized structuration operate in the world. To be sure, this 
formal definition contains a lot. So, let me try to unpack it.   
 
Section 2: Preliminary background concepts 
Below are three basic principles that serve to further unpack the definition above and 
clarify the concept. It’s potentially easy to confuse white ignorance with other forms of 
ignorance. So, the purpose here is to provide principles to contrast the aspects that make 
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white ignorance distinct. Most, but not all, of these principles are adapted from Mills’s 2012 
essay, “White Ignorance.”    
Principle #1: The concept is called “white” ignorance not because it’s exclusively 
associated with whites, but because it’s linked in some causal way to racial logics organized 
by the supremacy of whiteness. The category of “race” that underwrites white ignorance is a 
socio-structural rather than a physico-biological construct (Mills, 2007, p. 20). In other 
words, race is a social category that has emerged in the modern world as a consequence of 
particular social systems (most prominently those organized according to the supremacy of 
whiteness) that mark certain physical characteristics salient (especially perceived phenotype 
thought to be traceable in some meaningful way to ancestry). For this reason, white 
ignorance isn’t exclusive to persons of a specific race.  
Though white ignorance is not exclusive to whites, it appears most prominently 
among whites. Here’s why: Racial logics organize the world in ways that advantage some 
groups and disadvantage others. The effects of these racial logics are both epistemic and 
material. White ignorance is the corollary to material disadvantage, it helps to preserve and 
maintain advantage. Advantaged persons and groups, therefore, tend to be those most likely 
to inhabit white ignorance because patterns of racial structuration function to prevent 
accurate appraisal and assessment of the very patterns of racial structuration that serve to 
advantage them.8 
 
8 Alternatively, nonwhite persons who are disadvantaged by patterns of racial structuration tend to not similarly 
inhabit white ignorance because the world intervenes. The brute reality of racial disadvantage and injustice 
works as a mediating force that disrupts conceptual patterns associated with white ignorance in a way it does 
not for persons who are advantaged by the arrangement. In simple terms, the stark reality of injustice is most 
apparent to the groups and persons who suffer it most. 
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Principle #2: White ignorance doesn’t affect all cognitive operation and modes of 
interpretation. Mills, for his part, allows that various modes of inquiry and interpretation will 
not be affected by white ignorance. As he writes, it is important to distinguish “white 
ignorance from general patterns of ignorance prevalent among people who are white but in 
whose doxastic state race has played no determining role” (2007, p. 20). We can imagine, for 
example, that studying protoplasm at the bottom of the ocean does not implicate white 
ignorance. Similarly, if I am unaware of, or for some reason doubt, the science behind 
climate change, it is unlikely (though not impossible) that that specific type ignorance is a 
product of racial structuration.  
 Principle #3: The concept of white ignorance doesn’t contain easily-applied 
diagnostic criteria. Ultimately, it’s hard to tell whether a given judgment is an instance of 
white ignorance. Racial logics can influence the world and our perceptive faculties in ways 
we may not fully understand or appreciate. Some judgment or belief might therefore be an 
effect of racial logics — and thus an instance of white ignorance — without it being 
immediately apparent or obvious.  
Principle #4: White ignorance presents unevenly across different groups and 
individuals. Not everyone inhabits white ignorance to the same extent or same degree. It 
appears in different ways across different populations. White people as well as nonwhite 
people can inhabit white ignorance to varying degrees. Given that different groups and 
persons can occupy different social positions, white ignorance doesn’t impinge on epistemic 
functioning the same way across all groups and persons. 
Principle #5: White ignorance presents unevenly at different moments even within the 
same individual. Similarly, individuals do not inhabit white ignorance in consistent or stable 
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ways all the time. The same individual can sometimes appear to express behaviors or ideas 
associated with white ignorance and at other times appear to not participate in white 
ignorance at all.  
Principle #6: Context matters. Finally, different social contexts can mediate racial 
logics in various ways and therefore generate different manifestations of white ignorance. To 
borrow Mill’s phrase: The concept and the context drives the perception. Later in the project 
I put principles five and six in greater focus to explore what they mean for education and for 
helping persons navigate and manage the patterns of ignorance in which they might 
participate. Eventually, I argue that different contexts can activate white ignorance in 
unique—though sometimes patterned ways—and that individuals can learn to identify 
contexts or situations most likely to activate white ignorance.  
 
Conclusion 
The thesis of white ignorance is not designed to contain a diagnostic checklist. There 
are no hard-and-fast criteria that will help answer whether a given person’s beliefs or 
associated behaviors are definite instances of white ignorance. Yet, there are still myriad 
paradigm examples—and I identify them throughout subsequent chapters.  As Mills rightly 
points out, “the existence of problematic [or fuzzy] cases at the borders does not undermine 
the import of more central cases” (2007, p. 23).  
Although we can confidently identify central cases, it’s important to keep in mind that 
the purpose of theorizing white ignorance isn’t merely to diagnose instances of the condition. 
Rather, the aim should be to incite individual and social change. To that end, the goal is to 
make persons aware of how they might be subject to white ignorance, so that they can reflect 
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on, monitor and regulate the way it affects their interpretations and judgements. The aim, in 
short, is to inspire attentive vigilance to neutralize and minimize the possibility of being in 
error. That’s achieved, in part, by helping persons recognize constituent elements of white 
ignorance. So, let’s turn to that work. The next chapter describes and explains the first major 






















Doxastic White Ignorance  
 
In the previous chapter, I described preliminary concepts to situate the construct of 
white ignorance in general outline. In the next three chapters I flesh out in much greater 
detail the three main components of white ignorance: Doxastic, active and meta-white 
ignorance. The purpose of these chapters is to provide a vocabulary and conceptual 
framework that can help educators systematically identify constituent elements of white 
ignorance. As I said at the conclusion of the previous chapter, my goal isn’t to diagnose 
others; my goal is to provide a framework that can guide and coordinate education and 
ultimately self-reflection. 
Doxastic white ignorance principally involves ideas and beliefs—and, often, an 
absence of ideas and beliefs—concerning the world (i.e. phenomena, systems, social 
activities and arrangements), the self (i.e. one’s sense of identity) and one’s positionality (i.e. 
the relationship between self, world and others). More specifically, doxastic white ignorance 
typically appears as an ignorance of and about the way that racialized structuration organizes 
our shared world. Doxastic white ignorance manifests in three primary ways:  
1.  Incognizance, in which an individual does not notice, recognize or understand the 
ways in which race might structure a given context or situation.  
2.  Minimization, in which an individual is cognizant that race might be salient in a 
given context, but misapprehends or minimizes its import.  
3. Stereotypic narrativity, in which an individual recognizes the salience of race, but 
activates prominent narratives that contain stereotypes, which distort judgement 




This chapter is organized in three sections around these three dimensions. Drawing on 
a diverse body of literature, my goal is to describe and illustrate how these aspects of 
doxastic white ignorance tend to appear in the world. Note that many of the examples 
included in this chapter aim to identify paradigm cases. There are myriad other instances of 
doxastic white ignorance that are perhaps hazier and more difficult to specify. I’m hopeful 
that the general vocabulary and framework outlined here can help persons start to notice 
these more marginal, hazier instances.  
 
Section 1: Incognizance  
Incognizance is the most intuitive manifestation of ignorance. Incognizance is when 
one simply doesn’t know. For instance, I don’t know what you ate for dinner last night — 
I’m not cognizant of it. As it relates to white ignorance, specifically, instances of 
incognizance appear at moments when an individual sincerely doesn’t have the slightest idea 
that racial logics might be relevant or implicated in a given context. For example, imagine 
someone being introduced to the concept of “white privilege” for the first time. Prior to 
actively reflecting on the possibility of systematic racial advantage, we might say that the 
individual was sincerely ignorant of the idea that whites could be advantaged relative to 
nonwhites. 
Whites tend to be incognizant of the historical record, especially. Most whites do not 
know, for example, the history of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the reasons why it’s 
an unincorporated territory of the United States. Shannon Sullivan, in a provocative essay, 
concludes the reason she “know[s] so little about Puerto Rico” (2007, p. 57) is because of 
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extant larger patterns of ignorance among whites specifically as it relates to historical 
patterns of colonial oppression.  
Similarly, most whites do not know that Belgian officials, under the rule of King 
Leopold II, systematically murdered as many as 15 million people in what is known today as 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (Hochschild, 1999). Much of the ignorance owes to the 
Belgium government’s deliberate destruction of documents in the wake of the what some 
now call the “Congolese Holocaust.”   
In fact, patterns of white ignorance can often be traced to the deliberate destruction or 
obfuscation of the historical record by whites. Government officials in Tulsa, Oklahoma 
reportedly destroyed thousands of documents and records related to the so-called “Tulsa 
Race Riot.” Note that the popular naming convention alone serves to obfuscate the actual 
events. What happened in Tulsa was nothing less than white racial terrorism perpetrated by 
whites against blacks—not a “race riot.” In 1921, in the community of Greenwood (also 
known as “Black Wall Street”), a white mob rampaged through the town, burning down 
black businesses, murdering 40 people, injuring another 600 and leaving nearly 10,000 
homeless (Sulzberger, 2011). No whites were prosecuted after a brief “investigation” 
(Sulzberger, 2011). 
Similarly, the lack of official historical recording is a big reason why many whites 
only have a sketchy, incomplete account of American history, particularly as it relates to 
race. For example, because no anti-lynching laws were ever put on the books, zero whites in 
the 20th century were convicted of the crime. Yet, various sources document that more than 
4000 blacks were lynched between 1877 and 1950 (Robertson, 2015). The ghastly spectacle  
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often involved hundreds, if not thousands, of enthusiastic white onlookers. Yet, the American 
zeitgeist almost totally ignores—and indeed many simply do not know about—the horrifying 
extent of white racial terrorism that choked the country for nearly a century after the official 
end of state-sanctioned slavery.9  
Incognizance doesn’t just refer to patterns of ignorance about history, however. 
Indeed, whites are equally incognizant to the ways racial logics organize our contemporary 
world too. Most whites are not cognizant of how public policies, zoning and school 
districting can intensify the segregation and ghettoization of urban blacks (Erickson, 2016; 
Rothstein, 2018; Silver, 1997). They do not recognize how patterns of policing in black 
communities operate like an occupying military force—replete with gratuitous brutality—
rather than a partnership that aims to protect and serve (Butler, 2017).  They do not recognize 
how racial redlining is still practiced by banks, now called algorithm-based underwriting 
(Glantz and Martinez, 2018). They do not recognize how the mobility of capital continues to 
compound unemployment in black communities (White, 2018). They do not recognize that 
nonwhites are given 20% lengthier prison sentences than whites, for the same crimes 
(Schmitt, Reedt, & Blackwell, 2017). They do not recognize how court costs and fines for 
petty crime amplifies poverty in low-income mostly-black communities (United States 
Commission on Civil Rights Briefing Report, 2017). 
Importantly, they also don’t recognize how many black men graduate college, despite 
long odds and a society designed to make them fail. They also don’t recognize the outsized 
 
9 The near endless brutality inflicted on nonwhites in the history of the United States, usually by leveraging the 
mechanisms of the state, is almost never recounted in contemporary conversations about social justice and racial 
justice — even among liberals. And, in fact, stories and myths still prominently circulate, especially among 
conservatives, about the kind, gentle slaveowner, the noble Confederate, and how the Civil War could have 
been avoided if only people knew how to compromise (Coates, 2017). 
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cultural contribution of blacks relative to their population (blacks make up only a small 
portion of the total population, but are vastly overrepresented in esteemed music, art and 
literature). They also don’t recognize that there are far more black men in college than in 
prison (Desmond-Harris, 2015). They also don’t recognize that the majority of black fathers 
live with their children.10 
And finally, they tend not to recognize how their social position in this world is tied 
to their race. They tend not to recognize how their family wealth is tied to their race (Jones, 
2017). They tend not to recognize how the quality of their neighborhoods, schools, hospitals 
and parks is tied to their race (Wytsma, 2017). They tend not to recognize how their habits, 
attitudes, and behaviors are tied to their race (Leonardo, 2009; Sullivan, 2006). They tend not 
to recognize how second and third and fourth chances are extended to them, but not their 
nonwhite counterparts. They tend not to recognize how news programs describe black 
criminals as thuggish, but white criminals as mentally impaired (Wing, 2017). They tend not 
recognize that the federal response to the crack epidemic (drug use typically associated with 
blacks) primarily involved lengthening prison sentences, while the federal response to the 
opioid epidemic (drug use typically associated with whites) primarily involved earmarking 
billions for rehabilitation and mental health services. They tend not to recognize how whites 
are making billions of dollars dealing pot in Colorado and California, while young black kids 
in Louisiana are locked up for participating in the same industry.  
 
10 There is a pervasive belief among whites—but not only whites—that black fathers chronically abandon their 
children. The mistaken belief is partly a consequence of 2010 census data that reports 72% single-mothers in 
black households. But, this figure only indicates that mothers are unmarried, not that the father is absent. As 
Charles Blow writes: “While it is true that black parents are less likely to marry before a child is born, it is not 
true that black fathers suffer a pathology of neglect” (2015).   
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Ultimately, the full stock of patterned incognizance is so overwhelming it could fill 
multiple volumes.11 The extensive documentation across time and literature makes the 
following claim perhaps the least controversial in this project: White people—and not only 
white people—tend to be largely incognizant to the ways that race structures our world. Of 
course, incognizance comes by degree. As I outlined in the previous chapter, white ignorance 
presents unevenly across different persons and even appears differently at different moments 
within the same person. One can, for example, be incognizant to the very fact that racial 
advantage exists, or might simply be incognizant to the specific ways that racial advantage 
exists.  
To be sure, one cannot recognize or understand everything at once. The point is not to 
establish an unreasonably high normative standard for what one “ought” to know. In fact, the 
goal is not to set a standard at all. But if you’re an educator focused on racial and social 
justice, there are decisions to be made about what to teach, how much to teach, and when. 
The sheer scope of incognizance is something with which educators and education 
researchers should grapple. Why is this kind of doxastic white ignorance so pervasive? What 
role do schools play? What role should schools play? I don’t pretend to answer all these 





11 The brief catalog above doesn’t even touch on the patterned ignorance whites have surrounding Latinx, 
indigenous and other nonwhite communities. In fact, ignorance surrounding indigenous communities and 
nations is likely more extensive and more profound than white ignorance associated with other racial groups. 
I’ve focused here only on the characteristic white ignorance about black communities and white-black 
relationality—but there is so, so much more.  
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Section 2: Minimization 
The previous section explored patterns of incognizance to show that there are myriad 
aspects of reality that white people simplify don’t recognize, see or understand. However, 
that kind of ignorance—defined as a lack—is only one small part of the overall phenomenon. 
So much of what we mean by ignorance refers to assertions and judgements that stake a 
claim to reality. In other words, ignorance involves a kind incomplete knowledge. Even if 
only on a tacit level, whites have a lot of ideas about how race structures reality. Sometimes 
those ideas are inaccurate, sometimes erroneous, sometimes incomplete; sometimes those 
ideas do, in fact, approximate reality—other times they’re plainly weird.  
Because whites have so many ideas about how race and racism structure reality, Zeus 
Leonardo, Shannon Sullivan and others prefer to talk about “white racial knowledge” instead 
of ignorance. As I understand it, these scholars believe “ignorance” draws too much focus on 
incognizance (though they wouldn’t use this term) and doesn’t draw enough attention to the 
aspects of ignorance that involve positive formulations, concrete ideas and explicit 
assertions.  
Leonardo (2009), for example, notes that whites know very well what schools to 
attend, where to buy real estate, and where to socialize; they also know what things to say to 
make sure they sound like good and just white people (p. 71). He says they know where to go 
and what to say based on knowing where racial lines divide people socially and 
linguistically. Sullivan (2006), for her part, suggests that whites know very well what it 
means to act white and perform whiteness, that white people behave in specific ways because 
they’re keyed into social cues organized according to white normativity (p. 12). I understand 
both Leonardo and Sullivan to be saying that it’s analytically imprecise to talk exclusively 
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about “ignorance” per se because whites have a great deal of fluency around matters which 
involve race.  
In my view, this isn’t a conceptual disagreement, but merely terminological. If we 
agree that “ignorance” contains positive formulations about reality, which sometimes 
approximate reality with a high degree of fidelity, then we’re all on the same page. I prefer 
the term white ignorance because it helpfully captures the total constellation of epistemic 
practices that significantly impair cognitive and behavioral epistemic activity. But that 
doesn’t mean whites never get reality right. White ignorance doesn’t mean “always wrong in 
every context.” But it does mean that, on balance, patterns of ignorance increase the 
likelihood that whites will misapprehend relevant aspects of the world. This section about 
minimization and the following section about stereotypic narrativity key into patterns of 
doxastic white ignorance that involve positive formulations, and which some might prefer to 
call “white racial knowledge.”  
Minimization, the second kind of doxastic white ignorance, involves recognizing that 
racial logics might be relevant in a given context, but downplaying the salience of race.  In 
other words, where incognizance refers to sheer not knowing, minimization refers to 
incognizance about the extent or degree to which racial logics shape social systems or a 
given context.  Mills (2005) calls this phenomenon racial erasure, which he understands as 
“the retrospective whitening-out, whitewashing, of the racial past in order to contract an 
alternative narrative that severs the present from any legacy of racial domination. Racism as 
an idea . . . racial atrocity and racial exploitation, are collectively denied or at least causally 
minimized” (p. 220). Mills, in other words, applies the concept of racial erasure to patterns of 
collective forgetting, where such ideas function to create a picture in which past racism has 
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no bearing on the present. But racial erasure is not just applied to this kind of historical 
revisionism, it serves equally to explain our contemporary world too.   
For that reason, most scholarship has employed broader terminology. John Crowley 
(2016), for example, calls it “downplaying the salience of race” (p. 1024). I think this is 
probably the best way to capture what happens. Crowley’s study draws on interviews with 
teachers to better understand how white privilege can impact teachers’ “social imagination” 
(2016, p. 1024). He found that almost every teacher he interviewed “minimized the salience 
of race in structuring society or educational inequality” (2016, p. 1024). Rather than talk 
about race, participants in his study consistently invoked class or educational status to 
explain racial disparity. In other words, race was deliberately subordinated to alternate 
explanations.  
Other scholarship (Manross Guifoyle, 2015) connects minimization to “colorblind 
ideology,” suggesting that the latter “is a means by which societies choose to deal with racial 
differences by minimizing or dismissing the role of race whenever possible” (p. 42). As I 
describe later in the chapter, I believe colorblind ideology is a bit broader than minimization 
(and, indeed, even broader than white ignorance itself), so I don’t include an extended 
discussion of it in this section. But, I think it’s important to convey how and where the 
concept of minimization appears across the literature — so I mention it here.  
Segall and Garrett (2013) investigated how pre-service teachers in their classes 
interpreted a Spike Lee documentary about Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in New 
Orleans. The documentary, titled When the Levees Broke, makes a straightforward case that 
extant racial injustice exacerbated the severity of the damage (because black communities 
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were disproportionately in flood zones) and also explains the government’s shameful disaster 
response (white communities would have received a faster, more comprehensive response).    
Segall and Garret (2013) asked students questions about the documentary. Using 
discourse analysis, they identified a range of patterns in the students’ responses closely 
associated with white ignorance. Most prominently, they found: “Repetitive instances of 
participants initially recognizing race . . . but then diminish[ing] its relevance, clinging to 
other possible explanations, ones that better accommodate rather than challenge their already 
existing narrative frames about race relations in America” (2013, p. 279). Among other 
things, students openly rejected the working theory in the film. Many said that maybe “class” 
is more relevant. Others, like “Lynn,” had a different explanation:  
 
“But I don’t see it as a race or a class thing. Like I really don’t think that if all the rich 
 people had lived in the 9th district or whatever that the reaction would have been any 
 different … I don’t think the government was perfect in this situation, that’s not my 
 position. My belief is that it was just government ineptitude, it was not socially and 
 racially motivated. It was ineptitude” (2013, p. 278, emphasis added.).  
 
Lynn, in other words, believes that the aftermath of Katrina could be attributed 
simply to generic government ineptitude, and that race played no salient role. Similar to 
findings elsewhere, Segall and Garret (2013) document repeated efforts by participants to 
downplay the role race plays in shaping social phenomena.  
Lastly, Bonilla-Silva’s study, Racism without Racists (2006), contains an exhaustive 
and systematic account of minimization. The data for his study is drawn from hundreds of 
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interviews with social science students at a large midwestern university in the United 
States12. The interview questions aimed to elicit a conversation explicitly about race. Bonilla-
Silva and his assistants then coded and analyzed the responses. The analysis uncovered the 
various ways that participants actively downplayed the role of race even when directly asked 
how racism operates in the world.  
In one example cited in Bonilla-Silva’s (2006) study, the interviewer asks a white 
male student whether workplace discrimination is a problem in our society. The student 
replies: “I think there’s probably less [racial discrimination] than it used to be, but it still 
happens. It’s just in isolated places or, you know, happens in different places, but in most 
jobs, I think it probably doesn’t happen” (p.  44). In this instance the participant agrees that 
race structures the world — in particular, that racial discrimination exists — but emphasizes 
that it doesn’t happen regularly or often. In my view, this is a paradigmatic instance of the 
phenomenon: Agreement, followed by explicit minimization.  
Bonilla-Silva also documents how minimization can involve efforts by white people 
to actively resist what they perceive are exaggerated accounts of the role race plays in 
society. Many whites believe that when others invoke race, especially when nonwhite people 
invoke race, it’s merely an instance of exaggerating the existence of a problem. In other 
words, they perhaps agree that a problem exists, but the think the account is overblown. To 
counter perceived exaggeration, they downplay race. This is how one of the participants in 
Bonilla-Silva’s study expresses it:   
 
12 Bonilla-Silva’s sampling is worth highlighting. His study involves a kind of selection bias: Since all of the 
students in the study were enrolled in a social science course, we should expect that the participants were more 
likely (compared to a random sample) to be exposed to theoretical accounts of institutional racism.  In other 
words, college students are more likely, compared to the general population, to be exposed to descriptions of 
reality built on race-based analysis. Yet, despite greater exposure to race-based analyses of social phenomena, 
participants in Bonilla-Silva’s study still nevertheless exhibited patterns of white ignorance similar to what 




“I think if you are looking for discrimination, I think it’s there to be found. But if you 
make the best of any situation, and if you don’t use it as an excuse. I think sometimes 
it’s an excuse because people felt they deserved a job, whatever! I think if things 
didn’t go their way I know a lot of people have a tendency to use prejudice or racism 
or whatever as an excuse” (2006, p. 46).   
 
In this case, the study participant apparently believes that race is often invoked as an 
“excuse” for failure. In other words, minimization is activated at moments when individuals 
believe racial analyses are, in truth, excuse-making frameworks.  
Two common threads are worth highlighting. First, minimization characteristically 
relies, in part, on the notion that those who discuss race, or suggest that race might be 
relevant in a given context, are simply “looking for” it, and that you can find anything if you 
look hard enough. The implication is that those who elect to discuss race are the type of 
people who can “find race in anything” — so the antidote is to respond by minimizing the 
role of race. 
Secondly, minimization characteristically relies on a notion of historical progress 
(Segall & Garrett, 2013; Garrett & Segall, 2013). A common refrain is that, since racism isn’t 
as bad as it used to be, we shouldn’t discuss it so prominently. We should focus on how 
society has improved — not on how bad it is.  In such instances, people will point out the 
success of black Americans, especially former President Barack Obama. If some black 
people can be successful, they argue, racism probably isn’t a big deal like it once was.   
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At this point, I want to underline an important principle animating the analysis. I’m 
not trying to make a judgment about the underlying veracity or accuracy of the ideas 
expressed above. Of course, I have my own views about these formulations, but that’s not 
ultimately germane to the analysis. There are many reasons why it might be appropriate in 
some contexts to deemphasize race and elevate instead class, educational status, or something 
else. I don’t think that simply because you disagree with Spike Lee’s analysis of the storm 
tragedy that somehow you suffer from white ignorance.   
Sometimes economic analyses are warranted, sometimes other analytic frames are 
warranted. Most times using a rich combination of multiple frameworks is best. The point 
isn’t to adjudicate in each case what counts as the most “accurate analysis.” Instead the aim 
is to identify specific tendencies and patterns across the data in order to consider whether and 
to what extent these patterns can be traced to a larger phenomenon. If the evidence pointed to 
periodic minimization, then we should probably revisit the hypothesis. But in multiple 
studies across multiple disciplines the same patterns appear with unrelenting regularity.  
 
Section 3: Stereotypic narrativity  
Finally, stereotypic narrativity principally involves the meaning-making activity in 
which whites come to understand and make sense of reality. My analysis in this section 
follows Imani Perry (2011) who draws attention to the role of racial narrative in shaping 
those processes. Perry argues that narratives primarily serve an explanatory role—though the 
explanations are usually limited in important ways, “highlighting certain details and 
diminishing others” (2011, p.45). “The stories we hear,” she says, “channel our attention” to 
help simplify complex assessments and decision-making calculations (ibid.).  
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The idea of “channeling attention” nicely captures what happens. Stereotypic 
narratives serve to constrain and distort the interpretive possibilities available to us. In other 
words, they limit our interpretive vista, significantly increasing the likelihood we miss or 
ignore salient features of reality. Perry prefers the term “stereotypic narrativity” because 
although narratives are larger than stereotypes (which tend to be cruder, more totalizing and 
easily dismissed), they give birth to stereotypes and provide the fertile ground out of which 
stereotypes can flourish (2011, p. 46). 
In addition to channeling attention in specific ways, stereotypic narratives also 
generate discrete ideas that literally just pop into one’s head. Racialized narratives operate 
subconsciously in the background poised to prefabricate judgements at any moment. In other 
words, these narratives accelerate and fix the conclusions one may draw based on 
observations. I can personally attest to this reality: Whether I’m watching a show on TV or 
walking down the street, randomly and without any conscious deliberation, plainly racist 
judgements will organize thoughts in my mind. Owing to social habituation, these narratives 
are inescapable and function to inflict racist ideas onto one’s brain. The experience is 
automatic and incessant—I might see a black homeless man begging, and wham: Racist 
judgement pops into my consciousness. At this point, I can readily recognize that it happens, 
predict when it is likely to happen, then quickly recalibrate my judgement in light of that 
reflection.13 But that’s not the case for everyone. And I think this is an important thing to call 
out. Racist ideas do not necessarily reflect intentionality.  In fact, it’s much more productive 
to recognize that racist ideas are an effect of much broader, nonindividual patterns of social 
 
13 I have much more to say about this in Chapter 6, where I suggest the priority aim of education designed to 




and cultural activity—which often are mediated by and coalesce into patterns of stereotypic 
narrativity.     
Together, this constellation of narratives tends to culminate in a set of beliefs which 
hold that racial disparity is best explained by assigning blame and responsibility onto the 
racial group in question.14 Although the substance and character of these beliefs change over 
time (Kendi, 2016), they always function to explain instances of racial disparity by producing 
the judgement that there is something wrong with nonwhite groups. Focus is placed on the 
groups in question and never on the organizing racial logics that shape our world. Many 
consequently hold the view that the United States is basically a race-neutral meritocracy, 
nonwhite citizens are largely responsible for extant social inequality, and race and racism no 
longer play decisive causal roles in the modern world (Alcoff, 2015). Like patterns of 
minimization, stereotypic narratives are well documented across an array of studies, in 
different times and geographies. Understanding those patterns can help us recognize how and 
to what extent these narratives inform the way whites think about reality.  
Based on my review of the empirical research, stereotypic narrativity tends to 
circulate around three primary frames: (1) Naturalization, (2) White Disadvantage (3) 
Culturalism. Of course, there are others of infinite variety, but these three seem to appear 




14 By racial disparity, I mean instances in which measured indicators by racial group don’t match population 
proportion. For example, if blacks and African Americans constitute roughly 13 percent (2010 census data) of 
the population, we should expect blacks to comprise around 13 percent of the doctors in the United States, hold 
13 percent of the total wealth, and constitute 13 percent of prison population. If those respective numbers do not 
roughly match the population proportion (which they do not), then there is racial disparity. Of course, we don’t 
need these proportions to match exactly. Even plus or minus, say, 15 percent might be acceptable. But when 




Naturalization is a narrative frame identified in Bonilla-Silva’s (2006) work, which 
leads whites to “explain away racial phenomena by suggesting they are natural occurrences” 
(2006, p. 28). In other words, naturalization is a type of narrative that attributes extant 
conditions of white racial domination to natural causes instead of contingent socio-historical 
processes of racialized structuration.  
 Historically, naturalization has taken decidedly perverse forms. As Darby and Rury 
meticulously document in The Color of Mind (2018), the modern world was shaped in large 
part by sorting races according to perceived natural intellectual ability. Phrenology and IQ 
testing, in particular, served to “validate” various kind of more insidious categorization 
(2018, p. 35). And this is not a mere relic of the past. Today, so-called public intellectuals 
like Charles Murray are still peddling similar accounts. His books, The Bell Curve 
(Herrnstein & Murray 1996) and Real Education (2009), each advance the argument that the 
observed racial achievement gap owes its existence, at least in part, to differences in natural 
intellectual ability. 
 Bonilla-Silva’s research (2006) indicates that naturalization is most likely to appear 
when people discuss extant patterns of racial segregation or when prompted to explain their 
preference for a partner of the same race. Whites will often appeal to the idea that people of a 
given race naturally prefer to associate with people of the same race (2006, p. 53). Like is 
attracted to like, they say. Here’s one paradigmatic example in Bonilla-Silva’s study. “Sara,” 




Hmm, I don’t really think it’s a segregation. I mean, I think people, you know, spend 
time with people that they are like, not necessarily in color, but you know, their ideas 
and values and, you know, maybe their class has something to do with what they’re 
used to. But I don’t really think it’s a segregation. I don’t think I would have trouble, 
you know, approaching someone of a different race or color. I don’t think it’s a 
problem. It’s just that the people that I do hang out with are just the people that I’m 
with all the time. They’re in my organizations and stuff like that (2006, p. 71). 
 
To understand how this stereotypic frame narrows Sara’s attention, I want to contrast 
Sara’s account with a similar kind of argument that, at first blush, appears to follow the same 
track. In a popular book titled, Why are All the Back Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria 
(2017), Beverly Tatum argues that lunchroom segregation is a consequence of the fact that 
persons who share similar experiences naturally tend to gravitate toward one another. In 
other words, Tatum argues that people naturally want to associate with those who share 
similar experiences. Since black children tend to share similar experiences, she argues, they 
tend to gravitate toward one another in social settings. The same is true of white children and 
other races, as well.  
 Although Tatum’s argument appears to track the naturalization arguments Bonilla-
Silva documents in his study (like Sara’s above), the two arguments ultimately depart in 
significant ways. Most notably, Tatum recognizes that racial logics create conditions that 
lead white children and nonwhite children to experience the world very differently. Tatum’s 
account in this respect includes an assessment of the way that racial logics organize a given 
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context, whereas the naturalization narratives that Bonilla-Silva reveal in his study contain no 
such broader assessment.  
Tatum’s account follows this path: Racial logics generate conditions of white racial 
domination → conditions of white racial domination create a unique African American 
experience → African Americans therefore tend to associate with others who share the 
experience unique to African Americans. 
Contrast that with a naturalization account like Sara’s above: People like to associate 
with people similar to them → black people are similar to black people → black people like 
to associate with black people and that’s why there’s segregation. The naturalization account 
omits assessment of the way that racial logics organize the broader context. The account is 
simplified to the degree that it corrupts the consequent judgment. Narratives, as it relates to 
white ignorance, almost always fails to adequately account for the way race shapes a given 
context. 
 
White disadvantage  
A second prominent stereotypic narrative promotes the view that whites, on balance, 
are subject to racial disadvantage vis-à-vis nonwhites. The story whites tell involves a 
historical narrative which describes how nonwhites have been so consistently favored by 
political and economic institutions that today nonwhite Americans enjoy distinct racial 
privilege. In fact, perceived white racial disadvantage is so pervasive that it’s now 
fashionable for some commentators to talk about explicitly about “black privilege.” Recent 
essays and books carry titles like:  
• “It’s past time to acknowledge black privilege” (Levinson, 2015)  
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• “Why white people seek black privilege” (Shapiro, 2015)  
• Black skin privilege and the American Dream (Horowitz and Perazzo, 2013).   
Importantly, these ideas aren’t relegated to the fringe. I’m not citing extremist white 
supremacist corners of the internet like StormFront.com or 4Chan/pol/. I’m citing 
comparatively mainstream voices. And these narrative patterns are not new.  
In a sweeping history of the civil rights movement in the south, historian Jason Sokol 
documents how many whites in the 1960s and 1970s viewed civil rights achievements as 
threatening to white freedom. He argues that, in part, this interpretation was a vestige of how 
whites’ sense of liberty had long been tied up with African American bondage (2008, p. 37). 
White liberty was only possible because it existed alongside slavery. But even long after 
slavery had ended, there was another sense in which advances toward racial equality were 
viewed as directly targeting white freedom to conduct the white way of life. Because of the 
need to preserve, as George Wallace said, “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, 
segregation forever,” many whites interpreted the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act as raced-based initiatives designed to discriminate against whites. In other words, 
many whites at the time believed that the very laws and policies designed to expand civil 
rights to black Americans actually served to erode civil rights for white people.  
Like other stereotypic narratives, narratives of white disadvantage are limiting 
because they similarly omit crucial context. For example, whites may have legitimate 
concerns about discrimination related to affirmative action. Many whites will invoke “reverse 
racism” when they believe they’re being unfairly discriminated against on the basis of race. 
However, the narrative frame then incites them to extrapolate outward and conclude they 
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suffer from racial discrimination in myriad contexts in which affirmative action is totally 
absent.  
A 2016 survey by Huffington Post and YouGov found that Trump voters (and the 
majority of registered Republicans) believe that whites represent the group most likely to be 
discriminated against in the United States: 45% say whites are discriminated against, while 
only 22% believe blacks are discriminated against. The perceived discrimination makes it 
much harder, they believe, for whites, compared to nonwhites, to access good colleges, get 
good jobs and achieve economic security.  
Whites also believe, for example, that they’re at a disadvantage when it comes to 
public assistance programs. Among other things, whites believe that government assistance 
programs are designed to favor nonwhite people (they’re not) and that between free 
healthcare, cash assistance, nutrition assistance and housing aid, nonwhite Americans have it 
much better than white Americans. Some of these ideas are traceable to the trope of the 
“welfare queen,” a caricature of black women where, it is alleged, they deliberately have lots 
of children in order to get even richer on government money.15 
Notions of white disadvantage surface especially at moments when whites encounter 
political resistance — they interpret it as a threat. The rise of the Black Lives Matter 
movement, for example, incited intense backlash. BLM organized protests across the country 
to resist police brutality and condemn our criminal justice system because it doesn’t value 
black lives as much as white lives. In the wake of these protests, many whites said that BLM 
 
15 More recently, a similar kind of trope called the “Obama Phone” prominently circulated in conservative 
circles throughout the 2010s. Obama Phones, white people say, are free smartphones handed out mostly to 
black people who are on welfare.  The claim is that black Americans have it so good they’re even getting free 
phones now. Whites, they argue, are at a disadvantage because they have to actually work for their phones — 
and, at the same time, pay for Obama Phones too! 
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was a form of “white bashing,” alleging that participants in the movement hated white people 
simply for being white. Some even claim that Black Lives Matter is pushing an “anti-white 
agenda” and conducting “war on whites” (Ingraham and Long, 2017).  In short, white people 
tend to interpret efforts to advance racial equality as measures that in fact socially 
disadvantage whites.  
 
Culturalism 
In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson’s Assistant Secretary of Labor, Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, drafted a report about black urban poverty titled, ‘‘The Negro Family: The Case 
for National Action.” Known colloquially as “The Moynihan Report,” the primary objective 
of the paper was to build coalitions that could help provide more and better jobs in black 
urban areas. The legacy of the report, however, generated profoundly different consequences.  
Moynihan is widely credited with introducing the ‘‘culture of poverty’’ into the 
American zeitgeist. Though the word ‘‘culture’’ never once appears in the report, Moynihan 
references the ‘‘deterioration’’ of the black family as well as the ‘‘tangle of pathology’’ 
reverberating throughout black urban areas. The tangle of pathology represents an especially 
insidious concept because it points to a perceived culture common in black communities—a 
culture marked by laziness, indolence, shiftlessness and a general lack of ambition. Black 
culture, in this respect, is widely viewed as a primary cause of extent patterns of social and 
economic inequality that tracks racial lines. In plain terms, many white people believe that 
racial inequality exists because black people are lazy. And similar assessments are applied to 
a host of nonwhite groups.    
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Bonilla-Silva (2006) refers to these and similar ideas as “cultural racism,” which he 
says is “very well established in the United States” (p 40). Cultural racism has, over time, 
come to replace ideas about biological inferiority. Historically, white people believed that 
nonwhites had intellectual and behavioral deficiencies, traceable to genetic heritage. Today, 
however, white people tend to talk about cultural deficiencies that emphasize group-based 
moral failure. The consequence is the same. As Bonilla-Silva writes, whites “may no longer 
believe Africans, Arabs, Asians, Indians or blacks from the West Indies are biologically 
inferior, but they assail them for their presumed lack of hygiene, family disorganization, and 
lack of morality” (p. 40).  
As I have written elsewhere (Buck, 2014), most of the talk about bad culture centers 
on the family—and bad parenting, in particular. The racial achievement gap, for instance, is 
often explained by arguing that black parents don’t value education and therefore don’t instill 
a sense in their children that school is important (Perry, Steele, & Hilliard, 2003). Others 
allege that irresponsible parenting fails to instill the values of hard work. Parents, they say, 
actually encourage children to prefer living off of public assistance. Still others suggest that 
criminality is prevalent in black communities principally because black parents don’t 
discipline their children.  
As I mentioned above, stereotypic narratives tend to advance the notion that there is 
something wrong with nonwhite groups and racial disparity is best explained by assigning 
blame and responsibility onto the racial group in question. This is never more apparent than 
when white people start talking about culture. As Bonilla-Silva (2006) persuasively argues, 
the essence of culturalism is ‘‘‘blaming the victim,’ arguing that minorities’ standing is a 
product of their lack of effort, loose family organization, and inappropriate values” (p. 26). 
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At its most basic, culturalism provides an elaborate narrative to frame a most simple claim: 
There is something wrong with nonwhite people.  
 
Conclusion 
None of these elements of doxastic white ignorance operate independently or in 
isolation. That’s why it’s crucial to pay attention to the way in which the entire constellation 
of incognizance, minimization and stereotypic narrativity works together to produce 
erroneous, limited, incomplete or plainly wrong judgements about how race shapes our world 
and the relations in it. Doxastic white ignorance can appear in very different ways depending 
on the context. Sometimes, when invited to discuss how processes of racialized structuration 
organize our world, white persons will take pains to minimize the role of race. Other times, 
however, they’re very much inclined to emphasize the role of race, like when they want to 
allege that white people are subject to social disadvantage or when they want to allege that 
there is something wrong with black culture. In those moments, whites search for race-based 
analyses.  
My view is that most of this is unconscious and pre-reflective. In my experience, 
erroneous ideas about race and racism literally just pop into my head. I don’t call them up, I 
don’t ruminate or anything or invite analysis. It’s as if they’re already there. The white 
experience is one of being constantly inundated with unexpected racist ideas, which I think is 
directly a consequence of these various aspects of doxastic white ignorance. Doxastic white 
ignorance is so integral to being in a world organized by white supremacy, it’s here whether I 
want it to be or not. When you live in a white supremacist system, when these narratives and 
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ideas and patterns of thinking are socialized since birth, it’s impossible to escape the onrush 
of doxastic white ignorance.  
The point here isn’t to excuse away white responsibility. Just the opposite. As I argue 
in subsequent chapters, the framework outlined in this project is designed to help people 
become alert to the ways in which patterns of white ignorance influence and generate ideas 
associated with white ignorance. It’s true that I can’t control the ideas that pop into my head. 
But I can control how I react to those ideas and their influence on my judgement.    
 
Doxastic White Ignorance 





Does not notice or see the ways in which 
race structures a given context. 
 
 
• Historical ignorance 
• Contemporary 
ignorance 
• Identity ignorance 




Sees that race might be salient in a given 
context, but misapprehends or minimizes 
the salience of race. 
 
 
• Seeks alternate 
explanations for racial 
injustice 
• Resists perceived 






Recognizes the salience of race, but holds 
erroneous and false conceptions of how race 









Chapter Three  
Active White Ignorance 
 
Ignorance isn’t only about beliefs (or the absence of true belief). It’s not simply about 
how people hold incorrect or wrong ideas about the world and how it works. In a crucial 
sense, ignorance also involves a specific way of orienting oneself to the world that blocks the 
acquisition of true belief or severely impairs the capacity to correct erroneous belief. In plain 
terms: Ignorance isn’t just being dumb, it’s acting in ways that keep you dumb. And, in fact, 
when we see someone who maybe holds erroneous beliefs, but takes active measures to 
remedy that false belief, not only do we not call them ignorant, we say that they display a 
certain kind of epistemic virtue.  
White ignorance works the same way. The problem with white ignorance — and why 
it’s in some ways so intractable — is that erroneous ideas are generally protected by what’s 
called “active white ignorance.” Active white ignorance refers to patterns of speech and 
patterns of behavior that function to insulate one from reflecting on, interrogating, revising, 
or correcting false beliefs about how racial structuration operates in the world. In addition, 
active white ignorance also prevents one from learning about and acquiring accurate ideas 
about how race structures the world. In short, active white ignorance enables people to 
preserve, undisturbed, the ignorant ways that they already think about race in the world.  
 The scholarship tends to refer this component of white ignorance as “active 
ignorance” (Code, 2007; Medina, 2013) to capture the idea that persons actively raise 
defenses to shield themselves against alternative points of view. Jose Medina has developed 
what I think is probably the most systematic account of the phenomenon, describing it 
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alternately as a kind of “insensitivity,” “numbness,” or “blindness” (2013). In a paper with 
Jeff Edmonds, they define active ignorance this way:  
 
Active ignorance takes the form of insensitivity, a kind of numbness that affectively 
positions the learner with respect to certain phenomena and issues, acting as a shield 
against stimulations to question certain assumptions or to learn more about certain 
things. This numbness involves communicative dysfunctions such as difficulties in 
listening to certain considerations or in taking those considerations seriously, 
difficulties in seeing oneself affected by those considerations or in being moved to 
respond to them (Edmonds and Medina, 2015, p. 35).  
 
In a similar vein, Robin DiAngelo’s popular research on “white fragility” (2011; 
2017) describes many elements of active white ignorance, but situates the concept in a 
broader psychosocial—rather than purely epistemic—framework. “White Fragility,” she 
says, “is a state in which even a minimum amount of racial stress becomes intolerable, 
triggering a range of defensive moves. These moves include the outward display of emotions 
such as anger, fear, and guilt, and behaviors such as argumentation, silence, and leaving the 
stress-inducing situation” (DiAngelo, 2011, p. 57). In DiAngelo’s lights, patterns of behavior 
and speech serve to reinstate “racial equilibrium,” which means preserving a sense of white 
objectivity, authority, centrality and dominance (ibid.).  
In this chapter, I discuss both types of active white ignorance: Patterns of speech and 
patterns of behavior. The chapter is divided into two sections, tracking these two dimensions. 
As with the previous chapter, the purpose here is to sketch general patterns that are observed 
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across the empirical literature. The reason it’s useful to take this approach is because, as 
Barbara Applebaum persuasively argues, the rhetoric and behaviors we associate with active 
white ignorance are “socially sanctioned” and even “endorsed as common ways of thinking 
about diversity” (2015, p. 452). In other words, persons are socially habituated into enacting 
particular kinds of responses.  
Hytten and Warren (2003) similarly underscore that these practices are “not original 
— that is, they are already available, already common forms” (p. 66) of confronting racial 
reality. In many cases, instances of white ignorance represent much broader patterns that 
draw on an existing constellation of available social, linguistic and behavioral resources. It’s 
imperative, therefore, to document and make sense of how and in what ways the sum stock of 
socially sanctioned responses can shape the way whites approach race in the world.  
 
Section 1: Discourse-based active white ignorance  
The patterns of speech associated with active white ignorance characteristically 
involve discursive strategies, which function to halt engagement with new data points or new 
perspectives that might disrupt previously held ideas. On this front, Applebaum’s recent 
work is especially illuminating. She defines discourse as a type of talk that carries a social 
meaning, and therefore performs a social function, independent of the meaning that is 
otherwise implied in the semantic construction (2016, p. 2). In other words, as Applebaum 
argues, discourse is a type of expression that actively performs something in a social matrix, 
and the performative dimensions operate irrespective of the veracity of the utterance itself.  
So, for example, Applebaum says that when white people reply that “all lives matter” 
to voices claiming that “black lives matter,” the statement itself is true enough — all lives do, 
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in fact, matter. But in the context of the dialogue, in which “all lives matter” is positioned, 
specifically, as a rebuttal to “black lives matter,” the term carries a performative meaning in 
addition to whatever truth is contained in the underlying claim (2016, p. 3). In her view, the 
performance functions to elevate the moral superiority of the speaker, which serves to silence 
or diminish the claims made by nonwhite voices, washing them out in a banal reply that is 
beside the point.  
Like DiAngelo, Applebaum is interested in the psychosocial dimensions of 
performative speech. By contrast, I’m specifically focused on the way that this discourse 
operates to shut down the dialogue. In this case it serves to convey: I’m a good person and I 
don’t want to hear any more about it. In other words, discourse can contain nuggets of truth 
and accuracy, the function of which isn’t to describe reality, but rather to sever the dialogue 
in order to create conditions in which the interlocutor no longer needs to consider whatever 
counter-position is being expressed. 
Other scholarship has homed in on similar ideas. For example, Kathy Hytten and 
John Warren (2003) document how teachers employ “culturally-sanctioned discursive 
practices” in order to “[resist] critical engagements with whiteness” (p. 65). Alice McIntyre 
(1997), for her part, coined the term “white talk” (p. 29) to identify the same phenomenon. 
White talk, she argues, “serves to insulate white people from examining our individual and 
collective roles in the perpetuation of racism” (McIntyre, 1997, p. 30). Following McIntrye, 
Alison Bailey (2015) applies the concept a bit more broadly when she defines white talk as 
the “lingua franca of race talk among white folks” (p. 38). Bailey argues that white talk is 
deployed in order to “derail conversations on race, to dismiss counterarguments, to retreat 
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into silence, to interrupt speakers and topics, and to collude with other whites” (2015, p. 39) 
— to basically do anything to avoid talking about race.  
I want to underline that this section focuses on the function of discourse rather than 
the purpose. It’s not clear to me that people deploy these discursive strategies deliberately in 
order to achieve a specific aim. Most of what goes on is tacit and nondeliberate — the 
speaker is in most cases unaware of the ways in which they deploy discourse. As Bailey 
(2013) writes, white talk “usually springs from our lips without notice” (p. 39). In other 
words, discourse, as it relates to the preservation of ideas-based white ignorance, operates at 
a pre-reflective level, enacted more by habit, convention and routine rather than deliberate 
design.  
In addition, focusing on the function of discourse helps us distinguish between 
instances of discourse and instances of doxastic white ignorance. With respect to ideas-based 
white ignorance, the analysis seeks to uncover whether a given assertion is erroneous or not. 
By contrast, with respect to discourse associated with white ignorance, the veracity of a given 
assertion isn’t part of the analysis—we’re only interested in the function of the assertion.16  
Based on the extant literature, I’ve identified the three most common variants of 
discourse associated with white ignorance: (1) The discourse of moral innocence, (2) the 
discourse of colorblindness and (3) the discourse of evasion. The sections that follow explore 




16 Note that sometimes a given assertion can play double duty: It might be an instance of ideas-based white 
ignorance and at the same time an instance of discourse associated with white ignorance. Allegations of reverse 




Discourse of moral innocence  
The discourse of moral innocence refers to patterns of speech that function to position 
white people as morally innocent and not implicated in systems of white racial domination. 
Bailey’s recent paper titled, “‘White Talk’ As a Barrier to Understanding Whiteness” (2015) 
contains a vivid illustration of what this kind of discourse sounds like — so I want to start 
this section with her essay. Her illustration is based on conversations she’s had with students 
over the years in college philosophy courses that explore race and whiteness. This is her 
reconstruction of the discourse of moral innocence: 
 
“I’m a good person. I’m not prejudiced. My ancestors never owned slaves. Anyway, 
that  was a long time ago. I’m not responsible for the Indian Removal Act, Japanese 
internment, or the Black Codes. I wasn’t even born yet. Yes, I know America has a 
history of racism and genocide, but our nation has come a long way. And, you can’t 
dwell on the tragedies of U.S. history—that was in the past. Things are much better 
now. And, anyway, I’m not the problem—it’s only racists that are the problem. I’m 
not like my bigoted father. I don’t care if you’re black, red, or yellow with polka dots, 
everyone should be treated equally. The problem is that some people don’t treat 
others equally. It’s really not a white problem; I didn’t choose to be born white. 
Anyway, I have black friends. I regularly contribute to the Dolores Huerta 
Foundation. My church does charity work in the Chicago barrios. I’m from a poor 
white family. We suffered too, and you don’t hear us complaining. The problem is 
that people of color make everything about race. I don’t think of you as black. Right, I 
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understand the problem; I’ve read James Baldwin and bell hooks. I’m a lesbian, so I 
know what it feels like to be oppressed. I feel so awful about my whiteness. I don’t 
think of myself as white. I’m Irish, Dutch, and German. I’ve always felt as if I were an 
Indian in another life. It’s not like I’m a member  of the Aryan Nation or some 
Arizona militia group or something.  You can trust me! I’m on your side. I’m open-
minded, fair, supportive, and empathetic. My heart is in the right place. I mean well. 
I’m innocent. I’m good! I’m a good white person. It’s all good. There is no problem 
here” (2015, pp. 37-38; emphasis in the original). 
 
Bailey explains that these kinds of assertions are typically the first thing out of her 
students’ mouths when challenged to interrogate the relationship between white privilege and 
institutional racism. Rather than confront the classroom subject matter, rather than 
interrogate how they’re implicated in systems of white racial domination, she says that her 
students deploy these discursive strategies to close themselves off, check out and 
disassociate. Bailey says, further, that such discourse enables whites to “flutter” or “float” 
above on the “surface of things.” They never dive in and deal with race in a substantive way. 
As she writes, “we flutter when we look for detours, distract ourselves, and pull into our 
bodies. . .  We flutter to avoid hearing people of color’s histories, experiences and 
testimonies” (p. 43). The clear function of discourse in this context is to establish oneself as 
one-who-is-not-guilty and therefore foreclose in advance the possibility that perhaps one is 
bound up in systems of injustice. Through the magic of discourse, students can insulate 
themselves from reflecting on their position in the world, and thus preserve what I call above 
ideas-based white ignorance.  
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Applebaum’s most prominent work, Being White, Being Good (2010) explores the 
discourse of innocence from a slightly different angle. Her research documents the ways in 
which assertions of moral white innocence serve to reinscribe whiteness in social spaces, thus 
helping to nourish systems of racial oppression (where whites are historically viewed as 
“good whites” and those with dark skin are historically viewed as “suspicious” or 
“criminal”). Applebaum draws on Sara Ahmed’s (2007 & 2004) research to show how even 
when students say things like “I am complicit” or “I am racist,” what the discourse, in fact, 
functions to do is position them as not complicit and not racist. Applebaum (2016) uses the 
example of one who proudly claims to be a humble person (p. 4) — what they’re really 
saying is that they’re not humble at all. It’s a somewhat a confusing conceptual arrangement, 
but it goes something like this: I am one of the good whites because I know I am a racist.    
Applebaum’s concern isn’t so much that the discourse of moral innocence functions 
to preserve ignorance, but that it reinforces extant systems of oppression. Importantly, 
however, when she tries to convey this idea to her students, when she tries to explain that 
their protests of innocence serve to reinforce the very systems of oppression that they claim 
to oppose, she says they tend to double down on the discourse of moral innocence, not 
necessarily by asserting their innocence directly, but by citing their motives. In other words, 
she says that when she invites her students to reflect on the operation of the discourse of 
innocence, they insulate themselves further by appealing to the purity of their intentions 
(Applebaum, 2008 & 2010). Instead of being innocent whites, their discourse reframes them 
as “well-meaning” whites. But, ultimately, the function is the same. Even if their actions 
aren’t good, their intentions are good—and so they are still “good whites.”  
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Finally, what’s interesting about the discourse of moral innocence is that those who 
deploy it are not necessarily disinclined to discuss race and racism. As Robin DiAngelo 
(2012a) documents, commonly the discourse of innocence manifests at moments when 
whites highlight the ways other whites are racist and then contrast themselves with those 
other racists. For example, many white college students will describe how their parents or 
neighbors are bigoted, but how they’re not (DiAngelo, 2012a, p. 177). In this respect, the 
discourse of innocence enables the person to discuss race and racism in the world and in 
others while at the same time insulating them from interrogating their own role in systems of 
racial oppression.  
In every case, positioning oneself as a morally innocent white person means they no 
longer must consider the alternative—they no longer have to consider how and in what 
respect they might be complicit in systems of racial injustice. The discourse of moral 
innocence is a powerful way to halt inquiry and reflection.   
 
Discourse of colorblindness 
Next, the discourse of colorblindness refers to discursive practices that deliberately 
choose not to use explicitly racialized language. Mica Pollack (2009) calls this discourse 
“colormuteness” (p. 7), where speakers “de-race” their language to avoid talking directly 
about race. The “muteness” in her conception refers to the way deracialized language has a 
silencing effect as it functions to ensure the individual need not confront race in any 
sustained or overt way.  
The discourse of colorblindness has generated an immense body of scholarship in the 
last three decades. Initially, colorblindness was analyzed by critical race theorists (Delgado & 
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Stefancic, 2017), as legal scholars sought to understand how institutions of government 
navigate the twin challenges of the United States Constitution: Ensuring racial equality and at 
the same time ensuring that the government does not discriminate on the basis of race. 
Scholars wondered whether it was possible to advance racial equality if the government 
remained “colorblind.” In this space the analysis focuses mostly on policies and also the 
espoused justification for those policies.   
More recently, social scientists have documented the ways whites employ specifically 
coded language in order to talk about race while not explicitly talking about race. Like de-
racing, we might call this race-replacing language. White people may, for example, talk 
about geography or neighborhood instead of overtly referencing specific racial groups 
(Castagno, 2014, p. 68). In other cases, they might talk about ethnicity or perceived 
nationality instead of race (Castagno, 2014, p. 71).  
In education, researchers have shown how teachers and administrators employ terms 
like “urban,” “at-risk” or “disadvantaged” to refer, typically, to black students (Anyon, 2007, 
p. 14). In many cases teachers are far more likely to discuss cultural patterns, but not racial 
patterns. Pollack’s (2008) study of a school district in southern California documented how 
district representatives and policymakers often deleted race words from their public 
achievement talks, burying any mention of existing racial achievement patterns (see also: 
Noguera, 1995; Takagi, 1992). Paradoxically, she writes “the question Americans ask most 
about race in education—how and why do different ‘race groups’ achieve differently?—is 
the very question we most suppress” (Pollack, 2008, p. 10). In each case, the discourse of 
colorblindness serves to insulate whites from interrogating and considering how and to what 
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extent race shapes our shared world. We can’t understand the racial achievement gap if we 
refuse to talk about it.  
The discourse of colorblindness is sometimes related to the discourse of moral 
innocence because it can be similarly activated to position the speaker as a “good white.” 
Colorblindness in this context follows from the idea that it is inappropriate to discuss race. 
We might, therefore, refer to this expression as “normative colorblindness.” White people 
allege that one shouldn’t mention another’s race because we should live up to Martin Luther 
King Jr’s ideal of judging people only by the content of the character and not the color of 
their skin. So, they interpret MLK’s words to mean that talking about race is a bad thing. In 
cases where such whites are invited to discuss race, they may reply that they “don’t see 
color” and that they “only see the individual.” 
Normative colorblindness is present across the political spectrum. Liberals, for their 
part, sometimes engage in what some scholars have called the politics of “politeness” 
(Castagno, 2014; Yoon, 2012), whereby whites believe it is valuable to avoid talking about 
race in order to minimize or alleviate perceived racial tensions. The idea is that “good” 
whites, or enlightened whites, are “beyond” race, and don’t even see color at all. Elizabeth 
Anderson (2010) theorizes that politeness is a consequence of the fact that many whites 
believe that talking about race involves treading a minefield, so to speak, in that anything 
they say makes them vulnerable to accusations of political incorrectness or, worse, racism (p. 
55). To avoid such troubles, liberal whites may counsel one another to simply avoid talking 
about race in the first place.  DiAngelo (2018), for her part, suggests the normative 




Among conservatives, normative colorblindness can be especially passionate. Some 
conservatives believe that noticing race or discussing race at all is evidence of racial animus, 
and therefore believe even the mere mention of race is, on its face, racist. The real racists, 
they say, are those who see race everywhere and in everything. And they have terms for such 
people, too. People who discuss race are, among other things, “race-baiters,” they “play the 
race card,” and they traffic in “identity politics.” As Bonilla-Silva (2006) argues, normative 
colorblindness prima facie assumes a race-neutral context in order to allege that race is being 
brought into a context in which it doesn’t belong. At the extreme, normative colorblindness 
stigmatizes — and subsequently resists — every attempt to invoke race. Pundits have, for 
instance, called Black Lives Matter activists the real racists because they try to make 
everything about race.  
The discourse of colorblindness operates to preserve white ignorance because it 
prevents people from naming fundamental aspects of reality. White people can’t alleviate 
obliviousness if they refuse to talk about race. White people can’t correct error if they refuse 
to talk about race. In every case, the discourse of colorblindness helps protect various 
dimensions of white ignorance because it prevents head-on confrontation with the problem.   
 
Discourse of evasion 
The final type of discourse I want to discuss is called the discourse of evasion. The 
discourse of evasion is designed to, literally, change the subject to something other than race. 
Here’s an illustration of how the discourse of evasion operates: As I write (in the fall of 
2017), the President of the United States is continuing his ongoing attack of mostly black 
NFL football players who protest — or raise awareness about — racial injustice by kneeling 
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during the national anthem before the games. It started a few years prior, in 2015, when then-
San Francisco 49ers quarterback, Colin Kaepernick, declined to stand for the national 
anthem. Later, he said that he wanted to draw attention to the mistreatment of blacks in 
America, saying our country doesn’t live up to the ideals that the flag represents. Notably, 
instead of considering why Kaepernick was protesting, opponents chose instead to focus on 
how he was protesting. They said it is unAmerican to stay seated for the national anthem; 
they said he doesn’t respect our troops. The conversation, thus, shifted. Now, when players 
remain kneeling for the national anthem, the conversation tends to center on patriotism, the 
military and respect for the flag. The conversation rarely turns to the realities of racial 
injustice. 
In other cases, the discourse of evasion diverts attention from the subject of race onto 
the character of the people talking about race. Conservatives, for instance, allege that the 
only reason liberals talk about race is so that they can attract the minority vote and justify 
expanding the size and scope of government welfare programs. In this respect, the discourse 
of evasion enables them to change the subject from racial injustice to allegations that liberals 
are just self-serving politicians who want to consolidate power. More insidiously, some 
allege that those who talk about race are “grievance peddlers” or titans in a “grievance 
industry” (O’Reilly, 2014). Since the 1970s, Jessie Jackson has been a favorite target of 
conservatives because, they say, Jackson only talks about race because it’s profitable—a tool 






Discourses operate in concert: An illustration 
One of the reasons the thesis of white ignorance is useful is that sometimes it has an 
almost predictive capacity. Discourses are habitual—they appear in regular patterns, 
synchronized across large groups of white people. Importantly, distinguishing these 
discourses is only useful for the purpose of analysis. In practice, these discourses tend to 
blend together, deployed in concert to protect and insulate patterns of doxastic white 
ignorance. Below is an illustration of how these discourses are typically expressed and 
patterns they tend to follow.   
In a 2015 op-ed in the New York Times, titled “Dear White America,” George Yancy 
chronicles various types of discourse associated with white ignorance (though he doesn’t use 
this specific vocabulary to name the phenomenon). His open letter is directly addressed to 
white readers. His goal is to encourage white readers to—perhaps for the first time—truly 
listen and consider how and in what ways they’re bound up in systems of racial oppression. 
In the letter itself, Yancy anticipates how readers will respond to his letter, how they will 
avoid listening:   
 
“Don’t tell me how many black friends you have. Don’t tell me that you are married 
to someone of color. Don’t tell me that you voted for Obama. Don’t tell me that I’m 
the racist. Don’t tell me that you don’t see color. Don’t tell me that I’m blaming the 
whites for everything. To do so is to hide yet again. You may have never used the N-
word in your life, you may hate the K.K.K., but that does not mean that you don’t 
harbor racism and benefit from racism. . . .  
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“I know that there are those who will write to me in the comment section with boiling 
anger, sarcasm, disbelief, denial. There are those who will say, ‘Yancy is just an 
angry black man.’ There are others who will say, “Why isn’t Yancy telling black 
people to be honest about the violence in their own black neighborhoods?’ Or, ‘How 
can Yancy say that all white people are racists?’ If you are saying these things, 
you’ve already failed to listen.” (Yancy, 2015). 
 
Notice the fluency Yancy has with the kind of discourses I documented above. He 
can predict the exact replies he is likely to get. He knows how white readers are likely to 
respond when they’re invited to consider the role they play in systems that reproduce white 
racial domination. It’s evident that he predicts the replies so easily, in part, because they tend 
to adhere to the same patterns. He sees that, first, his readers will express the discourse of 
moral innocence, saying they have black friends and voted for Obama. He sees, also, that 
they will invoke normative colorblindness, telling him that they don’t see color and that he’s 
the real racist. He sees finally that they will activate the discourse of evasion and ascribe 
unfair motives to his speech, calling him an “angry black man,” among other things. None of 
these are one-off comments. I take it Yancy didn’t need to meticulously comb through past 
editorial comment sections to unearth some “nuggets.” Instead it’s clear that he receives the 
same comments, articulated in roughly the same way, adhering to roughly the same patterns, 
repeatedly and endlessly all the time. 
And right on cue, three days after Yancy published his letter, a columnist at the Daily 
Caller, a mainstream conservative publication (founded by Tucker Carlson) replied, 
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activating each of the discourses associated with active white ignorance. Here’s what Scott 
Greer, in part, writes in response to Yancy: 
 
 “To say [Yancy’s] rhetoric is divisive is an understatement. It stirs up racial 
animosity against one group of people and places all the woes of the country upon 
their shoulders. It removes any degree of responsibility for the actions of minorities 
from themselves and allows them to blame all of their problems on whites. Most 
troubling of all, it’s an insidious way to demand more power for people of a certain 
skin color—making racialism all the more attractive in our society . . . In many ways, 
[Yancy’s letter] sounds like inverted white supremacy—and the consequences for 
society accepting that idea could be just as bad as the days when America had Jim 
Crow (Greer, 2015). 
 
Here, Greer goes full throttle, almost as if he’s writing a grand symphony of 
discursive white ignorance. He’s prepared to say anything and do anything other than 
confront Yancy’s words. Whatever he can do to avoid listening, he does. It’s all there: Yancy 
is the real racist (colorblindness); Yancy is a race hustler (evasion); Yancy just wants more 
power (evasion); Yancy just wants to blame whites (moral innocence); Yancy’s words are 
worse than Jim Crow (colorblindness). At each step in the essay, Greer deploys paradigmatic 






Section 2: Character-based active white ignorance   
The second way that active white ignorance appears in the world is as a set of 
behaviors, habits, dispositions and attitudes that operate to insulate one from reality. As Jose 
Medina writes, “Actively ignorant subjects are those who can be blamed not just for lacking 
particular pieces of knowledge, but also for having epistemic attitudes and habits that 
contribute to create and maintain bodies of ignorance” (Medina, 2013, p. 33). This section 
draws heavily on Medina’s research to describe how white people tend to inhabit a set of 
character traits that make them impervious to new voices, perspectives and data points that 
might otherwise prompt them to reflect on, reconsider or revise their views. To contrast with 
the above, we might say that discourse represents the vocal and more visible element of the 
underlying character traits that serve to preserve varying degrees of ignorance.  
In The Epistemology of Resistance (2013), Medina draws on the concept of the 
“credibility economy,” first conceptualized by Miranda Fricker (2007), to provide an account 
of the ways in which whites come to inhabit epistemic vice. Medina (2013) notices that at the 
same time stereotypes about nonwhites are disparaging, stereotypes about whites tend to 
emphasize merit. So, where stereotypic frames promote judgements that nonwhites are slow 
and stupid, other stereotypic frames promote judgements that whites are smarter and quicker. 
The consequence is that whites are typically afforded the benefit of the doubt relative to 
nonwhites.  
Medina’s innovative contribution is to suggest that credibility excess tends to 
promote a set of corollary negative character traits in white people. It’s true, he says, that 
whites enjoy immense material advantage, owing to structural inequality; but whites are also, 
at the same time, subject to epistemic disadvantage (Medina, 2013, p. 44). In his view, the 
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social and economic forces that produce material advantage also at the same time create the 
conditions under which whites come to systematically inhabit epistemic vice. Since whites 
are usually given the benefit of the doubt, usually assumed to be correct, they’re disinclined 
to monitor their cognitive behaviors and they’re less likely to notice and regulate error. In 
short, because their credibility and authority are rarely challenged, whites are rarely 
prompted to undertake the difficult epistemic labor necessary to become sound thinkers. 
One thing to note here—which will matter significantly for the analysis in Chapter 
6—is that sometimes Medina’s conclusions are overdrawn. Medina’s account of epistemic 
vice appears to presuppose that epistemic character traits are unified or, at least, stable across 
privileged subjects—in all epistemic domains, not only those which involve race. Medina 
clarifies that epistemic vices associated with character-based active white ignorance are “not 
always present in the cognitive psychology of the powerful and privileged,” but that 
privileged persons “are certainly more at risk” of developing these vices. Here’s the passage 
in the text where I believe the scope of his account is wider than necessary: 
 
Epistemic vices . . . are flaws that are not incidental and transitory, but 
structural and systematic: they involve attitudes deeply rooted in one’s personality 
and cognitive functioning. Epistemic vices are composed of attitudinal structures that 
permeate one’s entire cognitive life: they involve attitudes toward oneself and others 
in testimonial exchanges, attitudes toward the evidence available and one’s 
assessment of it, and so on. These vices affect one’s capacity to learn from others and 
from the facts; they inhabit the capacity of self-correction and of being open to 
correction from others. . .  In short, these vices are deep and serious flaws in 
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epistemic character that limit the subject’s learning capacities and contributions to the 
pursuit of knowledge, and therefore they also damage the social knowledge available 
and harm the chances for epistemic improvement of the subject’s community 
(Medina, 2013, p. 30) 
 
My interpretation of this section (and others) is that Medina believes epistemic vices 
common among white people represent flaws that extend well beyond matters which involve 
race. Medina is not saying merely that, when it comes to questions about race and racism, 
white people are subject to epistemic vice. Instead, I interpret him to mean that white people 
are generally subject to epistemic vice across their “entire cognitive life”—and therefore are, 
as he says, epistemically “spoiled” (2013, p. 30).  
In Chapter 6 I argue that whites do not always inhabit epistemic vice; rather, given 
certain situational variables, whites are, in effect, triggered to inhabit bad epistemic character 
traits. In other words, sometimes whites can reason or listen very well and they don’t appear 
to inhabit epistemic vice at all. But other times when, for example, the topic or conversation 
concerns race or racism, whites may suddenly abandon the epistemic virtues they might 
otherwise inhabit in other contexts. The point is that various situations have the tendency to 
prompt whites to inhabit certain traits that impair their cognitive functioning. Although I 
believe Medina sometimes applies his insights too broadly, that does not detract from the 
merit of the diagnosis itself. His description of epistemic vice in this context is spot on and 
extremely valuable for how we understand behaviors that mark white ignorance. 
There are three kinds of epistemic vice identified by Medina. The first is epistemic 
arrogance, which refers to a propensity to inhabit over-confidence and egoistic conceit 
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(2013, p. 27). Medina’s choice term is “know-it-all,” (2013, p, 37) which he says describes 
whites who believe they have nothing left to learn because, of course, they’ve been told 
repeatedly that they’re already the smartest. If you believe you’re smarter than the next 
person, if you believe you know more than your interlocutor, you’ll be disinclined to listen to 
them or take their words seriously. In fact, those who inhabit epistemic arrogance are far 
more inclined to talk than they are to listen because they believe that, in most cases, what 
they have to say is more important than what the next person has to say (Medina, 2013). 
Next, Medina identifies epistemic laziness, which refers to a disinclination to 
participate in the interpretive or analytic work needed to expand or deepen understanding 
(2013, p. 37). Those who are always being told that they’re very smart and have lots of great 
ideas have no reason to undertake the kind of reasoned analyses necessary to generate 
genuinely thoughtful accounts of the world. Similar to epistemic arrogance, if you believe 
that you already know everything, then you’re far less likely to take the initiative to learn 
anything new. The fact is, it’s immensely challenging to confront and interrogate views that 
depart from one’s own, especially if those views potentially undermine deeply held 
assumptions. Sound thinking requires a lot of labor — it’s hard work — and whites are 
simply predisposed to avoid that kind of work, especially when it comes to cognition that 
involves race and racism.    
Finally, Medina identifies epistemic closedmindedness, which amounts to a “stubborn 
rigidity in outlook” or a characteristic unwillingness to inspect or revise one’s views, or 
admit new data (2013, p. 38). This particular vice is fairly broad and could, in principle, 
encapsulate all the others. I think Medina distinguishes epistemic closemindedness as a 
distinct vice, however, because it isn’t simply a condition. Closemindedness is an active way 
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of approaching the world, a “lack of openness to a whole range of experiences and 
viewpoints” (Medina 2013, p. 35). In this respect, closemindedness operates the same as 
other vices and should be categorized with them.  
In addition to Medina’s contributions, two other epistemic vices are worth 
highlighting. The first is incuriousness. Related to epistemic laziness, incuriousness involves 
a propensity not to initiate inquiry, or a characteristic disinterestedness in deepening or 
expanding understanding. In the first line of Metaphysics, Aristotle writes that “All [persons] 
by nature desire to know.” But what if structural conditions blunt that inclination? My view 
is that processes of racialized structuration infect white peoples’ epistemic faculties to the 
degree that one of the most fundamental human desires is muted and impaired. White people 
often do not desire to explore the way race and racism shapes the world. They do not desire 
to understand how their identity is bound up in matrices of racial injustice. They shut down. 
Their epistemic desire is broken.  
The final vice is identified in Mills’ research: epistemic dishonesty. Mills says that 
whites have a propensity to interact in bad faith or deceptively (Mills, 2007, p. 26). He 
defines bad faith following Sartre: "In bad faith, I flee a displeasing truth for a pleasing 
falsehood” (ibid.). Bad faith involves the recognition that if one tracks an argument a certain 
direction, it will lead to an unpleasant conclusion — so, instead they decline to proceed and 
retreat to the comfort of delusion. In this context, bad faith means that one declines to 
undertake genuine inquiry while pretending they’ve done just that. Bad faith in this respect is 
especially pernicious because it enables persons to feign virtue while inhabiting vice. In this 






The previous two chapters outlined two of the three elements of white ignorance. 
First, I described doxastic white ignorance, including incognizance, minimization and 
stereotypic narrativity. In this chapter, I described the corollary discourses and behaviors that 
function, in practice, to solidify and preserve features of doxastic white ignorance. Taken 
together, discourse combined with epistemic vice creates a powerful cocktail that efficiently 
protects whites in their ignorance. Discourse serves to signal to one’s interlocutor that the 
conversation need not proceed, it puts up a giant stop sign that says, “I’m not participating.” 
At the same time, a host of character traits engender the behaviors needed to habitually avoid 
inquiry and create distance. Discourse combined with vice ensures that whites abstain from 
dealing with race in a sustained and serious way. Through these various mechanisms, whites 
are enabled to preserve and maintain a high degree of doxastic white ignorance. For this 
reason, any attempt to ameliorate white ignorance must involve dealing not only with ideas 
but also behaviors, attitudes and discoursers that preserve those ideas. As with the previous 









Active White Ignorance 
Type Definition Paradigm Instance 
 
Discourse-based  
active white ignorance 
 
Performative speech that serves 
to halt inquiry and dialogue  
 
 
• Discourse of moral 
innocence  
• Discourse of 
colorblindness  





active white ignorance  
 
A set of behaviors, habits, 
dispositions and attitudes that 
operate to insulate one from 
reality 
 
• Epistemic arrogance  
• Epistemic 
closemindedness   
• Epistemic laziness  




















To this point, I have described two of the three components of white ignorance: 
Doxastic white ignorance and active white ignorance. This chapter discusses the third 
component: Meta-white ignorance. Meta-white ignorance is a concept also drawn from 
Medina’s (2013) work, in which he details concepts like “meta-blindness,” “meta-
insensitivity” and “meta-numbness” to capture the idea that ignorance can also involve 
unawareness of one’s own patterns of ignorance. We don’t just say someone is ignorant 
because they hold ignorant ideas or behave in ignorant ways — we also say they’re ignorant 
precisely because they’re ignorant of their own ignorance. The mark of true ignorance is 
confidence in the face of ignorance. In the ignorant, we observe brashness and certitude at 
moments where humility and reservation are most warranted. Medina says that blind people 
know that they’re blind, and thus readily acknowledge that there are things they cannot see 
(2012, p. 207). Those who suffer from meta-blindness, by contrast, erroneously believe that 
they see all there is to see. Meta-ignorance, in short, doesn’t recognize its own limitations. 
In this chapter, I develop a brief typology designed to help clarify what meta-white 
ignorance is and involves. In my view, meta-white ignorance isn’t an either/or you-either-
have-it-or-you-don’t construct. Instead, meta-white ignorance can manifest in varying 
degrees at different levels. I believe therefore that thinking about “levels” — three levels, to 
be specific — of meta-white ignorance can help illuminate how meta-white ignorance 
represents a unique educational problem.  
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In addition to identifying discrete levels of meta-white ignorance, this chapter also 
explores some of the larger sources outside of white ignorance that help support and sustain 
white ignorance. In particular, this chapter contains a discussion of the environmental factors 
that contribute to and reinforce white ignorance. These factors are, first, structural conditions 
(namely that the United States is organized according to the supremacy of whiteness) and, 
second, features of our cognitive life (namely that cognitive biases operate to influence how 
we address and uptake evidence).  
Ultimately, the goal is to provide a typology of the levels of meta-white ignorance as 
well as its sources in order to suggest a kind of roadmap by which educators can proceed as 
they to work to disrupt meta-white ignorance. As I will argue in subsequent chapters 
(especially Chapter 6), educators must tackle meta-white ignorance before they can tackle 
doxastic or active white ignorance. Or perhaps more accurately: We cannot tackle the other 
components of white ignorance unless we also at the same time tackle meta-white ignorance. 
Identifying discrete levels can help orient educators to the task, giving them signposts to 
reference on the journey. This chapter, therefore, will presage the educational approach I plan 
to develop in later chapters. 
 
Section 1: The levels of meta-white ignorance 
 These are the three main levels of meta-white ignorance.  
Level 3: Unawareness of the thesis of white ignorance per se. There are people who 
simply do not know that white people are subject to white ignorance. There are people who 
have never heard of the thesis, or perhaps have never considered that ignorance could be 
patterned in specific ways owing to broader social structures. This level of meta-white 
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ignorance is quite broad. It applied to me before I encountered the thesis in Charles Mills. It 
perhaps will apply to many readers of this dissertation. Level 3 involves nothing more 
complicated than the idea that many white people will first need to be introduced to the thesis 
itself. After all, one can’t recognize they’re subject to a certain kind of ignorance if they’re 
unaware that it exists in the first place.  
Level 2: Acknowledging that white ignorance is a real phenomenon to which others 
are subject, but not noticing that one is subject to white ignorance also. This level aims to 
describe the extent to which one accurately appraises whether they, personally, are subject to 
and manifest forms of white ignorance (among those who are aware of that concept). Recall 
that the discourse of moral innocence regularly manifests at moments when “good white 
people” diagnose and decry racism in others while at the same time denying that they might 
think or act in racist ways, too. Level 2 meta-white ignorance is similar. Whites may very 
well identify and condemn white ignorance in others, yet refuse to acknowledge that they 
also inhabit white ignorance. It’s a slight departure from Level 3. Level 3 meta-white 
ignorance doesn’t know about the thesis per se, whereas Level 2 accepts the thesis, but 
simply doesn’t recognize that it applies to oneself.  
Level 1: Recognition that one is subject to white ignorance, but not knowing the 
degree or extent to which they are. This level involves acceptance that white ignorance is a 
real phenomenon and also that one inhabits white ignorance. The difference in Level 1 is that 
the individual does not know how and in what ways they manifest white ignorance. There are 
two possible reasons for this. First, they may not be informed about the various ways in 
which one can be subject to white ignorance. Or, second, they may not have developed an 
adequate degree of self-transparency or self-knowledge. Of course, everyone lacks full self-
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transparency. Basic human psychology makes plain that there are all sorts of things that, at 
any given moment, we don’t know about our motivations, urges, reasons, behaviors, etc. 
Accurate self-assessment is thus extremely difficult—probably impossible. There are things 
others can see in us that we simply can’t see in ourselves. So, in this respect, Level 1 meta-
white ignorance is inescapable. But I don’t want to make the application of the concept too 
strict. All I want to capture is that Level 1 meta-white ignorance means the individual has no 
idea when, how and to what extent they might be subject to ideas or activate behaviors 
associated with white ignorance. Level 1 meta-white ignorance involves essentially sheer 
ignorance about one’s own comportment. Simply put, Level 1 meta-white ignorance can be 
captured this way: I know I’m ignorant, but I don’t know in what ways I’m ignorant.  
 
Why do these levels matter?  
As I argue at length in Chapter 6, I believe that it is possible to ameliorate these levels 
of meta-white ignorance. In fact, I will argue addressing meta-white ignorance should be the 
central and priority aim for educators who wish to pursue social justice and anti-racist 
education among white students. In my view, owing to broader structural conditions, which 
are especially entrenched, along with certain cognitive biases, it is not possible for white 
people to escape white ignorance altogether. Whites can inhabit white ignorance to greater 
or lesser degrees, to be sure, but they’re almost certain to be subject to white ignorance no 
matter what. For this reason, the aim of education shouldn’t be to simply eliminate doxastic 
and active white ignorance, but instead to focus on helping students work through the 
different levels of meta-white ignorance to achieve what I call wokeness for white people.   
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To presage what I argue extensively later, wokeness in this context involves 
activating self-reflection in order to identify the various ways and extent to which one is 
subject to white ignorance. Although wokeness does not involve full self-transparency or 
completely accurate self-assessment, it does involve knowing — at least to some degree — 
how one might be inclined to adopt erroneous ideas, or how one might participate in certain 
kinds of discourse, or how one may inhabit character traits that inhibit their ability to acquire 
new knowledge. This is exactly why I believe developing a cohesive framework with a 
comprehensive vocabulary is so important: It provides conceptual resources that educators 
and students need to name the ways in which they might be subject to white ignorance.  
The mark of true knowledge is not the absence of ignorance altogether. Rather, the 
mark of true knowledge is recognizing your own ignorance and the limits of your abilities. 
That’s what educators should aim to achieve with their students. If students can learn that 
white ignorance is a real phenomenon, recognize that they’re subject to it, and then begin to 
monitor the ways they may manifest white ignorance, they might be able to adopt strategies 

























Recognition of the 
ways one is subject 
to white ignorance, 
but still manifesting 





one is subject to 
white ignorance, but 
not knowing 




people are subject to 
white ignorance; but 
denying that one 
inhabits white 




Denial that people 
are subject to white 
ignorance. Denial 
of the thesis itself. 
Not knowing about 
white ignorance. 
 
Section 2: Conditions that support white ignorance 
So far, I have described three key components of white ignorance (ideas-based, 
character-based, and meta-) in specific detail, arguing that white ignorance, in particular, is a 
product of processes of racialized structuration. At the same time, however, there are other 
broader factors and conditions that contribute to and sustain white ignorance also. Two 
factors are especially prominent across the literature: Structural conditions (i.e. material 
realities) and psychological mircofoundations (i.e. features of human cognition). These 
represent the key factors outside of white ignorance that create the fertile conditions 
necessary for white ignorance to flourish. In other words, they interact with processes of 
racialized structuration in specific ways to help support and sustain white ignorance. In the 
subsections that follow, I discuss both in turn to show how they operate to make white 
ignorance such a uniquely difficult problem to address. The phenomena discussed below are 
not white ignorance per se, but bigger features of the human experience that help make white 




Structural conditions: “Not needing to know” 
White people in America enjoy structural advantage.  Given structural conditions 
organized according to the supremacy of whiteness, the basic social, economic and political 
institutions in society simply “work” for white people—at least vis-à-vis nonwhites. 
Whiteness carries a kind of cash value that makes it comparatively easier for whites to live in 
a society organized by the supremacy of whiteness. As a consequence, there’s not much to 
prompt whites to question — or reflect on — the status quo.  
In the book, How We Think, John Dewey explores the cognitive operations associated 
with problem solving, noting that humans aren’t inclined to think until they’ve encountered 
an obstacle of some kind. Only after they encounter a problem does the motor of cognition 
start humming. Before that point, Dewey says, people just more or less carry on in an almost 
nonconscious, nonreflective state. They carry on with business as usual until something halts 
them (Dewey, 2008, p. 181). 
Dewey invites the reader to imagine someone who takes the same subway the same 
way to work every day (2008, p. 204). Over time, the person is habituated into the same 
schedule, the same walk, the same set of stairs, the same platform, the same train, etc. They 
make the trip without thinking about it. But imagine, he says, one day they’re delayed for 
whatever reason—and they miss their train. Now, they’ve encountered an obstacle. 
Suddenly, they’re shaken from their unconscious routine and prompted to reflect on the 
situation. They begin to explore alternate routes, perhaps they consider taking a cab instead. 
The point is, they encountered an obstacle that makes them think differently about what 
they’re doing and how they’re doing it.  
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To carry the analogy, white ignorance is maintained through the same kind of 
habituated, nonreflective, unconscious ongoings that govern one’s daily commute. When 
you’re on time and the trains are running on time, there’s not much to think about — you just 
get in and go. It’s the same with white ignorance. White ignorance is possible because the 
trains, so to speak, are usually running on time for white people. There are no problems or 
hurdles or obstacles that prompt whites to reflect on or question processes of racialized 
structuration. In the literature, scholars (Applebaum, 2015; Medina, 2013) refer to this 
phenomenon as “not needing to know,” that is, whites have no need to know about the 
organizing principle and governing logic that structures society and delivers a comparative 
advantage. They don’t need to know about it because it does not present as a problem.  
Problems generate curiosity. An absence of problems is usually correlated with an 
absence of curiosity. In short, the material conditions associated with white racial advantage 
serve to contribute to and preserve white ignorance because comfort associated with the 
racial order typically fails to inspire curiosity, inquiry and reflection.     
    
Psychological microfoundations: “Needing not to know” 
Where material conditions dull curiosity, psychological features function to actively 
minimize inquiry. This section centers on the psychological microfoundations and the 
generic features of human cognition that contribute to motivated ignorance. Motivated 
ignorance is a type of ignorance driven by individual desires, interests, needs, or goals. 
Motivations and desires govern and guide one’s epistemic comportment in specific ways, 
affecting how they attend to and reflect on new evidence. It is generally accepted that 
motivations affect cognitive function "by directing people's cognitive processes (e.g., their 
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recall, information search, or attributions) in ways that help to ensure they reach their desired 
conclusions" (Molden and Higgins 2005, p. 297) — or at least avoid undesired conclusions. 
Although the features of human cognition associated with motivated ignorance appear at an 
individual level, the motivations themselves might be generated by larger social and 
structural patterns. 
 Motivated ignorance appears in all forms. Imagine, for example, a woman who feels a 
lump on her breast one morning, but doesn’t seek a medical examination for fear of what she 
might find. Or imagine the shopaholic who refuses to check his bank and credit card 
statements for fear of what he’ll discover. These are just a few ways that motivated ignorance 
appears: Persons refuse to attend to evidence because of second-order desires, motivations, 
etc. Note that the desires that underwrite motivated ignorance need not have anything to do 
with the ignorance itself. In fact, motivated ignorance is most typically generated by 
ancillary concerns. Here are some of the key cognitive biases that I believe animate and 
support white ignorance. 
First is the “good-self” bias or, more broadly, a “self-serving bias” (Sedikides, 
Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998). A self-serving bias generates cognitive distortions that 
function to preserve a positive self-image or bolster self-esteem. In plain terms, people have a 
desire to feel like they’re good, morally upright individuals. Research has shown that self-
serving biases are especially evident at moments when “individuals formulate attributions 
about the causes of personal actions, events, and outcomes” (Forsyth, 2008). People attribute 
positive outcomes to things like hard work and internal motivation, and they attribute 
negative outcomes to things like bad luck, chance, or some broader unfairness. The good-self 
bias animates the discourse of moral innocence.  
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It’s easy to see how the self-serving bias would inhibit whites from confronting ways 
that race shapes a given context. On the one hand, inquiry in this direction could undermine 
one’s sense of goodness. If there’s too much inquiry into race, some whites know — albeit at 
a subconscious level — that they could uncover the truth that they act in racist ways or ways 
that serve to reinforce the supremacy of whiteness. People simply don’t want to deal with the 
fact that they’re complicit in systems of racial oppression. They don’t want to discover that 
their success in life is due, in no small part, to their skin color. These are difficult realities for 
white persons to face because they can undermine one’s sense of self-worth and goodness. 
Self-serving biases, in this respect, underwrite motivated ignorance and, by extension, help 
support and sustain white ignorance. 
Next is confirmation bias, which refers to a tendency to pay more attention to 
evidence that confirms what we already believe to be true (Woomer, 2015). As Woomer 
(2015) explains “confirmation bias can involve both selective attention to confirming 
evidence over other evidence, as well as cutting off searches for evidence prematurely after 
finding confirming evidence” (p. 77). There’s a definite comfort associated with a sense of 
certitude, so it’s only natural that persons are inclined, when possible, to preserve that sense 
of knowing. A sense of knowing generates a higher degree of confidence and also helps 
sustain a positive self-image. 
It’s not difficult to imagine how doxastic white ignorance is strengthened and 
reinforced by confirmation bias: Whites are disinclined to attend to evidence that might 
undermine or disconfirm what they already take to be true. Confirmation bias is at work, for 
example, when whites identify perceived cultural failures in black communities, but decline 
to pursue additional inquiry to discover what role social structures might play. They see 
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evidence that they believe points to cultural/moral failure in black people, and then cease 
further exploration and analysis. Similarly, confirmation bias is at work at those moments 
when whites are convinced that “America” is the greatest country on earth, and so decline to 
attend to evidence of racial injustice. When persons decline to further understand the world, 
white ignorance is thereby strengthened and nourished. 
 But it’s not just that whites decline to continue inquiry. Doxastic white ignorance is 
also sustained because whites give greater weight to pieces of evidence that support their 
priors, and they ignore or minimize pieces of evidence that run counter to their priors. Whites 
focus on, for instance, drug use in black communities while ignoring that drug use is 
equally—if not more—prevalent in white communities. Selective attention to evidence helps 
generate and support white ignorance.  
Another bias worth highlighting is shared-reality bias. This bias refers to the fact that 
“people are motivated to achieve mutual understanding or ‘shared reality’ with specific 
others in order to (i) establish, maintain, and regulate interpersonal relationships, thereby 
satisfying relational needs for affiliation and (ii) perceive themselves and their environments 
as stable, predictable, and potentially controllable, thereby satisfying epistemic motives to 
achieve certainty” (Jost, Ledgerwood, Hardin, 2008, p. 3). The basic idea is that epistemic 
comportment and socio-relational motivations are linked in significant ways. Persons tend to 
think similarly to those with whom they associate. Shared-reality bias is a big reason why 
political propaganda can be so effective and also why we are seeing the balkanization of 
political ideology in the wake of increasingly specialized and niche media production.  
In my view, shared-reality bias makes the problem of white ignorance especially 
sticky because disrupting white ignorance often requires whites to break socially from other 
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whites — or at least generate a certain degree of social distance. Elements of white ignorance 
are bound up with one’s sense of self, place and identity. Disrupting white ignorance, 
therefore, may involve displacing white identity and splintering white solidarity. It’s 
undoubtedly very difficult for one to think about the world in different terms when it’s the 
only way they’ve ever thought about the world, and when it’s the only way their family and 
siblings and friends and neighbors think about the world too.  
It’s no secret that elements of white ignorance are bound up with other identity 
markers, like political affiliation and cultural-linguistic cues. In this respect, there’s a real 
sense in which expressing ideas associated with white ignorance are principally about 
expressing one’s identity and signaling in-group affiliation. Shared-reality bias is thus related 
to identity preservation. The risk associated with fragmenting one’s identity and social 
affiliation inhibits whites from attending to and accurately appraising available evidence. If 
one tacitly realizes that confronting new evidence may involve losing a sense of who they 
are, they’ll be disinclined to deal with that evidence sincerely and wholeheartedly.     
The penultimate bias I want to discuss is called system-justification bias. This bias 
refers to “a general psychological tendency to justify and rationalize the status quo, that is, a 
motive to see the system as good, fair, legitimate, and desirable” (Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
Humans generally tend to prefer the familiar over the unknown. They tend to prefer that into 
which they’ve been habituated versus the alternative. And because they prefer the status quo, 
they’re also inclined to rationalize it in some way. Elizabeth Anderson argues that system-
justification bias is thus closely related to a “just-world hypothesis” (2010, p. 68). That is, 
people don’t want to imagine that the world in which they live, the society in which they 
participate, may be unfair or unjust. Not only is it difficult to confront the reality that others 
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are subject to injustice, but it’s also difficult to confront the reality that one’s social location 
may be based on something besides merit or personal motivation. If it turns out that one’s 
race is a strong predicate of success, then one’s positive self-image may be threatened.  
Note that in this respect system-justification bias is strongly related to the good-self 
bias. In order to preserve the notion that one is good, they must also believe that the system 
in which they live is just. Altogether, then, persons look for evidence that confirms the world 
in which they live is just and that their behaviors are good. System-justification bias is 
unsurprisingly strongly correlated with white ignorance because it deters people from 
attending to the ways in which race structures the world, and thus the way race injustice 
pervades our world.      
Finally, complexity aversion refers to the cognitive tendency to approach immensely 
complex problems and imagine they’re far simpler than they are (Duttle and Inukai, 2015). 
As I described at multiple points throughout chapters 2-3, white ignorance tends to involve 
focusing, in large measure, on individual explanations and ignoring broader social structures 
that could also help explain individual behaviors and outcomes. I believe this tendency is at 
least partly a consequence of complexity aversion. It’s simply easier, and requires less 
intellectual labor, to adopt an individual orientation rather than a structural orientation 
(Chubbuck, 2010). To attend to the ways race structures the world may require more 
sophisticated analyses and an ability to conduct nuanced reflection. Often, it’s just too much 







The discussion above does not contain an exhaustive list of all the relevant cognitive 
biases that might be associated with white ignorance. There are, no doubt, other cognitive 
biases identified in the empirical literature that also help explain the phenomenon. My goal is 
simply to underline that when we analyze white ignorance, specifically, we shouldn’t lose 
sight of the general features of human cognition that contribute to the phenomenon.  
Importantly, the presence of these basic cognitive biases (combined with material 
advantage) is what leads me to believe that certain elements of white ignorance will always 
be present. Hence, I do not hope to eliminate white ignorance altogether simply because I do 
not believe that we can eliminate cognitive biases altogether. If persons are wired in specific 
ways, there’s not much we can do about it. But we can make ourselves and one another more 
conscious of the ways that various biases influence how we interpret and assess the world. 
And I believe greater awareness can inspire greater self-monitoring and self-regulation such 
that white people can learn to neutralize the bad effects generated by these cognitive biases 
and other cognitive habits.  
If we can help students name and identify the main components of white ignorance, 
as well as the features of the world that help sustain white ignorance, then we might help 
minimize cognitive impairment owing to white ignorance. For these reasons, this and the 
previous four chapters systematically synthesized the literature in order to outline the key 
components of white ignorance. I discussed, first, what white ignorance is, then I described, 
in turn, doxastic, active and meta-white ignorance. The table below contains a tidy 
summation of all these components. In the next few chapters, I illustrate how this framework 
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can be used by education researchers, teachers and teacher educators to address some core 
challenges I outlined in the introduction of this project.  
 











Ideas and beliefs (or the absence thereof) that 
misapprehend the way that racialized 
structuration organizes the world 
 
 
• Incognizance  
• Minimization  
• Stereotypic 





Behaviors, habits, attitudes and patterns of 
speech that function to insulate and preserve 
doxastic white ignorance 
 
 
• Discourse  




Varying degrees of ignorance of one’s own 
ignorance  
 
• Level 3 
• Level 2 













White Schools, White Ignorance  
 
The preceding four chapters were primarily conceptual and analytical, using existing 
research to identify and clarify the constituent features of white ignorance. The aim was to 
create a comprehensive, typological framework that can help us name and understand the 
three main components of white ignorance: Doxastic, active and meta-white ignorance. In 
this chapter (and the ones that follow), I endeavor to show how this framework can be 
applied to educational research, theory and practice.  
In the introduction, I said that a central purpose of this project is to imagine what it 
might look like if education researchers expanded the diagnosis-remedy approach associated 
with culturally responsive and sustaining pedagogies and brought it to bear in white contexts 
to inform the education of white children. In the most general outline, this diagnosis-remedy 
approach first identifies the way that the epistemic infrastructure in schools affects nonwhite 
students (specifically, how it serves to disadvantage and discount nonwhite students’ unique 
ways of knowing). Then, the research develops a remedy designed to encourage educators to 
replace white supremacist epistemologies with epistemologies that validate and reflect 
indigenous ways of knowing—and then further incorporate those epistemologies into the 
classroom.     
The approach I illustrate in this chapter follows the same trajectory: My goal is to 
consider ways the white ignorance framework can be used to guide empirical investigation. I 
hope to illuminate areas where education researchers can more systematically uncover 
exactly how and in what ways white supremacist patterns in schools serve to reproduce white 
ignorance in white communities. At this stage, the notion that schools are partly implicated in 
the proliferation of white ignorance in white communities is only an educated hypothesis, 
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grounded in deduction. But it’s a testable hypothesis, provided we initiate the sort of 
systematic empirical inquiry I think the question demands. If we can understand how schools 
might function to promote white ignorance, we’ll be in much better position to create 
pedagogies that can disrupt those practices.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section considers how policy 
choices might aim to preserve white ignorance. I draw on a case study examining the 
controversy over Raza Studies in Arizona to potentially identify the reasons why and in what 
circumstances policymakers might choose to endorse patterns of ignorance. In the second 
section, I move beyond explicit policy to consider how patterns of practice might function to 
reproduce white ignorance, even where educators are working to achieve exactly the 
opposite. The second section organizes findings according to the typology created in 
Chapters 2-4. Each sub-section ends with a hypothesis to guide future research.  
 
A Note on methodology  
Virtually all the empirical literature that deals with race, whiteness or racism in 
school tends to focus on schools and communities populated mostly by nonwhite students. In 
fact, only one study I’ve found directly examines the pedagogical practices associated with 
race and whiteness as enacted by white educators in an almost-all-white school. Prentice 
Chandler’s seminal research (2015) investigates three high school social studies teachers and 
the way they teach American History in an almost-all-white high school in southern 
Alabama.  
Other studies look at white schools, but don’t necessarily examine formal teaching 
practices or policy consequences. Pamela Perry, for example, has a relevant and illuminating 
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book-length study based on her dissertation research. Titled, Shades of White (1992), her 
inquiry examines processes of identity formation in an almost-all-white high school in 
California. However, her research doesn’t explicitly focus on teaching and pedagogy. 
Amanda Lewis (2004), for her part, conducted research in three elementary schools in 
Chicago to investigate ways children are taught (and interpret) racial messages and 
consequently form a racial identity. Importantly, only one of the three schools in her study 
was classified as mostly white. 
Given the dearth of empirical research into white schools, there’s no single body of 
literature on which I can draw to help address the empirical question at hand: How do white 
schools in white communities support and sustain white ignorance? Therefore, I draw on 
existing, related research that investigates mostly nonwhite contexts to develop a series of 
hypotheses that may warrant exploration in white educational contexts. Stated differently, I 
draw on findings from research in mostly nonwhite contexts and extrapolate from those 
findings hypotheses about what might be happening in mostly white contexts.   
The research below, therefore, does not directly deal with white ignorance—and 
almost none of the researchers I cite use this vocabulary. However, I believe that this 
extrapolatory method can provide a blueprint for the kind of investigation that might 
illuminate whether and to what extent mostly white schools are implicated in the 
proliferation of white ignorance. So, although I lack the resources to draw confident 
conclusions, I believe creating actionable hypotheses represents a useful first step.  
Importantly, these hypotheses reflect only my own conjecture based on educated 
deduction. The hypotheses are not always fully supported by the research (either empirically 
or conceptually). Sometimes I make logical leaps in order to draw attention to problem areas 
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and focal points. That’s why I keep insisting that the sections below contain hypotheses—not 
conclusions—designed to initiate more and better inquiry.  
 
Section 1: Raza studies in Arizona 
In 2010, the Governor of Arizona, Jan Brewer, signed into law Arizona House Bill 
2281 which declared, among other things, “that public school pupils should be taught to treat 
and value each other as individuals and not be taught to resent or hate other races or classes 
of people” (HB 2281, p. 1). At first glance, the text of the bill doesn’t sound especially 
controversial. Who, after all, would advocate for an education that promotes the hate or 
resentment of other races? Does anyone believe that we ought not value one another, as 
individuals? Despite its neutral language, the passage of the bill symbolizes an ongoing war 
in Arizona against K-12 Raza Studies, officially known as the Mexican American Studies 
(MAS) Program. And the bill, in my view, represents an attempt at state-mandated 
preservation of white ignorance in public schools (see also: Cabrera 2012).   
Here’s the back story. In 2002, Augustine Romero was appointed the Director of 
Mexican-American Studies in the Tucson Unified School District (TUSD). Shortly after the 
appointment, Romero created two programs: The Social Justice Education Project (SJEP) 
and the Critically Compassionate Intellectualism Model of Transformative Education (CCI). 
Together, in collaboration with other educators in high schools and nearby universities, the 
program created four courses: American Government (using a social justice lens), American 
History (from Mexican-American perspectives), Chicana/o Art (beginning and advanced), 
and Latino/a Literature (Cammarota, Romero and Stovall, 2014). The courses were primarily 
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designed for, and almost exclusively attended by, middle and high school Mexican-American 
students (Sterna, 2013).17  
According to Romero (2010), the principal aim of MAS was to elevate “barrio-
organic intellectualism,” wherein intellectuals use all of their capacities and resources to 
advance and protect their community (p. 8).  Elias Serna (2013) argues that barrio-organic 
intellectualism is an educational movement that represents a logical outgrowth of Chicano/a 
studies in higher education, which is seen fundamentally as an “epistemological 
confrontation” with educational institutions and the larger social sphere (p. 42). Barrio-
organic intellectualism, as Serna (2013) argues, work to challenge: 
  
 The accepted patriotic, Eurocentric, male, triumphalist versions of US history, 
especially  in the Southwestern United States. The epistemological space for the field was 
created by  challenging lies, revealing exclusions, and making successful historical 
arguments over such things as the Mexican-American War. While traditional history 
books mentioned Mexican provocation, Chicano historians detailed a US invasion 
involving war hawk legislation, demographic and military provocation, and how the 
doctrine of manifest destiny operated ideologically (p. 44). 
 
 
17 An important dimension of this controversy that is often overlooked: White children were never enrolled in 
these courses, were never actively offered these courses, probably never sought these courses. In much of the 
contemporary educational scholarship that aims to promote “epistemological confrontation” in schools, the 
standard rationale is that nonwhite students, in particular, need programs like MAS because they serve to 
“engage minority students’ interest” by employing “lesson content that resonates with students’ social and 
cultural backgrounds” (Almarza & Fehn, 1998). In other words, the rationale is often that programs like MAS 
promote student achievement by making school more consonant with the way nonwhite students view and think 
about the world.  
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The educational motivation behind MAS was a “disruptive epistemological 
challenge” (Serna, 2013). Educators who participated in MAS sought to create a classroom 
experience that contested pervasive patterns of ignorance that regulated curricula and other 
school practices (Cabrera, 2012).  
By 2008, MAS generated severe backlash from a cadre of white legislators and 
policymakers across the state. In April of that year, an amendment was proposed to Senate 
Bill 1108 (a bill chiefly regarding homeland security), which would have prohibited “any 
program of instruction” (classes, courses, or school-sponsored activities) that works to 
“promote, assert as truth, or feature as an exclusive focus any political, religious, ideological, 
or cultural beliefs or values that denigrate, disparage, or overtly encourage dissent from the 
values of American democracy” (Cammarota, Romero, and Stovall, 2014, p.  57). According 
to the text of the amendment, “The primary purpose of public education is to inculcate values 
of American Citizenship.” The language for the amendment was drafted by then-Tuscon 
Superintendent Tom Horne, who argued that, “The very name ‘Raza’ is translated as ‘race’” 
and therefore Raza studies is racist and should be dismantled (Cammarota, Romera, and 
Stovall, 2014, p. 60).18  
The amendment to Senate Bill 1108 was ultimately defeated, but it laid the 
groundwork for House Bill 2281, which was signed into law two years later. The new house 
bill tempered the language found in the proposed senate bill amendment, but still prohibited 
classes that, (1) “Promote the overthrow of the United States Government,” (2) “Promote 
resentment toward a race or class of people”, (3) “Are designed primarily for pupils of a 
particular ethnic group”, (4) “Advocate solidarity instead of treatment of pupils as 
 
18 As Cabrera (2012) points out, Raza more “properly connotes the cultural and historical ties which unite 
Spanish speaking people” (p. 134), so it would be weird to call Raza “racist.” 
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individuals” (Serna, 2013, p 55).  Despite the fact that the MAS program didn’t do any of 
those things,19 TUSD Superintendent Tom Horne found the Raza studies program out of 
compliance with the new law (Cabrera, 2012). It’s worth noting, as Cabrera (2012) does, that 
Tom Horne never attended a single Raza studies class (p. 133).  
In a press conference, Horne said that MAS courses taught students “that Latino 
minorities have been and continue to be oppressed by a Caucasian majority. This harmful, 
dispiriting message has no place in public education” (Cammarota, Romero, and Stovall, 
2014, p. 91). In January of 2012, the school board voted to end MAS courses and seven 
books were prohibited from the school curriculum for being in violation of the new law:  
• 500 Years of Chicano History in Pictures by Elizabeth Martine 
• Critical Race Theory by Richard Delgado;  
• Message to Aztlán: Selected Writings of Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzalez by Rodolfo 
Gonzalez 
• Chicano! The History of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement by Arturo 
Rosales 
• Rethinking Columbus by Bill Bigelow and Bob Peterson 
• Pedagogy of the Oppressed by Paulo Freire20 
 
The United States is marked by white racial and cultural domination, both historically 
and in the present day. Oppression of Latinx communities is real. Yet, legislators and state 
agents actively worked to disallow the circulation of ideas that confirmed and substantiated 
that reality. State actors literally prohibited classes that taught a basic fact about the world: 
White racial and cultural domination is real.21 
 
19 Educators were more than willing to invite students of any race or background to participate in the course, 
and didn’t believe that Raza studies per se should be exclusive to a single race or ethnic group (Cabrera, 2012). 
20 About this text in particular, Cabrera writes: “Lost in this attack was the remarkable pedagogical 
accomplishment of high school students reading Freire” (2012, p. 133). 
21 The ban on MAS only lasted one year. Federal court ruled that the ban did not comply with desegregation 
law. The TUSD School Board voted in 2013 to un-ban the seven books (Acosta and Mir, 201 2). The MAS 
program has been since been revised. TUSD students can attend a single Mexican American studies course 
called CLASS (Chicano Literature, Art, and Social studies) offered through Prescott College in Tuscon. The 
course can be taken for college credit and is free of charge to all students in TUSD (Acosta and Mir, 2012).   
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As Cabrera argues, “While the historical and contemporary oppression of Latina/os 
has been substantiated, the only acceptable form of Arizona public education is one that 
denies this reality” (2012, pg. 132).  The passage of House Bill 2281, and the events that 
followed, illustrate an important point: It is not simply that schools don’t do enough to 
disrupt the reproduction of white ignorance, but in fact schools may operate in an active way 
to sustain and reproduce white ignorance.  
The reasons why legislators and policymakers resisted the MAS program are worth 
exploring. I do not assume that policymakers in Arizona were explicitly interested in 
preserving white ignorance just for the sake of preserving white ignorance. I believe there 
was a competing interest at stake: Social cohesion and patriotism. Henry Levin (2012) 
persuasively argues that a key purpose of school is to promote a sense of national pride and 
solidarity. Similar themes and ideas are echoed in John Dewey, who endorsed the role of 
schools to strengthen social bonds and address shared problems.  
Many believe that talking and teaching about race and racism is ipso facto divisive 
and undermines the mythos that animates the American republic. Diversity, identity politics, 
multicultural education, social justice education—opponents say that all of these things 
encourage youth to focus on differences instead of solidarities, alienating them from one 
another, and undermining a sense of civic pride. Such patterns, it is alleged, have long-term 
deleterious effects on social cohesion and solidarity.  
Ultimately, we don’t know the regularity with which schools block teaching around 
race and racism. To be sure, there are some high-profile examples of just the opposite. In 
May 2018, New York City Public Schools earmarked twenty-three million dollars for 
system-wide anti-bias education. But, notably, only 15% of the children enrolled in New 
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York City Public Schools identify as white. Are there any examples of almost-all-white 
school districts and communities deliberately advancing anti-racist initiatives at the p-12 
level?  
Hypothesis #1 is divided into three discrete parts: a) Mostly white school 
districts rarely advance anti-racist educational initiatives. b) Often they decline to 
advance these educational programs because they believe it undermines social cohesion 
and a sense of civic pride. c) In some cases, educators and policymakers actively resists 
attempts to incorporate race-focused educational programs.  
 Education researchers might explore how and in what ways policies actively resist 
educational approaches that might serve to undermine white ignorance. The Raza Studies 
controversy is prominently known because it was openly challenged by dedicated 
stakeholders and eventually made its way through the courts. But what about policies that are 
not challenged? What about everyday, comparatively minor efforts to silence or shelve 
educational lessons that might focus explicitly on race?  
Importantly, the point is not necessarily to resolve how we might adjudicate 
competing interests to interrupt white ignorance with other interests to promote social 
cohesion (or even how these two interests might in fact align). My goal, instead, is to simply 
learn more about these processes in schools. How are policies about curriculum and race 
made—and how are they resisted? And by whom? Moving forward, it will be advantageous 
to conduct policy analyses to uncover which policies are most likely to contribute to the 
reproduction of white ignorance. If we can understand the policy rationales, then educators 




Section 2: Practices that contribute to white ignorance  
In this section I consider how practices in schools might be responsible for 
reinforcing and reproducing white ignorance in white communities. To frame the discussion, 
I center the analysis on ideas-based and character-based white ignorance. Drawing on the 
extant empirical literature, I discuss how and in what ways schools and teachers might be—
despite the best intentions—complicit in the reproduction of white ignorance.  
 
Doxastic white ignorance 
This section is organized according to the typology outlined in Chapter 2, which 
described the elements of doxastic white ignorance. In turn, I discuss how schools and 
teachers might be responsible for reproducing incognizance, minimization and stereotypic 
narrativity.   
 
Incognizance  
To restate, incognizance refers to sheer not-knowing — an absence of certain kinds of 
knowledge. Because incognizance marks an “absence” of something, it’s hard to identify, 
empirically, “what” specifically causes it. Schools and teachers can’t cover everything, so 
students will leave school necessarily incognizant of many things. It is therefore 
unreasonable to try to document all the things schools are not doing—the list would be too 
long and somewhat arbitrary. Accordingly, this section focuses only on affirmative choices 
teachers and schools make that might contribute to incognizance.    
 
The pervasive whiteness of the classroom  
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There is a great deal of scholarship in multicultural education that points to the 
“pervasive whiteness” of the classroom (Gangi, 2008). Much of the literature has described 
the way that children of color are surrounded with classroom paraphernalia that reflects white 
culture and white ways of thinking about the world. Many studies (described below) indicate 
that a significant impediment to nonwhite students’ literacy are classrooms nearly 
exclusively populated by books which principally involve white protagonists and depict 
themes and activities typical in white communities. Young nonwhite readers don’t have the 
requisite background knowledge to fully comprehend these school texts in a meaningful way. 
They are, therefore, less likely to relate to, or generate interest in, the books to which they 
have access. A lack of investment promotes a lack of engagement, which in turn minimizes 
the likelihood that children will spend time reading.  
Guilfoyle’s (2015) study, for instance, found that 80 percent of the more than five-
hundred children’s picture books she sampled from a popular database for p-5 literacy 
instructors contained white protagonists. Additionally, almost half of the nonwhite 
protagonists were depicted in stories in a historical context. The upshot is that less than 10% 
of the picture books sampled contained nonwhite protagonists in contemporary context.  
Raw statistical analysis like this does not necessarily capture the core problem. But it 
does portend a prominent finding across the literature: Many children’s books “can be said to 
be both informed by and supportive of white cultural values and norms, to the exclusion of 
the experiences and perspectives of other cultural groups” (Pearce, 2012, p. 460). 
The problem is not simply that most children’s books contain white protagonists, but that 
many children’s books also contains themes, narratives, and ideological frames that operate 
to reinforce white norms and cultural codes.  
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Another important study (Young, 2015) recently examined the “habits of whiteness” 
in popular fantasy literature.  Young’s research analyzes popular texts throughout the history 
of the genre, from CS Lewis’s Trilogy and The Lord of the Rings franchise to more 
contemporary works like Game of Thrones and Phillip Pullman’s His Dark Materials.  
Young found that much of the genre is dominated by white bodies and white voices; white 
identity is persistently constructed through racist stereotypes, particularly those associated 
with blackness; and fantasy worlds tend be structured either as a “pre-race utopia” or 
organized by “nostalgia for imperialism” (p. 12). 
Based on this literature, an important question emerges: What effect does the 
pervasive whiteness of classroom literature have on white children in mostly white schools?  
How do all these materials centering on mostly white themes and ideas affect cognitive 
functioning around issues related to race, racism and whiteness?  
Hypothesis #2: The “unbearable whiteness” of the classroom contributes in some 
substantial way to the incognizance associated with doxastic white ignorance.  
Importantly, I don’t think mostly white literature, on its own, directly leads children 
to inhabit white ignorance. Themes in literature can operate as heuristics, drawing attention 
to, and even destabilizing, problematic aspects of the world in a way that may guide the 
reader to participate in social- and self-critique. Further, any text is open to a nearly infinite 
array of potential interpretations. So, none of the findings reported here can say anything 
definitive about how a young child will interpret or make sense of different texts, or what 
effect a text would have on a child’s view of the world. I also recognize that there are many 
classrooms and schools around the United States that deliberately try to incorporate more 
inclusive literature for all students. At the same time, however, merely incorporating more 
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inclusive literature may not serve as a cure-all for the incognizance associated with white 
ignorance. It also depends on how much and to what extent the teacher encourages 
interaction with these texts and helps children read and think through them.  
The point, in short, is that additional research is clearly warranted. Right now, the 
scholarship critiquing the pervasive whiteness of the classroom is framed as a problem for 
young nonwhite readers exclusively. But there is good reason to suspect it may be a serious 
problem for white children too. In the same way that prominent white themes may impede 
nonwhite readers from meaningfully engaging a text, there is also the risk that prominent 
white themes can reinforce modes of white ignorance in young white readers.  
 
Failures of multicultural education  
Some scholarship in education has critiqued the ways in which multicultural 
education in white schools can serve to undermine the very aims it seeks to achieve. The 
motivation for different forms of multicultural education is typically to introduce white 
students to cultures, races and histories different from their own in order to minimize bias 
and increase racial and cultural sensitivity. Unfortunately, if conducted without adequate 
care, multicultural education carries risk. 
First, research has shown that many times multicultural education tends to focus 
exclusively on “heroes and holidays,” and views “cultural appreciation” kind of like a 
cafeteria menu, giving children an opportunity to celebrate a variety of individuals and enjoy 
tasty food (Killoran, Panaroni, Rivers, Razack, Vetter and Tymon, 2004). Scholars (Derman-
Sparks and Ramsey, 2011; Lin, Lake, Rice, 2008) worry that this approach largely ignores 
structural inequality and avoids critique of systematic racism. The consequence is that 
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children focus on culture without attending to the broader social structures that delimit social 
value and, by extension, limit vital economic and social resources. Because of the narrow 
focus, children might ascribe causal factors to culture itself — e.g. blaming extant inequality 
on cultural behavior. Along with incognizance, then, multicultural education can also prompt 
the kind of culturalism associated with stereotypic narrativity. 
Second, other research has focused on the ways in which multicultural education 
treats whiteness (Ortiz, 2000; Sleeter, 2001). The main problem, it is argued, is that the focus 
tends to center exclusively on the cultures associated with nonwhite groups. Whiteness itself 
is taken as the unnamed reference norm (McIntyre 1997; 2002). Children come to believe 
that culture is something exclusive to, say, black and brown people—and not something 
associated with being white. For instance, Pamela Perry’s investigation (2004) of a mostly 
white high school in California uncovers some of the problems that emerge from this 
approach. She writes: “White students . . .  usually expressed enthusiastic appreciation for 
‘the chance to learn about so many cultures.’ But learning about other cultures merely gave 
them more references by which to define what they were not” (Perry, 2004, p. 99). For Perry, 
multicultural education at her school encouraged children to think of culture strictly as that 
which is associated with nonwhite others.  
Similarly, Robin DiAngelo (2011) argues that some approaches to multicultural 
education fail because they encourage white children to think of “white” as an “unracialized 
identity or location” (p. 41). DiAngelo believes that some forms of multicultural education 
thus promote “a kind of blindness; an inability to think about whiteness as an identity or as a 
‘state’ of being that would or could have an impact on one’s life” (p. 41). When you 
systematically decline to name whiteness, and when you systematically decline to critique 
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structural racism, it encourages children to systematically ignore the ways that their own 
social position is tied to their race.  
Hypothesis #3: Some approaches to multicultural education contribute to the 




In addition to incognizance, some research points to ways that teachers and classroom 
materials might promote the racial minimization associated with doxastic white ignorance. 
Racial minimization refers to the way teachers (and others) downplay or diminish the 
importance of race in a given context.  
 
Minimizing racial slurs  
Lewis (2003) describes myriad instances in which students in her study either 
casually employed racial epithets or deliberately directed racial slurs at other students. In 
most of the cases, Lewis reports that the white teachers at the school were inclined to treat 
racial slurs such as they might any other cuss word. Lewis says that teachers in her study 
tended to “deracialize” incidents, conveying to students that conflicts involving racial slurs 
“are like regular, everyday conflicts in which both parties should be held equally responsible: 
such ways of addressing racist events make it seem as if the victims rather than the 
perpetrators are the ones with the problem, as if they are making a big deal out of nothing” 
(p. 2003, p. 22). In other words, whenever students employed racial epithets, teachers didn’t 
mark those words or give them any special relevance. Instead, teachers minimized the 
115 
 
salience of the words, often choosing to focus on the conflict itself. The conflict was thrown 
into relief, while the words that animated the conflict were downplayed. In most of the cases, 
the presence of racial slurs did not generate alarm in the teachers. They did not believe that 
such events warranted additional or unique educational responses.  
The risk is that when teachers and administrators respond to racist language in this 
way, it conveys the message that racial epithets are not a big deal. Later in life white people 
may struggle to adequately understand why such language is socially odious and morally 
problematic. It isn’t always plain to them, for example, why or how using the n-word might 
be offensive to others. And if white children are taught that explicitly racist language is not a 
big deal, it’s logical they would grow up to believe nonwhite persons are “overly sensitive” 
or “overacting” to racist language.  
Hypothesis 4: The way teachers confront instances of racism in schools 
contributes to patterns of racial minimization among white populations.  
 
Racial erasure  
A recent study (Rogers & Christian, 2007) employed discourse analysis to uncover 
the construction of race in four children’s books. The selected books were chosen because 
they contained explicitly racialized themes and are likely to be read in classrooms where the 
teacher has an interest in multicultural or social justice education. The authors found that two 
of the books in the sample contained many of the elements related to the kind of “white talk” 
(Rogers and Christian, 2007, p. 32) I described in Chapter 2. In addition, the authors found 
that two of the books in the study functioned to historicize racism by setting the context in 
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the distant past, depicting racism as something that happened a long time ago—and not 
necessarily as something that happens in the present day.   
Because the books contained no effort to connect the past to the present, the authors 
show how the narrative arcs track the kind of “racial erasure” Charles Mills names in his 
research. Racial erasure is a distinct kind of minimization that emphasizes historical progress. 
It encourages white people to focus exclusively on the advances that have been made toward 
racial equality while at the same time downplaying extant racial inequality.  
Amanda Lewis uncovered much of the same in her research. Many students she 
interviewed “saw the injustices they learned about as specific to an earlier point in time, as 
problems that were solved rather than being linked to contemporary forms of racial exclusion 
(Lewis, 2004, p. 18). She says further that, “The students did not appear to use anything they 
had learned about the settling of California, the genocide of Native Americans, or the 
subjugation of the Chinese to understand or interpret present-day racial realities (e.g. wage 
inequality, wealth inequality, Native Americans’ socioeconomic status)” (Lewis, 2004, p. 
18).  
Racial erasure is thus an effective tool for minimization because it permits white 
people to contrast contemporary realities with past reality in order to downplay contemporary 
racism by saying that it isn’t as bad as it used to be.  
Hypothesis 5:  The books teachers choose to teach about historical racism often 






Stereotypic narrativity  
Finally, a not insignificant body of literature points to possible ways that curricula in 
school serve to produce paradigmatic patterns of stereotypic narrativity associated with white 
ignorance. For this section, I employ the term “curriculum” somewhat narrowly to refer to a 
formal and planned sequence of instruction in specific content areas. Following Michael 
Apple’s (2004) general framework, I think of curriculum as a primary tool through which 
meaning is controlled and organized in school. The aim of this section is to explore various 
dimensions of the curriculum to locate how it might influence the way students think about 
race, and thus how it might contribute to stereotypic narrativity. The animating principle of 
this section is that the curriculum serves as a key site for the protection and preservation of 
white ignorance, not just because there is a lack of explicit attention to racism and cultural 
diversity, but because of the way curricula operates to express larger racialized narratives.  
Social studies — especially history — courses have long been lightning rods for 
political controversy and social contest. The roots of Chicana/o Studies and African-
American Studies programs in post-secondary education stem from efforts in the 1960s and 
1970s to revise history curricula in which nonwhite actors were debased, marginalized or 
excluded altogether. Despite years of “curriculum wars” (Binder, 2009) contesting whose 
history should be included and represented, evidence suggests that not much has changed at 
the p-12 level. To be sure, culturally responsive and sustaining educators have, in fact, made 
meaningful strides to design and implement a more inclusive social studies curriculum. But 
oftentimes those efforts target nonwhite students exclusively.  
Many scholars express serious concern about how nonwhite people are portrayed 
within social studies curricula. Ladson-Billings (2003), for instance, argues that if one 
118 
 
attempted to reconstruct the history of African Americans “based on the information 
presented in a typical U.S. History textbook” that history would be narrow and inexact, 
consisting mainly of a not-too-terrible boat ride across the Atlantic, some years of slavery 
with a friendly, caring master, maybe reconstruction, and possibly a discussion of Jim Crow 
social conditions, but only in the context of a Civil Rights Movement that succeeded in 
making racism a thing of the past (p. 26). Absent from the narrative are the years of white 
racial terrorism perpetrated by white people spanning from the formation of the United States 
up through the present day; absent are narratives that depict the agency of African 
Americans; absent are narratives that describe how African Americans funded and provided 
for their own education in the face of laws prohibiting black literacy and in states that refused 
to fund public education for black children; absent, too, are narratives that display the 
outsized cultural, artistic and literacy achievements of black Americans.  
Ladson-Billings (2003) also describes the false and erroneous ideas U.S. History 
curriculum contains regarding American Indians:  
 
We see American Indians as welcoming European settlers, joining them in a 
Thanksgiving celebration, guiding them as they explore the west, being massacred as 
settlers push westward, and finally being removed and subdued by Andrew Jackson. 
After the “Trail of Tears” American Indians disappear from the pages of our 
textbooks and the curriculum. For our students American Indians are museum 
exhibits. No discussion of the ongoing plight of Indians in America is available to 
most students in our schools. The contemporary Indian rarely emerges in the 
classroom. At most, our national discussion of American Indians focuses on gambling 
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casinos and alcoholism. We rarely configure race into our discussion of American 
Indians (p. 3). 
 
Other scholarship has confirmed the presence of what Ladson-Billings (2001) calls 
the “discourse of invisibility” (p. 204), a discourse that hides nonwhite Americans or 
downplays how systems of white racial domination saturate the history of the United States. 
For example, one recent study (Shear, Knowles, Soden and Castro, 2015) analyzed five high 
school (three advanced placement), one middle school, and two elementary U.S. history 
textbooks to understand what they say about indigenous education. All of the textbooks in 
the sample were published after 2011.  
Shear and colleagues found that the history textbooks, on the whole, describe 
indigenous education as a process of “peaceful reform” instead of, more accurately, a process 
of cultural genocide and assimilative cultural erasure (2015, p. 69). They also found that 
most discussion of indigenous education was relegated to the fringes of history, literally 
printed in sidebars on the margins of the pages. Finally, the authors found that there was no 
mention of indigenous education after 1900 (2015, p. 69).  
Craig and Davis (2015) similarly analyzed eleven secondary textbooks to locate how 
the logics of white supremacy organize the presentation of history. They found that 
indigenous peoples were regularly described in a context of violence — depicted typically as 
a singularly violent people. The authors believe that history textbooks function to recycle the 
stereotype of the “savage” and make it seem as if Native Americans can only resolve conflict 
through violence (Craig and Davis, 2015, p. 91).    
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Prentice Chandler’s recent research (2015; 2017; Chandler and Branscombe, 2015) 
has described these practices and pedagogies as “White Social Studies,” which he argues 
serves to protect the “white racial code” (Chandler and Branscombe, 2016, p. 61). Chandler’s 
(2015) research is particularly illuminating because it’s the only empirical work I’ve found 
that investigates practices in almost-all-white schools and classrooms. Chandler (2015) 
invesigates three high school history teachers at an almost-all-white high school in southern 
Alabama. Consistent with other research, Chandler located four pillars of “White Social 
Studies”: “(1) silences relative to race; (2) American exceptionalism; (3) dominance through 
mentioning; and (4) missing in interaction” (2015, p. 66). The three teachers in his study 
comprise the entirety of the social studies department at the school. And, importantly, each 
teacher reported being trained in a teacher preparation program that included some 
coursework teaching about whiteness and critical race theory. They each also described 
themselves as being committed to social and racial justice (Chandler, 2015, p. 68).  
Chandler (2015) found that all three of the teachers appeared to have “deep, personal 
and racial investment in the fictive imaginary of the United States” (p. 68). Accordingly, the 
teachers performed silences about nonwhite persons in U.S. history, which Chandler (2015) 
argues served to preserve “dominant white narratives about how things came to be” (p. 69). 
Additionally, Chandler (2015) describes how each of the teachers were invested in ideas 
about white exceptionalism. Consistently, he found that the teachers would frame racism or 
other kinds of oppression as anomalies or aberrations to — rather than central and integrated 
features of — a state that, according to the pedagogy of White Social Studies, represents a 
beacon of freedom and equality. In this respect, narratives conveying white exceptionalism 
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lay the groundwork for the kind of anti-black culturalism that is a hallmark of the kind of 
stereotypical narrativity associated with white ignorance.   
 Next, Chandler (2015) describes a common pedagogical practice among the teachers, 
which he calls “stopping short” (p. 72). Themes around race, racial dominance, and white 
supremacy were always “mentioned” but were rarely included in formal outlines, notes, or 
testing (p. 77). As mentioned above, other research has similarly noted the way “stopping 
short” techniques are employed in textbooks, where racial issues are mentioned, but not 
developed in depth. Instead, they’re positioned as marginalia. Apple and Christian-Smith 
(1991) call this “dominance by mentioning” which they argue is an especially insidious form 
of epistemic oppression because it operates under the guise of inclusion and equality (p. 8). 
Teachers, as Chandler (2015) writes, are able to dutifully acknowledge “a more complicated 
version of history” but it’s usually “followed by a ‘stopping short’ of developing” that history 
in order to preserve and protect dominant white narratives (p. 75). 
 Finally, Chandler (2015) describes ways that “White Social Studies” depict nonwhite 
groups as “acting with no purpose” (p. 71). Regularly the teachers would describe events 
involving nonwhite groups without drawing attention to, or analyzing, the motivations, 
experiences, or active interests that might have governed historical interactions. History is 
described as something that happens to nonwhite groups; rarely are nonwhite groups 
constructed as active agents in the production of important historical events or processes 
(Chandler, 2015, p. 79). In this respect, stopping short could contribute to the kind of 
naturalism that is the hallmark of error associated with white ignorance. Students are literally 
trained to stop short from performing the kind of structural analysis that might invite them to 
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consider alternative explanations to extant social realities. Instead, they’re potentially 
encouraged to imagine that the way things appear are just the natural order of things.  
Hypothesis 6: The way history and social studies is taught to white students has 
the effect of reifying stereotypic narrativity, laying the groundwork for narratives of 
naturalism, culturalism and white disadvantage. 
 
Active white ignorance 
There is plenty of evidence to suggest schools may be complicit in the reproduction 
of doxastic white ignorance. It’s not as clear, however, that schools serve to reproduce active 
white ignorance. I have found no research, for instance, that points to ways that schools may 
encourage students to inhabit intellectual vice, such as laziness, arrogance or incuriousness. 
Some of the literature that theorizes epistemic virtue points to evidence that schools may not 
be doing enough to break students from poor intellectual habits. But it’s another thing 
altogether to suggest that schools may be actively producing bad intellectual habits. 
There is, however, a small body of research that points to ways teachers and schools 
might be encouraging students to adopt the discursive practices associated with white 
ignorance.  In Chapter 3, I defined discourse-based active white ignorance as that which 
serves to insulate white people from confronting or interrogating racial dimensions of reality. 
In this section, I want to explore how schools may be responsible, in part, for helping 






Discourse-based active white ignorance: Colorblindness   
The discourse of colorblindness, as defined in Chapter 3, refers to discursive practices 
that explicitly avoid racialized language to insulate oneself from dealing with race or racism 
in some substantive way. Multiple ethnographic and qualitative studies have documented 
how when teachers discuss nonwhite students, they’re inclined to employ any marker except 
race. Scholars refer to this phenomenon as “white silencing” and “colormuteness.” 
 Lewis (2003) describes how colormuteness operates in practice. Her research 
documents how teachers regularly discuss race by using geographical markers (2003, p. 27). 
Because of the spatial racial segregation that divides Chicago along various boundaries, 
teachers pointed to different neighborhoods, or even relied on the “suburban-urban” split, to 
talk about different racial groups (Lewis, 2003, p. 28). Black communities, for example, were 
described as “urban” and white communities were described as “suburban.”  In this way, 
Lewis (2003) argues, educators are able to replace racial categories with terms like “inner-
city,” “welfare,” “project-kids” or “Barnsworth folks,” which serve as shorthand references 
to mostly-black neighborhoods in Chicago (p. 28). 
 Lewis’s findings mirror a recent study by Castagno (2014) who describes ways that 
teachers were “implicated in discourse around ‘east-side’ and ‘west-side’ schools and 
students” (p. 86). The west-side schools were mostly lower-income Latinx. The east-side 
schools, by contrast, were higher income and mostly-white. 
 Along with geographical markers, recent studies (Freidus and Noguera, 2015; Zirkel 
and Pollack, 2016) also document how teachers rely on categories like language status, 
socioeconomic status and refugee status to discuss race. In Castagno’s (2014) study, 
language-status categories supplied especially effective code words “because almost all 
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students of color at this school were classified as English-language learners and enrolled in 
ESL courses. Thus, by talking about ‘language minority’ students . . . educators could talk 
about and around race in ways that were perceived to be safer and less threatening” (p. 86). 
Freidus and Noguera (2015) similarly document how teachers rely on categories like “low-
income,” “poverty,” “dangerous,” “violent” and “drug-infested” to describe nonwhite 
communities and schools. Lewis (2003) similarly found a willingness among educators in her 
study to describe other communities in terms of “dysfunction,” “chaos” and 
“disorganization” while tracing the cause to socio-economic status and the “culture of 
poverty” (p. 63).  
Importantly, these analyses do not imply that only explicitly racial markers and 
categories are appropriate or correct. There are a range of contexts in which categories like 
language-status, geography, economic-status, refugee-status and so on can helpfully and 
productively refer to real features of the world that are relevant to education and other social 
projects. The reason, however, that research tends to dwell on these specific vocabularies is 
primarily because there is a conspicuous pattern whereby educators are evidently willing to 
use almost any other category except race.  It’s therefore appropriate to infer, given the 
evidence, that these categories must function as racial codes precisely because explicitly 
racial categories are almost never otherwise employed. These discourses function to silence 
mention of race to insulate interlocutors from confronting race in a sustained way.  
Other studies have documented instances in which teachers not only employ the 
discourse of colorblindness themselves, but also explicitly encourage their students not to 
discuss race when it comes up. Castagno (2014) suggests that the efforts to shut down 
dialogue around race is a consequence of what she calls a pedagogy of “niceness.” One of 
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Castagno’s key theses is that “whiteness” is marked by “niceness” which operates to preserve 
the status quo in an effort to minimize social conflict. She says that educators focus on 
helping students be nice to one another, and believe that race-based language will undermine 
that objective. Amanda Lewis, for her part, believes the phenomenon can be traced to a 
persistent belief that any discussion of race is inherently “divisive” (2003, p. 18). Because 
teachers believe that discussing race is divisive, they’re inclined to halt or avert discussion of 
race in order to avoid controversy or conflict. In this respect, colormuteness is often 
motivated by the discourse of normative colorblindness.  
Sometimes, educators do not enact colormuteness deliberately. In her book, 
Colormute: Race Talk Dilemmas, Mica Pollock (2009) describes how she was 
unintentionally complicit in performing colormuteness as a teacher. In an vivid recollection, 
she describes how one of her black students approached her to complain that other teachers 
were acting and talking in racist ways. Pollock recounts how she told the student he needed 
to make his case in a “calm” manner and “provide evidence” for the serious charges. In 
retrospect, she recognized that it was inappropriate to ask the boy to provide evidence for 
racism; her requirement, she said, merely functioned to ensure that racial confrontation was 
thwarted.  
Castagno’s (2014) study provides two especially rich examples of the way teachers 
may discourage students from discussing race. In one case a guest speaker gave a talk about 
living in Germany to students in a German-language class (the speaker was a parent of a 
child who attended the school; she was born and raised in Germany) (p. 94). After the talk, 
students were invited to ask questions. One of the students asked the guest speaker what 
“color” the speaker was (Castagno, 2014, p. 83). He was either asking about her race or her 
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nationality (Castagno can’t quite work out which). The guest speaker and the teacher both 
told the child that it was “inappropriate” to ask that question (Castagno, 2014, p. 84). When 
the child asked why it is inappropriate, the teacher responded that it’s not polite to ask such 
questions “in public” and “in front of everyone” (p. 84). According to Castagno, the teacher 
said to the student, “If someone came up to you and asked you about your religion or 
ethnicity or race, it’s just not polite” (2014, p. 84).  
In another case, Castagno (2014) reports an episode in which a Pacific Islander boy 
and a group of Latino boys were discussing the meaning of various racialized terms, such as 
“Spicket” and “Tonganos,” and whether the terms are racist (p. 90). Castagno describes that 
the teacher interrupted the conversation and said, “‘Stop talking about race and ethnicity 
because it’s making you upset’” (2014, p. 90). Castagno’s interpretation of the conversation 
differs, however, from the teacher’s. As Castagno (2014) writes, “I did not get the sense that 
the students were getting upset; it seemed to me that they were having a productive 
conversation about race and language” (P. 91). In any case, the teacher demanded that the 
boys stop talking about the racial terms because “other people can hear it and may get 
offended” and because she wants the classroom “to be a nice environment where everyone 
feels welcomed’” (Castagno, 2014, p. 91).   
Across a variety of studies, researchers have documented markedly consistent 
findings. Regardless of the motivation, whether it’s because, as Castagno (2014) argues, 
whiteness requires “niceness,” or because of efforts to avoid conflict, educators often actively 
prevent discussion around race. To be sure, there are a host of reasons why a teacher may 
want to silence conversation about race in the classroom. Castagno’s interpretation of the 
conversation illustrated above could have been wrong. Perhaps the art teacher knows 
127 
 
something about her students that Castagno does not. Perhaps there were similar discussions 
among the boys in the past that escalated into verbal altercation, or worse. Perhaps the 
teacher believed that the students’ dialogue was in violation of school policy around hate 
speech. It’s hard to tell what that teacher’s motivations were, in part because Castagno does 
not ask. But, in a way, that particular teacher’s motivations are beside the point.  
My goal isn’t to critique or interrogate everything a teacher does in the classroom. 
The point is to highlight documented patterns of practice to locate ways that educators might 
be responsible for the reproduction of white ignorance. My seventh hypothesis is, thus, 
multipronged: The discourse of colorblindness in schools has two deleterious effects. First, 
white students are deliberately and expressly denied a space to make sense of what race is, 
how race structures the world and how it affects their lives. Second, teachers who employ the 
discourse of colorblindness send an explicit message that it is not “appropriate” or “normal” 
or “acceptable” to talk about race. It seems plausible that if students are explicitly trained not 
to discuss race, then the outcomes will reflect cognitive and interpretive patterns consistent 
with character-based white ignorance. They’ll be inclined to insulate themselves from new 
ideas that might disrupt the ideas-based white ignorance they inhabit. Hypothesis 7: The 
way teachers employ the discourse of colorblindness encourages children to adopt the 
discourse of colorblindness and prevents children from confronting race in sustained 
and meaningful ways. It seems prudent, therefore, to follow Fine (2017) and investigate the 
formal and informal ways schools control what can and cannot be spoken, what discourse 







Historically, education researchers have focused on mostly nonwhite schools, since 
those are the places in which some of the most severe educational injustices transpire. But the 
hypotheses developed in this chapter suggest that major problems may be found in mostly 
white schools too. Worst case scenario is that we have publicly funded institutions 
systematically inculcating deep patterns of white ignorance, serving to reify the epistemic 
dimensions of a white supremacy. At this point, education researchers don’t have a good 
sense of what, exactly, is going on in these schools.  
In this chapter I tried to show how the white ignorance framework can be used to 
guide future research. Researchers can, first, focus on how specific policies promote and 
validate doxastic white ignorance. At the same time, they can investigate how classroom 
practices may promote and validate behaviors and discourses associated with white 
ignorance. The goal, eventually, is to build a robust educational approach capable of 
undermining white ignorance. Unfortunately, that goal can’t be achieved unless we first 
identify what the problem is. The table below summarize the seven hypothesis I identified in 
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In the previous chapter, I showed how the white ignorance framework can be used to 
guide empirical inquiry into mostly white schools. The purpose was to illuminate areas where 
we can test the general hypothesis that schools are, to some degree, complicit in proliferating 
white ignorance in white communities. In this chapter, I show how the framework can be 
applied to educational practice, not just research. More specifically, I want to show how the 
framework can help answer the core question that motivates this project: How can mostly 
white schools in white communities operate to disrupt and undermine the reproduction of 
white ignorance in white communities? 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and clarify the aim of an anti-white 
ignorance pedagogy that might help interrupt and undermine the reproduction of white 
ignorance in and across white communities. Then, I want to show how educators can employ 
the white ignorance framework toward that end. In sum, I plan to articulate the aim and then 
suggest how we might get there.22 
Because white ignorance involves three primary components—doxastic, active and 
meta-white ignorance—I think it’s intuitive that we should work to advance pedagogy 
capable of addressing all three. Lots of research exists that helps guide educators toward 
eliminating doxastic white ignorance. Approaches like “critical whiteness pedagogy” (Allen, 
 
22 Of course, like the last chapter, my approach is somewhat limited because I don’t have an actual body of 
empirical research from which I can draw to help identify areas that warrant remedy. It’s difficult to conceive of 
an educational aim when we aren’t exactly sure what the problem is. I have a hunch, but not much hard 
evidence. Culturally responsive and sustaining pedagogies are positioned, in part, as responses to specific 
practices in schools that are toxic and counterproductive. However, in this case I’m not sure exactly what 
practices in mostly white schools are toxic and therefore warrant the most immediate attention. In this respect, 
the aim I identify is independent of sound diagnosis. That doesn’t mean it’s wrong per se. Only that it’s limited. 
Should education researchers undertake more systematic investigation, expect potential revisions to my thesis.    
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2004; Yeung, Spanierman, & Landrum-Brown, 2013), “pedagogies of whiteness” (DiAngelo, 
2012) and “white privilege analysis” (Lensmire, McManimon, Tierney, Lee-Nichols, Casey, 
& Davis, 2013) have gained enormous currency in the last two decades. The purpose of these 
pedagogies is straightforward: To help white students understand the mechanics of race, 
racism and racial domination. In other words, the goal is to “visibilize” the racial dimensions 
of our shared world (DiAngelo, 2012; Rogers & Moseley, 2006), to minimize obliviousness, 
moderate minimization and correct error.  
The seminal voice in this tradition is Peggy McIntosh, whose essay “White Privilege: 
Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack” (1990) remains one of the most widely read essays about 
whiteness in education today. The main aim of the essay and the pedagogy that underwrites 
“white privilege analysis” is to help white students recognize and acknowledge their own 
white racial privilege.  Other scholarship takes a similar approach, but seek to go beyond 
privilege to larger domains of racial ignorance. Barbara Applebaum, for example, developed 
an approach called “white complicity pedagogy.” Applebaum’s concern is that white students 
are taught the ways they “benefit” (2008) from systems of white racial domination, but they 
are not taught the ways in which they are also complicit in those same systems. So, she 
advocates for a pedagogy that encourages students to identify their own complicity as part of 
an awakening to the ways their everyday behaviors are implicated in systems of white racial 
domination.  
Lawrence Blum’s research (2012) represents a related approach, expressing similar 
concern that sometimes educators focus too much on racial privilege. According to Blum, 
often absent from the conversation is a robust structural analysis of white racial domination. 
In his view, white students are not given the vocabulary and resources needed to interpret and 
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understand all the ways that race shapes the modern world. Blum believes that by directly 
teaching about race as an explicit school subject (2015), students can gain an expanded 
vocabulary and acquire new conceptual frameworks that help facilitate new kinds of 
interaction and expression, provide new ways to interpret racial phenomena in the world, and 
hopefully thereby promote more ethical conduct. 
Together, these scholars help develop frameworks we can use to minimize and 
sometimes eliminate elements of doxastic white ignorance, helping students understand 
white privilege, white complicity and all the ways in which race otherwise structures 
phenomena in our world. Ultimately, what these various approaches share is a faith that 
minimizing doxastic can help create a society that is more just. 
These approaches are worthwhile—and absolutely crucial for any educational 
approach that seeks to undermine white ignorance. In what follows, however, I construct 
several arguments to support the idea that the priority aim of anti-white ignorance pedagogy 
should be to help students overcome the levels of meta-white ignorance I elucidate in 
Chapter 4. In other words, although it’s important for educators to help minimize doxastic 
and active white ignorance, I will argue that educators should prioritize meta-white ignorance 
above all.  A priority aim is one that, when achieved, educators can be confident they’ve 
done their job. Educational success in this context means eroding the three levels of meta-
white ignorance I identified in Chapter 4. 
To restate, here are the three levels of the meta-white ignorance. 
Level 3: Unawareness of the thesis of white ignorance per se. Persons simply don’t 
know that white ignorance is a possible condition to which they’re subject.  
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Level 2: Acknowledging that white ignorance is a real phenomenon to which others 
are subject, but not noticing that one is subject to white ignorance also. Persons may be 
inclined to believe that they’re immune to white ignorance, even while acknowledging that 
the problem is real.  
Level 1: Recognition that one is subject to white ignorance, but not knowing the 
degree or extent to which they are. Persons may fully acknowledge that white ignorance 
affects them, but they may not be able to identify how it affects them and in what context(s).  
Persons who overcome all three levels of meta-white ignorance can realize wokeness. 
Wokeness, I will argue, doesn’t mark the absence of ignorance. Rather, wokeness reflects an 
alertness to one’s ignorance combined with the readiness and capacity to recalibrate one’s 
judgment and neutralize the effect ignorance has on one’s judgment. Here’s a more formal 
definition to align with the definition of the levels above: 
 Wokeness: Recognition that one is subject to white ignorance combined with the 
capacity to identify how and in what ways they’re subject to white ignorance. In addition, 
wokeness includes a readiness to recalibrate one’s judgment based on reflective meta-
cognitive work. 
My theory of wokeness draws heavily on the model of “testimonial sensitivity” that 
Miranda Fricker elucidates in her book Testimonial Injustice (2007). But where she focuses 
on virtuous listening, I try to broaden the application of her theory to epistemic comportment 
in general. I will show how her model perfectly captures the reflective, meta-cognitive 
operations central to wokeness. Woke persons are always ready to reflect on their epistemic 
comportment, then monitor, regulate and adjust for their ignorance. In sum, wokeness is not 
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realized by eliminating ignorance altogether, but by recognizing and ethically managing 
one’s own inescapable ignorance.  
 
Why should we prioritize meta-white ignorance?    
In this section I try to build the case that educators should aim to achieve wokeness, 
not conceived as independence from ignorance, but conceived as keen awareness of one’s 
own ignorance.  There are several theoretical and practical reasons why I believe this 
approach is crucial. First, the theoretical argument: It seems impossible to leverage 
educational institutions (or really any mechanism) to eliminate white ignorance altogether. 
As Jose Medina (2013) persuasively argues, white ignorance is the epistemic corollary to 
material patterns of white supremacy. The two exist side by side, together as one. You can’t 
eliminate white ignorance unless you eliminate white supremacy. And at this stage of 
American history, eliminating white supremacy does not seem plausible.  
Further, even if we could eliminate doxastic and active white ignorance, it seems like 
too high a bar and too much a burden to place on educators. Consider that I’m in the 
advanced stages of a PhD program, writing a dissertation focused on white ignorance. For 
nearly a decade now I’ve taken courses from some of the top scholars about race and racism, 
focusing much of my intellectual energy on patterns of ignorance among white people. At 
this point, the most foolish conclusion I could draw is that my education has made me 
somehow immune to white ignorance. If anything, I’m simply more attune to all the ways in 
which I still am regularly subject to patterns of doxastic and active white ignorance (and I 
think that’s the point!). So, if the very education that helped to produce this research couldn’t 
eliminate my own doxastic and active white ignorance, why should we expect any 
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educational approach to achieve that aim? The reality is that white ignorance is the epistemic 
water in which white people swim. You can’t simply erase deeply inculcated patterns of 
behavior and thought. It’s here whether we like it or not. The question is: How should we 
deal with it?  
Of course, an obvious objection might be: Just because we can’t altogether eliminate 
white ignorance doesn’t mean we shouldn’t work to minimize it as much as possible. As an 
analogy: We can’t completely eliminate germs, but we still prudently wash our hands to 
prevent the spread of virus and illness. To respond to this potential objection: I am not 
suggesting that we should abandon efforts to minimize doxastic and active white ignorance. 
It’s vitally important! But the very fact that we can’t eliminate these kinds of white ignorance 
throws into relief the value of eliminating meta-white ignorance first and foremost. If 
patterns of white ignorance are guaranteed to affect white people to some extent, then it 
seems necessary to equip them with the skills and reflective resources to understand how 
they’re subject to that ignorance, so they can address it.  
There are several practical considerations too. Even if it were possible to eliminate 
doxastic and active white ignorance, it would probably be a relatively rare educational 
outcome. Therefore, there’s decided risk in encouraging white people to imagine that they’re 
no longer subject to doxastic and active white ignorance. The risk is that we potentially train 
young people to, in a sense, weaponize wokeness. Former President Barack Obama has 
expressed concern about what he names “call-out culture.” Here’s how Obama describes it:  
 
I do get a sense sometimes now among certain young people, and this is accelerated 
by social media, there is this sense sometimes of: ‘The way of me making change is 
136 
 
to be as judgmental as possible about other people.’ Like, if I tweet or hashtag about 
how you didn’t do something right or used the wrong verb then I can sit back and feel 
pretty good about myself, cause, ‘Man, you see how woke I was, I called you out.’”23 
  
I think Obama nicely captures how wokeness—when understood as an absence of 
ignorance—invites epistemic hubris and overconfidence. If Medina (2013) is correct that 
patterns of racial advantage tend to promote epistemic arrogance, then our educational 
approach should work to help students avoid that fate. If we do not help white persons 
eliminate all the levels of meta-white ignorance and achieve wokeness (conceived as 
recognition of one’s own ignorance), they might get stuck in Level 2 meta-white ignorance. 
They might come to believe that they’re no longer subject to white ignorance, but that others 
are. They might spend all their time calling out others, while ignoring their own ignorance. 
However, if we prioritize meta-white ignorance, then we’re more likely to promote epistemic 
humility. Wokeness should involve the persistent recognition of one’s own epistemic 
limitations.   
 Another practical consideration concerns how white ignorance manifests. Do we 
imagine white people activate patterns of active white ignorance the same way in every 
context? Or do we imagine epistemic vices like arrogance, laziness and incuriousness only 
appear sometimes in some contexts? Some recent scholarship promotes the former view, 
arriving at a conception of active white ignorance that I worry is too broadly applied. For 
example, Whitt (2105) implicitly agrees with the basic thesis I advance in this project, 
 
23 The former President’s remarks came at a summit for the Obama Foundation on October 29, 2019. View the 




arguing that “it is not sufficient for teachers to make students aware of injustice, or their 
potential complicity in it” (p. 427). In other words, it isn’t enough to only attend to doxastic 
white ignorance. “Beyond this,” Whitt writes, “teachers should cultivate epistemic virtue in 
the classroom and encourage students to take responsibility for better ways of knowing” 
(2015, p. 427). This is key. Whitt says that to deal effectively with white ignorance, and 
specifically active white ignorance, educators must help students “cultivate epistemic virtue.” 
Later in the article, Whitt underlines the same point: “An adequate response [to white 
ignorance] requires cultivating epistemic humility, intellectual curiosity and open-
mindedness" (p. 437).  
Whitt’s prescription here is based on the surprising diagnosis that “many students will 
have little practice with these epistemic virtues” (p. 437). Whitt explains that the reason 
teachers need to teach epistemic virtue is because students, in general, don’t really have any; 
students are unpracticed when it comes to epistemic virtue. I value Whitt’s analysis. He 
recognizes that educators must go beyond doxastic white ignorance and seek to deal with the 
dialogic, emotive and behavioral responses white students bring to the classroom when 
discussion centers on racism and racial privilege. But I’m not confident that the response 
Whitt endorses is the right one — and I’m not confident his diagnosis is fully accurate.  
Here's why. Whitt (2015) is reflecting on his experience as a college-level English 
literature instructor. He’s talking specifically about college students. What’s more, his 
teaching experience is at a relatively prestigious university, perennially ranked in the top 25 
in the United States. Whitt seems to say that the students in his classroom simply don’t have 
the intellectual virtues required to learn about facts in the world in a responsible, autonomous 
fashion. To be fair, Whitt might very well be right. Indeed, on some level it’s plausible that 
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even some of the best students at one of the better schools in the United States are basically 
incurious, close-minded and arrogant. But that assessment feels somewhat inexact and heavy 
handed.  
Is it accurate to say that some of the best students in the country are altogether 
unpracticed when it comes to epistemic virtue? I imagine there’s a strong likelihood that 
student behaviors don’t reflect epistemic virtue in his classroom, specifically amid activities 
and conversations which invite students to reflect on racism and racial advantage. But can 
Whitt claim that these students altogether lack epistemic virtue simply because they don’t 
exhibit virtue in his classroom? I’m not sure it’s fair to render an assessment of these 
students’ entire intellectual character based on observed behaviors during some classroom 
lessons.    
Importantly, Whitt is not alone. Medina (2012), for his part, articulates a very similar 
diagnosis, using sometimes even stronger, more emphatic language. As I described in 
Chapter 3, Medina believes that structural social advantage serves to generate a pathological 
condition in whites, which makes them, he says, “absolutely incapable of acknowledging any 
mistake or limitation, [and] indulging in delusional cognitive omnipotence that prevents 
[them] from learning from others and improving” (2012, p. 31; emphasis added). Since 
whites, according to Medina, enjoy “ignorance out of luxury” (2012, p. 34) they eventually 
assume a “habitual lack of epistemic curiosity” (p. 35), which over time “atrophies one’s 
cognitive attitudes and dispositions” creating “blinders” that inhibit the acquisition of 
knowledge about the world (p. 35). Ultimately, Medina says, their character is one of 
“epistemic closed-mindedness,” a condition in which “one’s mental processing remains 
systematically closed to certain phenomena, experiences, and perspectives” (2012, p. 34).  
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In my reading, both Medina and Whitt describe whites as inhabiting full-blown 
epistemic vice. For example, as I quoted above, Medina says structural conditions are such 
that privileged white subjects are “absolutely incapable of acknowledging any mistake or 
limitation.”  In my view, “absolutely incapable” represents unnecessarily strong language.  
There are other points in the text when Medina doubles down on the same analysis, writing:  
 
Epistemic vices are flaws that are not incidental and transitory, but structural and 
systematic: they involve attitudes deeply rooted in one’s personality and cognitive 
functioning. Epistemic vices are composed of attitudinal structures that permeate 
one’s entire cognitive life: they involve attitudes toward oneself and others in 
testimonial exchanges, attitudes toward the evidence available and one’s assessment 
of it, and so on (p. 31; emphasis added). 
 
Medina is not mincing words. In his lights, epistemic vice is that which infects one’s 
entire character — one’s entire cognitive life. In other contexts, Medina describes how 
privileged white subjects can become “epistemically spoiled” (2012, p. 54). Their character 
is rotten, literally, to the core. At each step, Medina asserts a sweeping diagnosis of the way 
privileged people, in general, are constituted. 
  I have no doubt that the behaviors Whitt and Medina observe are real and common. 
But the question is whether it’s accurate to assert that white people exhibit the same 
epistemic vice in all contexts. Would Whitt’s students, for example, exhibit the same kind of 
epistemic vice in, say, math class or science class? My guess is that it’s unlikely. On some 
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level we must imagine that the students at the top universities in the United States exhibit 
intellectual virtue in some contexts and classes.  
The question is important because how we conceptualize the problem significantly 
impacts how we construct an educational approach. If we think that students lack virtue then 
we need to help students acquire virtue. Alternatively, if we think that most students, 
generally speaking, can inhabit intellectual virtue, but simply fail to do so in some contexts, 
then that’s something else altogether.   
In the next section I build on Miranda Fricker’s research to advance the latter view. I 
argue that the situation significantly shapes how patterns of ignorance manifest. Whites do 
not always and in every case inhabit epistemic vice; rather, given certain situational 
variables, whites (and not just whites) are, in effect, triggered to inhabit bad epistemic 
character traits. In other words, sometimes whites can reason or listen very well and they 
don’t appear subject epistemic vice at all. But other times when, for example, the topic or 
conversation concerns race or racism, whites may suddenly abandon the epistemic virtues 
they might otherwise inhabit in other contexts. The point is that various situations have the 
tendency to prompt whites to inhabit certain traits that impair their cognitive functioning.  
In my view, then, it’s inexact to say that white people altogether lack epistemic 
virtue. It’s more accurate, I believe, to say that white people lack epistemic virtue on some 
(perhaps many) occasions—but not always! And the fact that most white people can 
sometimes inhabit intellectual virtue in some contexts carries pedagogical implications 
because educators can help students become alert to instances in which they fail to inhabit 
virtue. Therefore, I believe the educational goal is not exactly to eliminate active white 
ignorance, but rather to help students recognize and identify when and in what situations 
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they’re likely to inhabit epistemic vice associated with active white ignorance. Wokeness 
shouldn’t mean the absence of active white ignorance, but the aptitude to reflect on how 
active white ignorance affects one’s epistemic comportment and the ability to recalibrate 
one’s judgement in light of that reflection.  
 
Miranda Fricker’s Model of Testimonial Sensitivity  
In her landmark book, Epistemic Injustice, Fricker (2007) seeks (among other 
objectives) to analyze why white people commonly fail to listen to, and seriously consider, 
the views of nonwhite others. Her research, in other words, seeks to understand why 
privileged whites tend to ignore others who don’t share the same skin color and social status. 
A paradigmatic example of this phenomenon, she says, is an instance in which a white cop 
doesn’t give appropriate weight a to black witness’s testimony.  Fricker says, in general, 
white cops tend to be more suspicious of black witnesses compared to white witnesses.  
The reason, she argues, that whites fail to listen to nonwhite others is because whites 
inhabit or activate stereotypic frames that affect their perception. When a hearer encounters a 
speaker to whom she has either explicitly or implicitly assigned a negative stereotype, the 
would-be hearer is often also inclined to ascribe less credibility to that speaker. Prejudice, she 
says, “will tend surreptitiously to inflate or deflate the credibility afforded the speaker, and 
sometimes this will be sufficient to cross the threshold for belief or acceptance so that the 
hearer’s prejudice causes him to miss out on a piece of knowledge” (Fricker, 2007, p. 17).  
Fricker (2007) refers to this as a “prejudicial credibility deficit” (p. 19) owing to a negative 
stereotypic judgement. In other words, extant stereotypes (e.g. “black people are dumb” or 
“untrustworthy”) causes a hearer to believe that the speaker is not credible, and therefore the 
142 
 
hearer doesn’t listen as carefully or diligently as she might listen in other contexts to other 
people.  
Fricker argues that there are many situations in which a similar phenomenon occurs.24 
For instance, prejudicial credibility deficits might also prompt men to exclude women from 
conversations about politics simply because it is assumed women qua women aren’t capable 
of discussing politics intelligently. Whatever the topic, the key idea is that persons are 
assigned a certain degree of credibility on the basis of a given stereotype. Women, 
nonwhites, children even, are subject to operant stereotypes that involve alleged cognitive 
capacity and incapacity, presumed duplicitousness, foolishness etc. Given active stereotypes, 
women are judged unintelligent simply because they are women. Blacks can be judged as 
dishonest simply because they are black. Children can be perceived as unintelligent simply 
because they are young. There are, in short, according to Fricker, endless stereotypic frames 
that may function to incite a prejudicial credibility deficit.  
Fricker’s analysis is useful because she captures an important reality: It’s not like 
white men are altogether bad listeners. Fricker recognizes that when white men converse 
with one another they’re surely inclined to listen intently and ascribe appropriate credibility 
to their interlocutor. In other contexts, white men might even listen well to women, if the 
context is one in which stereotypic frames aren’t activated. In fact, Fricker says that owing to 
evolutionary biology and the historical means by which humans gather knowledge, people 
tend to be pretty good listeners — our survival depends on it! And yet, as soon as a 
stereotypic frame is activated it all falls apart.  
 
24 In fact, Fricker believes that “the right vision of epistemic relations is such that testimonial injustice goes on 
much of the time, and while it may be hard enough to police one’s beliefs for prejudice, it is significantly harder 
to reliably filter out the prejudicial stereotypes that inform one’s social perceptions directly, without doxastic 
mediation” (2007, p. 36). 
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 What I glean from Fricker’s account is this: Several factors in a situation can cause 
persons to fail to inhabit epistemic virtues they might otherwise inhabit in other situations or 
contexts. The key idea is that some element of the situation triggers the person to call up a 
stereotype, which makes them view and appraise their interlocutor with less credibility. The 
credibility deficit, in turn, makes the hearer not exercise responsible listening, and therefore 
they don’t inhabit concomitant epistemic virtues like humility, diligence and curiosity.  
Importantly, “situation,” in this context, shouldn’t be conceived too narrowly. A 
situation might refer to literally every instance in which a white person interacts with a 
nonwhite person. By situation, I don’t mean to identify a discrete event with a definite time 
horizon. Situation might include simply being in the world. I just mean to say that our virtue 
manifests differently in different situations.    
Fricker focuses chiefly on interpersonal interactions, especially those influenced by 
negative stereotypic frames. However, I want to suggest that credibility deficits that stem 
from stereotypic frames are only one small aspect of the broader problem. So, it makes sense 
to expand Fricker’s framework to encompass other aspects of white ignorance too. White 
ignorance is a massive epistemic condition that includes stereotypic framing, to be sure, but 
also much more than that. In my view, we should focus on the entire constellation of 
epistemic challenges, including doxastic white ignorance (incognizance, minimization, racial 
narratives) and active white ignorance (discourses, habits and attitudes). The problem we 
encounter is much broader than stereotyping and poor listening.  
Consider the way two situations might trigger entirely different epistemic 
comportment. Imagine two white people are discussing the movie First Man (a movie about 
Neil Armstrong landing on the moon), they're not likely, during the course of the 
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conversation, to inhabit aspects of white ignorance. Under normal conditions, they'll 
probably listen pretty well to one another and enjoy a generally charitable and productive 
dialogue. Alternatively, consider if those same two white people begin conversing about the 
movie BlacKKKlansman. In this instance, I believe they are much more likely, simply based 
on the situation (i.e. the topic of discussion), to be subject to elements of white ignorance. In 
this respect, the "situation" is simply the topic under discussion. So, it’s not just about 
stereotypes generating credibility deficits. More broadly, it’s about how the topic and the 
situation triggers aspects of white ignorance that might otherwise be absent. All of the 
sudden, the same two white people who could discuss First Man without any problems might 
suddenly start inhabiting epistemic vice when the topic turns to BlacKKKlansman.  
To give another example: A single person alone at home watching a James Baldwin 
documentary on Netflix is thereby involved in a "situation" where they're much more likely 
to inhabit vices associated with white ignorance than they would be at home alone watching 
a National Geographic documentary about exotic birds. The "situation," in this instance, is 
merely the documentary that's being viewed. A documentary about James Baldwin that 
includes explicitly racial themes is likely to trigger discourses and behaviors and attitudes 
associated with white ignorance. The situation, on this account, doesn’t need to involve an 
interlocutor. Of course, we can imagine much more nuanced situations where it may not be 
immediately obvious that white ignorance is likely to trigger. There are plenty of situations in 






The educational remedy: Teaching toward wokeness  
If the account above is roughly correct, then several educational implications follow. 
The first and most obvious: You can’t educate your way out of white ignorance. In a racist 
society marked by conditions of white racial domination, white ignorance will necessarily 
prevail — at least so long as correlate material conditions organized by the supremacy of 
whiteness prevail too. Fricker says that no matter how much we try to eliminate and avoid 
prejudiced beliefs, “stealthier, residual prejudices” will still hold sway (2007. p. 36). If 
conditions of white racial domination are present, then an inverted epistemology will also be 
present. It’s just a fact of the sea in which we swim. No one can become wholly immune to 
stereotypes and racial framing. 
The question for educators, then, is how do we proceed with education under 
conditions of white ignorance?  Instead of an approach that aims to eliminate ignorance, we 
can assume ignorance is more or less inescapable. The educational task, then, is to focus on 
helping students think more systematically and accurately about the types of situations and 
social conditions likely to trigger epistemic failure. Students should learn how to identify 
limitations, blind spots and epistemic lacuna. The goal should be to promote epistemic 
hesitation and caution instead of confidence. In other words, we don’t just want to help 
students acquire virtue, we need to help them figure out what to do in those moments when 
they don’t inhabit virtue. We don’t just want to provide students accurate knowledge, we 
need to help them figure out what to do in those moments when they don’t possess accurate 
knowledge. That’s what wokeness is and involves.  
The conception of wokeness I have in mind tracks closely to Fricker’s conception of 
“testimonial sensitivity.” Fricker argues that it’s possible for persons to notice when the 
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context is one in which they’re unlikely to inhabit epistemic virtue and then neutralize their 
judgements in light of that (2007, p. 67). This capacity (i.e. testimonial sensitivity), involves 
an “anti-prejudicial virtue,” which is “reflexive in structure” and serves to “correct” for the 
failure in judgement that stems from a credibility deficit (ibid.).   
Here’s how it works. When the hearer confronts a situation in which a stereotype is 
likely to generate a credibility deficit, the hearer can “shift intellectual gear out of the 
spontaneous, unreflective mode and into active critical reflection in order to identify how far 
the suspected prejudice has influenced her judgement” (2007, p. 91). From there, Fricker 
says, they can correct the credibility deficit by recalibrating the credibility judgement 
“upwards to compensate” (2007, p. 91). They can, in other words, reconfigure and recalibrate 
credibility judgements in order to avoid ethical failure and listen more diligently. Fricker 
suggests further that persons can conduct step-by-step reflection to neutralize bad judgements 
that stem from credibility deficits.  
Here’s what it looks like:  
 
Step 1: The hearer must recognize that she’s in a situation in which a stereotype is 
likely to trigger a credibility deficit.  
Step 2: Recognition should then instigate reflection.  
Step 3: Reflection enables the hearer to recalibrate her judgement so that the 
credibility deficit doesn’t affect her perception of the speaker.  
Step 4: After she has corrected the credibility deficit upwards, she is able to then 




Notice that the step-by-step framework relies first of all on the ability to recognize 
when one is in a situation in which a credibility deficit is likely to obtain. That’s no small 
thing. In fact, it might be the whole thing. Fricker’s framework provides the prescription, she 
identifies the target, but what’s missing is the pedagogy. How do we help students—or 
persons more generally—learn to interpret and decode those moments when a credibility 
deficit is likely to activate? To state the question differently: How do we help students 
recognize when they’re in a situation in which doxastic or active white ignorance is likely to 
influence their judgement? I believe the white ignorance framework developed in Chapters 1-
4 contain the conceptual resources and vocabulary necessary to guide meta-cognitive and 
meta-behavioral reflection in important ways. The next section describes how educators 
might achieve that end.    
 
“Going meta:” Helping students tackle meta-white ignorance 
To tackle white ignorance, as stated above, I don’t believe it’s prudent to try to fill 
students up with “correct knowledge.” Yes, it’s important to correct erroneous ideas about 
the world. But it’s counterproductive to correct those views directly. Instead, the approach 
for which I advocate involves, to coin a phrase, “going meta.” Going meta means, first, that 
educators should focus on meta-white ignorance. A focus on meta-white ignorance involves 
teaching about white ignorance in a sustained, systematic manner — the way we might teach 
about any academic subject that covers a broad and complex phenomenon (e.g. economics, 
human psychology, sociology, etc.).   
But there’s also another sense in which educators should approach white ignorance on 
meta-terms. When the approach involves directly correcting erroneous and false ideas about 
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race, then active white ignorance inevitably manifests. Students display evasive and 
discursive behaviors that serve to divert or shutdown open confrontation with new and 
alternative ideas. Classroom dialogue can devolve pretty quickly, as well-meaning educators 
grow increasingly frustrated with the behaviors and attitudes white students often display. 
Educators may vent privately with one another, but they rarely have a strategy for dealing 
with active white ignorance when it appears in the classroom.  
My (untested) hypothesis is that going meta carries the potential to preempt and re-
frame patterns of speech and behavior associated with white ignorance. The proposed 
approach involves building a curriculum based on the white ignorance framework. Educators 
can present the evidence for white ignorance and describe the patterns of speech and 
behavior associated with white ignorance in dispassionate, third-person terms. White 
ignorance should be taught for what it is: A broad social phenomenon that shapes our social 
world and human behavior in significant ways.  
The educational approach I have in mind should seek to erode the levels of meta-
white ignorance.25 First and most obviously, teaching about white ignorance can familiarize 
students with the concept itself, thus helping to erode Level 3. Then, over time, students can 
apprehend the breadth and depth of the evidence for the thesis itself. By working through the 
recognition and identification of all the elements of doxastic white ignorance as well as 
active white ignorance, students can start to name the constituent elements in the real world.  
 
25 To restate them: 
• Level 3: Unawareness of the thesis of white ignorance per se.  
• Level 2: Recognition that white ignorance is a real phenomenon to which people are subject—but which 
affects others, not oneself.  
•Level 1: Recognition that one is subject to white ignorance, but not knowing the degree to which they do. 
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In this respect, the core purpose of the framework I have developed in this project is 
to provide educators and students with a comprehensive vocabulary that can be used to name 
and identify patterns of behavior and patterns of cognition in others (Level 2) and also, 
eventually, in oneself. Ultimately, the goal is to help students recognize when they’re at risk 
of inhabiting white ignorance (Level 1). They should have the vocabulary and framework 
needed to regularly monitor the contours of the context, as well as the tools to identify how 
context shapes their own behavioral and cognitive proclivities.  
In practice, the phrase going meta tries to capture the difference between 
individuating a concept versus framing is as part of a general pattern. Consider the 
differences in how similar ideas are framed on the next page. On one side is a framing that 
aims to correct erroneous ideas directly, on the other side is a meta-framing that invites 


















You’re a privileged person because of your 
white skin color. 
Many white Americans are unable, for a 
range of reasons, to recognize how processes 
of racialized structuration give them an 
advantage based on skin color. Because of the 
way a patterned, inverted epistemology 
operates, they struggle to see their own 
privilege. Let’s discuss what might contribute 
to this.  
It is not true that, since the Civil Rights 
movement, black Americans have achieved 
roughly the same opportunity as whites. 
There is a widespread mistaken belief among 
many people, most of whom are white, that, 
since the Civil Rights movement, black 
Americans have achieved roughly the same 
opportunity as whites. Let’s discuss why this 
might be.  
When you say you have black friends, you’re 
merely trying to reassert your white 
innocence, while ignoring the reality in which 
you’re implicated.  
Many white people, when they’re challenged 
to consider how race shapes their place in the 
world, say things like “I have black friends” 
in order to signal to their interlocutor that 
they’re “not racist” and shouldn’t explore 
their own complicity in systems of racial 
injustice.  Let’s discuss why this might be and 
what the consequences are.  
 
 
Going meta, as the above examples illustrate, involves subtly shifting the terrain, 
moving away from the direct phenomenon toward exploration of the broader social pattern. 
Consider the first example—an assertion that one’s white skin confers social advantage. Such 
direct framing risks confrontation animated by active white ignorance. When we discuss the 
phenomenon (white privilege) directly, students are essentially invited to challenge the 
assertion both because it directly implicates them personally and also because it inevitably 
activates discursive elements that aim to prevent reflection. The meta framing, by contrast, 
assumes in advance the validity of the reality (racial privilege exists), does not tie it to any 
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agent in particular, and then ultimately invites inquiry into the broader social pattern 
(collective ignorance). With meta framing, we don’t immediately litigate whether white 
privilege is real. Instead, we explore why it’s denied so broadly and so consistently.  
Importantly, framing in meta terms only represents the entry point. Obviously, there 
is still space to establish the veracity of the underlying claim itself (that racial privilege 
exists). In addition, students may still elect to protest the underlying claim, and teachers may 
be challenged to document extant evidence as they might in any other context. But the way 
that evidence is presented can make a big difference. Consider the difference in the 
following: “Here’s the evidence that demonstrates white privilege is real” versus “Many 
people deny white privilege is real despite X Y, and Z evidence.”  In the latter framing, 
educators can document the evidence at the same time that they maintain focus on the 
patterned ignorance per se.   
I believe—but don’t have much evidence for—going meta has three distinct 
advantages. First, it creates distance between the student and the idea/behavior. Creating 
distance minimizes individuated investment, and therefore alleviates the likelihood that 
active white ignorance will manifest. Second, it frames the student as an effect of social 
forces, which I believe has the capacity to generate curiosity and exploration. Finally, going 
meta can preempt ideas, discourses and behaviors associated with white ignorance by naming 
and predicting them in advance. Such preemption gives teachers the resources to invite 
students to inquire and reflect on whether their response(s) amount to an instance of the 
phenomenon of white ignorance itself. In this way they can encourage students to practice 
the kind of reflection Fricker endorses.  
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First, when we talk about patterned ignorance at the broad social level, it enables 
students—at least initially—to encounter these ideas at a conceptual distance. To some 
extent, students are able to disinvest from their commitment to specific ideas, since no 
specific idea is being interrogated. Instead, what’s being interrogated are broad domain-
specific patterns of ignorance. It’s easier to scrutinize a phenomenon and set of social 
behaviors if the discussion centers on patterns of behavior among others. As an illustration: 
instead of directly encouraging students to imagine what it means to benefit from racial 
privilege, the idea is that we can encourage students to observe how other people deal with 
that reality. By examining how patterns of ignorance appear in others, students might be 
disarmed, which could minimize the likelihood that they’ll activate active white ignorance. 
They might be more likely to participate in inquiry, instead of immediately shutting down. 
This aspect, however, only manages to erode Level 2 meta-white ignorance. 
Next, the framing for which I advocate identifies each instance of white ignorance as 
an effect of a broad social phenomenon. Functionally, the purpose of this approach is to help 
students recognize that their thinking and their behavior is, in certain instances, a 
consequence of patterns of social habituation. In other words, we want to help students 
recognize that their discursive moves, for example, are not their own—they're simply 
predictable patterns of speech, common across myriad persons and contexts. Such framing 
serves to disindividuate instances of white ignorance, encouraging students to explore how 
broader social patterns influence and impact their thinking and judgement. This may help 
generate the meta-cognitive reflection needed to erode Level 1 meta-white ignorance. 
Encouraging students to examine themselves as an effect of processes of socialization can 
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invite curiosity and inquiry as students interrogate whether and to what extent their behavior 
and ideas are a consequence of individual agency or social habituation.  
Finally, framing white ignorance in meta terms can help educators preempt 
expressions of white ignorance, placing educators in a better position to respond. The 
purpose of systematic meta-framing is to provide students and educators with a vocabulary 
they can use to name and interpret phenomena that appears in the classroom. Often educators 
confront discourse-based active white ignorance as it arises, but because the meta-framing is 
not conducted in advance, they lack the resources to help students recognize the expression 
for what it is. The consequence is that expressions of, say, discourse-based white ignorance 
ignite a more personal confrontation. A student, for example, may express the discourse of 
white innocence, and the teacher may strain to articulate why those utterances are 
problematic without directly impugning the student in a counterproductive way.  
In my own teaching, students regularly (both in the classroom and in their writing), 
express a range of utterances exactly patterned according to discourse-based white ignorance. 
At my worst moments, such instances instigate an argument between myself and the student. 
If I don’t undertake the meta-framing in advance, I don’t have the resources available to 
name and describe what is happening. The best I can do is encourage the student to reflect on 
their own thinking. But if I do the work up front to provide a vocabulary and conceptual 
framework, then I have the resources to help guide reflection in an intelligent and meaningful 
way. It should be possible to say, “sometimes in these moments we’re at risk of inhabiting 
the discourse of moral innocence [or whatever it might be], do you believe this [specific 
statement] is an instance of that?” Instead of an occasion for confrontation, the expression of 
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white ignorance becomes an invitation for exploration, inquiry and reflection.  In turn, 
students may practice the meta-cognitive activity needed to realize wokeness.  
 
Realizing wokeness 
So far, I have described how meta-framing may help students work through the 
various levels of meta-white ignorance, starting with third-person objective analysis (i.e. 
identifying patterns of white ignorance in others) and moving toward first-person subjective 
inquiry (i.e. identifying patterns of white ignorance in oneself). Ultimately, the purpose of 
this approach is to train students to name constituent elements of white ignorance, so they 
can identify it as it appears. The goal is to achieve something similar to the testimonial 
sensitivity Fricker identifies in her research. “Wokeness” is a concept that I believe captures 
that basic aim. We want students to be able to recognize an expression of white ignorance 
and the context that underwrites the occasion for it. Then, hopefully, they’ll be able to 
neutralize the effects of white ignorance on their judgement.   
Meta-dialogic and meta-cognitive analysis are the principal means through which 
reflective recognition is achieved. At every step, educators can encourage students to try to 
identify whether and to what extent they’re subject to various dimensions of white ignorance. 
Guided writing assignments and group discussions may help facilitate the meta-cognitive 
work necessary to identify, say, erroneous ideas or inclinations to activate minimization in 
one’s own social analyses. We want students to discern when the situation is one that 
generates aspects of white ignorance.  
Similarly, meta-dialogic analysis can help students uncover how and in what ways 
their own patterns of speech and behavior involve, say, evasion or the discourse of innocence 
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or colorblindness. Educators may construct specific assignments that invite students to reflect 
on past behaviors and discourses and encourage students to name instances in which they’ve 
activated white ignorance in the past. Educators can also scaffold this inquiry by naming as it 
appears during discussion or in the marginalia of papers. When students activate discourses 
consistent with active white ignorance, educators can directly point to it and ask students 
whether they agree it’s an instance of the phenomenon and how they believe it might 
influence their judgement.  
Importantly, going meta is only one strategy among many that teachers might employ 
to try to help students realize wokeness. I don’t believe that going meta works in every 
context or with every student. And, of course, success is predicated on an endless array of 
variables, most of which teachers can never control. That’s why I’m more concerned in this 
chapter with working to identify the aim.  Regardless of which strategies teachers employ, 
the idea is to help students practice identifying when and at what moments white ignorance 
risks influencing and impairing their judgement. We want students to notice when the context 
is one in which they’re prompted to inhabit behaviors and discourses that they don’t inhabit 
in other situations. The process of reflective recognition eventually should look something 
like this: 
  
1. Reflect: At this moment, am I at risk of inhabiting certain kinds of white ignorance? 
Is this context one in which erroneous ideas or incognizance are likely to influence 
my judgement? Is this situation likely to prompt discourses or behaviors that prevent 
me from attending to the world in responsible ways?  
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2. Identify: Which elements of white ignorance am I subject to? Am I subject to 
incognizance? Am I practicing minimization? Am I participating in the discourse of 
innocence? Am I participating in the discourse of colorblindness? Am I being 
intellectually lazy?  
3. Monitor: How are these elements of white ignorance influencing my judgement? Is 
incognizance hampering my capacity to see something new? Are my current 
behaviors causing me to miss out on exploring reality?   
4. Regulate: Can I recalibrate my judgement to attend to phenomena more accurately 
and with greater care?   
 
These activities associated with wokeness aren’t necessarily linear. The process, in 
practice, is more fluid and tacit. But, perhaps initially it makes sense to encourage students to 
explicitly identify each step, to explicitly map their meta-cognitive activity, so they can 
improve their capacity to name and identify how white ignorance impacts their thinking 
about the world and relationships in it. In short, we simply want students to recognize when 
the situation triggers deviation from their normal epistemic practice. Having the tools to 
name and identify the type of epistemic misfire is sine qua non for that practice.  
 
Conclusion 
Over time, naming the constituent elements of white ignorance through meta-dialogic 
and meta-cognitive analysis can help students practice locating limits and distortions in their 
epistemic field. They may start to notice when they’re subject to epistemic lacuna owing to 
racialized structuration. They may start to notice when they’re activating discourses and 
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behaviors that depart from their normal functioning. In this respect, teaching white students 
about race and racism should be guided by a specific goal: to help students identify, locate 
and catalog potential perspectival, interpretive and cognitive limitations they might face as a 
consequence of systems of racial structuration. So, it’s not just thinking about how race 
organizes the world out there; not just now racial logics disadvantage nonwhite persons and 
groups; not just how racial logics confer privilege on me or others; not just how racial logics 
can structure and constitute white identity. But, most importantly, thinking about how racial 
logics organize one’s field of perception, one’s interpretation of the world, one’s habits, 
attitudes and dispositions, one’s vocabulary, the way they employ that vocabulary, and how 
it’s bound up with one’s emotions and way of being in the world. 
























Toward a Racially Responsive Pedagogy 
 
 The purpose of this final chapter is to consolidate all the forgoing into a cohesive 
package, hopefully to illuminate a path forward for teachers and teacher educators committed 
to achieving social justice. My goal is to show how the white ignorance framework presented 
in this dissertation can be incorporated into a larger framework, which I call “racially 
responsive pedagogy.” A racially responsive pedagogy, I believe, creates a standardized logic 
to underwrite and motivate both culturally responses and sustaining pedagogies as well as the 
pedagogical approach I described in the previous chapter. 
As I argue below, undermining the reproduction of white ignorance in mostly white 
schools represents the inverse corollary approach to what educators currently employ when 
they practice culturally responsive and sustaining pedagogies (CRSP) in mostly nonwhite 
schools. CRSP asks educators to notice and decode ways the supremacy of whiteness 
functions to erode and erase indigenous epistemologies (Emdin, 2016); similarly, the 
framework I’ve articulated here asks educators to notice and decode ways the supremacy of 
whiteness functions to sustain and nourish white ignorance in white schools. A racially 
responsive pedagogy serves to formalize this shared diagnostic approach. Before educators 
can decide what educational model to adopt, they must clearly acknowledge what they’re up 
against. I think a racially responsive pedagogy can help concretize that acknowledgment.  
 In my experience colleges of education focused on social justice do not typically 
prepare educators to pursue social justice in mostly white schools. The consequence is that 
teachers often abandon significant aspects of their social justice mission when they move 
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from mostly nonwhite into mostly white schools. Many teachers are not given a framework 
to think about how to operationalize social justice education in mostly white communities.  
 Let me share an anecdote: I recently had a conversation with a colleague who was 
discussing a state-wide job fair that the graduates of her teacher preparation program attend 
every year at the state capitol. She said she often worries that recent graduates will end up 
taking a teaching position in mostly-all-white schools in the suburbs. She described feeling 
like such an outcome amounts to a waste of time and resources. In her view, they spend years 
training teachers to teach effectively in Latinx communities or black communities or Hmong 
communities, and so when graduates immediately take positions at affluent mostly white 
schools, it’s as if all the training was for nothing. Her position is that their college of 
education is committed to making an impact on society toward greater justice, and when 
graduates elect to teach outside of low-income nonwhite contexts, the college is failing at 
their mission. 
I suspect her view is not uncommon. Very likely, many programs that focus on urban 
education, or teaching for social justice, are at pains to encourage graduates to make a 
difference in the most disadvantaged communities. They want graduates to teach in so-called 
crisis communities where efforts will make the biggest impact. Although I don’t quarrel with 
this basic idea, I have tried to establish here that white communities are also likely in crisis. 
If my hypothesis is correct, white schools are at least partly responsible for reproducing and 
validating patterns of ignorance among white populations. These patterns of ignorance 
function to justify and solidify material conditions of racial inequality. It goes without 
saying, I think, that the systematic reproduction of ignorance (of any kind) is bad. The 
systematic reproduction of ignorance that helps validate white racial domination is much, 
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much worse. We should not ignore the deep problems in mostly white communities.   
I believe, therefore, that subtle revisions to how teacher education programs approach 
questions of social justice can position graduates to pursue social justice no matter where 
they take their first job or eventually teach. The framework articulated in this final chapter 
invites teacher educators to expand on and strengthen existing practices so that novice 
teachers can gain the tools, pedagogies and resources to make a difference—whether that’s in 
white communities, nonwhite communities or more integrated districts.  
The plan of this chapter is as follows. First, I provide a brief genealogy of the 
development of CRSP. I want to construct a narrative to outline the conceptual origins of 
these pedagogies to suggest that two significant practice-based problems have emerged in the 
wake of widespread institutional implementation. First, there’s been an outsized focus on the 
pedagogies themselves without regard to why the pedagogies are in the first place needed. 
Second, there’s an overemphasis on “culture” and so teachers end up focusing more on 
specific groups rather than the reasons why unique pedagogies are warranted for different 
groups. The purpose of this story is to illuminate the reasons why I believe a racially 
responsive pedagogy will help strengthen justice-focused education.  
Section two argues that a vocabulary shift toward a “racially” responsive pedagogy 
can help make racial analyses more central and more prominent, thereby helping to overcome 
some of the limitations I describe in Section One. A racially responsive pedagogy, I argue, 
can serve as a comprehensive approach, encapsulating CRSP as well as anti-white ignorance 
pedagogies that aim toward realizing wokeness. My framework invites educators to perform 
an ongoing assessment and diagnosis of the way patterns of white supremacy organize their 
school and their classroom.  Educators first must identify how and in what ways processes of 
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racialized structuration organize their schooling context and then decide the appropriate 
educational remedy. In mostly white schools the educational remedy will look a lot like the 
wokeness pedagogy described in the previous chapter. In mostly nonwhite schools the 
educational remedy will include CRSP, mostly as practiced today. Emphasizing the diagnosis 
in this respect enables educators to advance social justice work in every school and 
classroom.       
 
Section1: A brief genealogy of culturally responsive pedagogy. 
Culturally responsive pedagogy emerged because of a recognition that the 
fundamentally racist patterns of practice in schools functioned to — and were in some cases 
designed to — promote the cultural erasure of students’ and communities’ unique ways of 
being in the world. In particular, the key concern articulated across the scholarship is that 
schooling practices, curricula, assessments and textbooks are saturated by white norms and 
epistemologies, which function to center the Euro-American reference group. There are 
expectations regarding how children should talk and dress (Delpit, 2006), as well as how they 
should behave and comport themselves (Valenzuela, 1999; Ferguson, 2001), and these norms 
(and associated policies) can delimit lines of exclusion and marginalization. Children are 
consequently marked as deviant and subject to unfair punitive institutional response 
(Ferguson, 2001). Furthermore, the fabric of schools is grounded in what some scholars have 
called “unbearable whiteness” (Gangi, 2008), whereby the curricula, classroom materials, 
books, histories, and more general conversation is grounded in a white system of reality. In 
simple terms, the classroom doesn’t reflect how nonwhite students interpret and understand 
the world.  
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The consequences of these problems are multiple. First, schooling practices and 
policies have a “subtractive” effect, in that they systematically erode nonwhite students’ 
distinct social capital (Valenzuela, 1999). Subtractive practices, in turn, function to elicit a 
particular set of responses from students; students rightly reject the subtractive assimilative 
practices that require them to deny their background and home life. Students accordingly 
disengage or refuse to participate in these toxic schooling activities.  
Teachers, however, misinterpret student responses. As Valenzuela writes, “rather than 
seeing youths’ bodies as the site of agency, critical thinking, and resistance to schools’ lack 
of connectedness to them, school officials see hapless, disengaged individuals who act out 
their defiance through their strut-and-swagger attitude toward school rules” (1999, p. 32). 
The interpretation from school officials and teachers, in other words, initiates a set of deficit 
logics. It is said students “don’t care” about school; and their families don’t “value” school. 
The problem is diagnosed as a problem with students’ “culture,” and so schools tend to 
double-down on the same set of marginalizing policies and practices. The message is clear: 
the students’ culture is broken and needs to be “fixed” (Anyon, 2005). 
To combat these racist patterns of practice, scholars like Ladson-Billings and Villegas 
began to catalog and standardize teaching practices that aim to validate cultures and 
backgrounds that depart from the white reference norm. Instead of thinking about students’ 
culture as something to “overcome,” scholars started thinking about students’ culture as 
something to be valued. From there “asset-based” and “resource-based” pedagogies became 
increasingly prominent. As Alim (2007a) argues, youth cultural and linguistic practices are of 
value in their own right and should be creatively foregrounded. Asset-based pedagogies, 
thus, repositioned the linguistic, literate, and cultural practices of working-class 
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communities—specifically poor communities of color—as resources and assets to honor, 
explore, and extend (Ball, 1995; Garcia, 1993; Ladson-Billings, 1994; Lee, 1995; McCarty & 
Zepeda, 1995; Moll & Gonzales, 1994; Nieto, 1992; Valdés, 1996).  
Over time, asset-based pedagogies became codified into an approach more broadly 
called culturally “relevant” and culturally “responsive” pedagogy. As culturally responsive 
pedagogy gained widespread appeal, advocates for the approach started to downplay 
explicitly anti-racist themes. Instead, focus was placed on more anodyne goals, like “higher 
achievement” and “closing the achievement gap.” I suspect the shift in language was born of 
necessity. Scholar-practitioners were making a huge push to incorporate culturally responsive 
pedagogy into policy-mandated practice. The truth is that it’s hard to build broad support for 
policies that aim to achieve “racial justice.” It’s much easier to find support for policies that 
aim to “close the achievement gap.” In this way, the vocabulary shifted in order to build 
change-making coalitions.  
These subtle shifts, however, generated new problems. First, educators and teacher 
educators started to focus primarily on the pedagogy itself, losing sight of the reasons why 
the pedagogy was in the first place identified and elucidated. In other words, culturally 
responsive pedagogy was becoming all about the medicine, but teachers weren’t talking 
about the diagnosis. Hundreds of articles and handbooks have been put in print about what 
teachers can “do” to teach nonwhite youth better, but these papers tend to dwell on the 
practices themselves, and not so much on the reasons why the pedagogy is in the first place 
warranted. 




Culturally responsive pedagogy evolved, in part, as a result of racist practices, which 
did not account for students of color nor recognize the importance of the racial and 
cultural experiences these students brought into the classroom. Although cultural 
elements are essential, the dynamics of race and culture can never be separated because 
the very structure of race initially stratified which culture counted and which did not” 
(p. 66).  
 
Culturally responsive pedagogy, in other words, was initially developed as a tool to 
combat and resist racist patterns of practice. Best practices therefore require teachers to 
perform the diagnostic work necessary to identify racist patterns of practice in school and 
then cease to enact those practices. It’s two sides of the same coin, one negative and the other 
positive. On the one hand teachers must work to refrain from enacting practices that promote 
cultural erasure, while at the same time engaging in practices that function to “[reintegrate] 
knowledge that was initially marginalized due to systemic racism” (Mattias, 2013 p. 68).  
The main problem is that focusing mostly on the pedagogy meant teachers started to 
focus exclusively on their students (and specific cultural backgrounds) without paying 
attention to the systemic, policy-based, or larger patterns of practice and racial logics that 
organize schooling. Eventually, race-based structural analyses disappeared to the extent that 
Ladson-Billings was writing myriad articles in the late 1990s and 2000’s working to put 
critical race theory back into culturally responsive pedagogy (1998; 1999; 2005; 2006). The 
pedagogical practice, in other words, had been so far removed from racial structural analyses 
that the top progenitor of the approach had to advocate for reincorporating racial structural 
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analysis!26 In short, teachers simply do not always understand the reasons this specific 
approach to teaching nonwhite youth is warranted. The “why” behind the pedagogy is 
persistently missing.  
More recently, cultural “sustaining” pedagogy (CSP) has emerged as a way to 
foreground the justice-oriented themes initially associated with asset-based pedagogies. The 
purpose of culturally sustaining pedagogy is to support multilingualism and multiculturalism 
in practice and perspective for students and teachers. Here’s the formal definition: “CSP 
seeks to perpetuate and foster—to sustain—linguistic, literate, and cultural pluralism as part 
of the democratic project of schooling and as a needed response to demographic and social 
change.” Advocates for CSP believe it’s an important paradigm shift—from culturally 
responsive to sustaining—because educational institutions should be about more than simply 
high achievement. Schools should also be about promoting social justice and combating 
white supremacist patterns of practice. To prevent cultural erasure, educators should to work 
to sustain and empower distinct languages and epistemologies.   
Culturally sustaining pedagogy is a welcome shift in theory and practice because it 
aims to retrain focus on justice and racism. But culturally sustaining pedagogy also carries its 
own challenges. Part of the problem, in my view, is the nomenclature associated with the 
paradigm. Focusing too much, or exclusively, on “culture” invites educators to ignore 
broader structural patterns that shape which epistemologies are valued and which are not, 
 
26 Other scholarship has also aimed to more directly incorporate a racial analytic into culturally 
responsive educational frameworks. Brown-Jeffy and Cooper (2011), for example, worry that culturally 
responsive pedagogy “does not explicitly problematize race . . . [or] critically examine the structures that feed 
into the cultural incongruence perspective” (p. 71). They suggest that race should play a more decisive 
explanatory role in culturally responsive education because racial analyses can identify the ways “privilege has 




which groups succeed and which do not. Emphasis on culture leads educators to focus on the 
various groups themselves and not so much on broader patterns shaping the institutional 
response to those groups.   
As Blum (2009) argues, focusing on culture can often play into racist discourses that 
blame underperforming groups because “culture is generally seen as emanating from, and the 
responsibility of, the group itself, rather than being the result of mistreatment of others” 
(Blum, 2009, p. 2). In other words, when culture is elevated and race diminished, educators 
and policymakers tend to focus almost exclusively on perceived cultural patterns without 
performing the needed analysis to uncover why such patterns are present and why schooling 
practices are incongruent with some cultural patterns and not others. The consequence is that 
even colleges of education that center around culturally sustaining pedagogies still risk 
animating deficits of discourse if the teacher training isn’t adequately scaffolded.  
In summary, there are two potential limitations in the way that CRSP is implemented 
in practice. First, an overemphasis on the pedagogy itself serves to obscure the reasons why 
the pedagogy is in the first place warranted. Teachers might attend workshops to learn how to 
“do” culturally responsive pedagogy without learning to decode the white supremacist 
patterns of practice that create the occasion for the pedagogy. Second, an emphasis on culture 
has the effect of inviting teachers to focus mostly on specific student groups without 
reference to racist background conditions, which in the worst case might invite teachers to 
activate stereotypes and discourses of deficit. These outcomes undermine the valuable aims 
CRSP seeks to achieve. In the next section, I suggest how a racially responsive pedagogy can 




Toward a racially responsive pedagogy 
I propose that we shift the vocabulary to employ a more race-primary framework, so 
that racial analysis is a central, rather than ancillary, part of the pedagogical approach. 
Specifically, I suggest educators use the term “racially responsive pedagogy” to refer to a 
global set of teaching practices and pedagogies according to which educators directly 
confront, resist and combat schooling practices organized by the logic of white supremacy.  
Instead of focusing first—and exclusively—on the student, the first move for teachers should 
be to interpret and assess the way their school, as well as their own teaching, activates racial 
logics that function in the first case to exclude and marginalize nonwhite students and in the 
second case to reproduce and reify patterns of white ignorance among white students.  
A racially responsive framework can thus serve as a more comprehensive framework, 
serviceable and actionable in any school and in any context. It provides a way for educators 
to orient themselves to their practice no matter where they end up teaching. And, most 
importantly, it represents a plausible framework that can help address the twin challenges I 
outlined above.  
A racially responsive pedagogy should emphasize that the primary purpose of 
teaching for social justice is to resist and undermine white supremacist patterns of practice. 
Therefore, colleges of education can look for ways to help aspiring teachers identify, decode 
and diagnose the ways that white supremacist patterns of practice structure their classroom 
and affect their students. This kind of diagnostic work can be employed in any context. If it’s 
a mostly nonwhite school, then educators can look to identify the way processes of racialized 
structuration underwrite subtractive schooling practices that promote cultural erasure. 
Enormous bodies of research have been dedicated to helping teachers achieve exactly this. If 
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it’s a mostly white school, by contrast, then educators can look to identify the way processes 
of racialized structuration underwrite and promote patterns of white ignorance. So, far there 
hasn’t been a great deal of research that can help educators and teacher educators perform 
this kind of diagnosis. Hopefully the contents of Chapter 5 can help illuminate a pathway 
forward.  
The diagnostic work, then, becomes central to the pedagogy that’s ultimately 
employed. That is, the diagnosis furnishes the rationale. All schools are organized according 
to the supremacy of whiteness. But those organizing logics generate different effects for 
different groups. In mostly nonwhite schools, where processes of racialized structuration 
promote subtractive schooling, culturally responsive and culturally sustaining pedagogies are 
warranted. In mostly white schools, where white supremacist patterns of practice promote 
white ignorance, educators should work to resist and undermine the proliferation of white 
ignorance—and work toward wokeness for white students.  
Such interpretive work throws into relief the need and moral imperative for CRSP. 
These pedagogies aren’t needed simply because nonwhite students learn differently, but 
because schools alienate and minoritize nonwhite students. These pedagogies aren’t needed 
simply because students bring different ways of knowing and being to the classroom, but 
principally because schools exclude and erase different ways of knowing. CRSP is so 
effective not because it furnishes a new method for teaching nonwhite students, but chiefly 
because it functions to reduce the effects of racist patterns of practice in school.  
What I want to underscore, above all, is that CRSP always necessarily represents a 
response to a crisis. The response always aims to remediate an injustice: Instead of erasing 
students background culture and identity, they validate it. Instead of correcting student 
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speech and home language, they showcase it. If historically schools functioned to eliminate 
indigenous and culturally particular epistemologies, then the response is to find ways to 
reincorporate those epistemologies back into the classroom. All of these features of CRSP 
operate to create an educational space far more conducive to actual teaching and learning 
because they help make schools less marginalizing and alienating.  
On the flipside, there’s a plausible case that white schools are also in crisis. The crisis 
is that white supremacist patterns of practice are operating to nourish, sustain and reproduce 
white ignorance in white communities. So, there must be a pedagogical response to the crisis. 
If mostly white schools function to validate and proliferate white ignorance, then the 
response is to find ways to interrupt, disrupt and undermine those practices. If mostly white 
schools operate to promote white ignorance, then the response should focus on finding ways 
to minimize white ignorance. 
The two approaches represent inverse images. CRSP serves, among other things, to 
reincorporate epistemologies that are being systematically excluded. The pedagogy for 
which I advocate in this project can serve, by contrast, to resist epistemologies of ignorance 
that systematically proliferate. One approach seeks to include marginalized epistemologies, 
while the other seeks to exclude epistemologies of ignorance.  
To illustrate in more concrete terms, here’s the kind of practice-based analysis I hope 
a racially responsive pedagogy can promote. Think of it like a step-by-step approach: 
Step 1: Identify and decode how white supremacist patterns of practice affect your 
classroom and your students. Are these practices serving to erase culturally unique 
epistemologies or are they serving to promote epistemologies of ignorance?  
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Step 2: Stop doing things that promote cultural erasure or incite epistemologies of 
ignorance. In other words, aim first to pump the brakes. Stop doing harm. 
Step 3: Implement the appropriate pedagogy based on your initial diagnosis. If you 
need to confront subtractive schooling practices, then CRSP is warranted to reincorporate 
indigenous knowledge back into the classroom. If you need to confront the proliferation of 
white ignorance, then a pedagogy like that which is outlined in Chapter 6 is warranted to help 
students deal with their ignorance and potentially realize wokeness. 









I don’t want to pretend that realizing wokeness in white schools will be easy in 
practice. I’m calling for an organized, nearly-militant approach, something like we might see 
from Teach for America—except here I think we need an army of idealistic educators ready 
to infiltrate mostly white communities and fix the dangerous and toxic schools that serve to 
nourish and amplify white ignorance. Teachers ready to participate in this work should 
prepare for profound opposition and defiance, the likes of which we probably haven’t seen 
since busing practices in the 1970s.  
Consider what happened recently in Wisconsin. On January 15, 2018 Oconomowoc 
High School in Oconomowoc, Wisconsin hosted an assembly to observe Martin Luther King 
Jr. Day, inviting the almost-all-white student body27 to reflect on, among other things, 
“empathy” and “privilege.” Here’s how the district website described the purpose of the 
event:  
 
OHS held an assembly this morning that was largely designed by students around the 
theme of empathy. Following the assembly, and to build on the theme of empathy, the 
students engaged in a reflective activity in their Pride homerooms about privilege. 
They participated in a great conversation as they talked through their thoughts and 
beliefs about discrimination in the school, community, and beyond (Anderson, 2018). 
 
 
27 Oconomowoc High School is an intensely segregated school, with fewer than 10% identifying as nonwhite 
(mostly Latinx).  
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Note that, besides for the term “discrimination,” the language used to officially 
describe the event doesn’t explicitly refer to race or racism (though we can infer that such 
was the purpose, given the context of MLK Jr. Day). Despite the neutral language, the event 
sparked local outrage after students were invited to take a “Privilege Aptitude Test” adapted 
from the National Civil Rights museum (Johnson, 2018). The aptitude test challenges 
children to consider ways they may enjoy certain privileges or disadvantages, encouraging 
them to reflect on, among other things, whether they’re ever followed in a store, whether 
peers make fun of their last name, whether their elected officials look like them, whether 
their intelligence is questioned because of the way they speak, etc.  
Many parents in the community strongly objected to these activities, claiming it was 
just indoctrination and a form of district bullying (Johnson, 2018). After initial blowback, the 
District Superintendent, Roger Rindo, issued the following statement: 
 
“The assembly and classroom activities that took place on Monday, January 15, on 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Day at Oconomowoc High School were initiated by student 
interest and developed by a committee of staff and students. Assembly topics, music, 
speakers, and classroom activities were not intended to judge or offend staff or 
students in any way. The classroom activities that followed the assembly were 
intended to open a conversation among small student groups. They were not required 
assignments, nor were they collected by teachers. The District is working to find 





A few days after the event, the district school board convened a closed-door meeting 
with the Oconomowoc High School principal, directing “him not to allow future activities 
around the topic of privilege except in classrooms where it is related to a specific course and 
teachers can provide appropriate context” (Anderson, 2018). In other words, the district 
officially banned school-wide assemblies and activities designed to encourage all students 
and all teachers to reflect on racial privilege.   
Explaining the decision, District Superintendent Rindo said, "Schools are a 
microcosm of their communities. And we had parents in our community who felt like the 
concept of privilege went a little far, particularly for some of our younger students” 
(Anderson, 2018).28 Less than a month later, Oconomowoc High School principal officially 
resigned, leading to speculation that he was forced out by the school board (Johnson, 2018). 
Another district school board member, Stephen Zimmer, apparently confirmed the 
speculation when he resigned in protesting saying, “that he ‘disagreed with the way board 
members used the MLK Day assembly to push [the principal] out’" (Anderson, 2018).  
The controversy and fallout surrounding the white privilege assembly is worth 
reflecting on. Consider what happened: A short program on MLK Jr day aimed at 
ameliorating one element of doxastic white ignorance threw an entire white district into 
upheaval, instigated emergency board meetings and ultimately forced out a school principal.  
Yikes.  
 
28 Note that district leadership cites student age as a primary motivation for disallowing the program. There are 
good reasons to be suspicious of this. First, it should be noted that leadership altogether banned similar 
programs in the future, even for students in older grades. In addition, district leadership never explained why the 
content is inappropriate for younger grades, nor did they cite evidence-based research to support this assertion. 
In other words, they didn’t explain why parent objections are warranted. Neither did they encourage educators 
to create a more age-appropriate curriculum. It is, and remains, a wholesale ban. I suspect many educators will 
confront opposition on the grounds that some children are simply too young to learn about racial privilege or 
white ignorance. Maybe so. But, we can’t be certain until we have more and better evidence. At this point it’s 
baseless conjecture.  
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Obviously, this single assembly isn’t anything remotely near the kind of sustained, 
systematic approach to white ignorance I endorsed in this project. Therefore, there’s good 
reason to question the viability and serviceability of my proposed approach. Given 
overwhelming evidence of white rage and resistance, it’s understandable to imagine this 
approach won’t work. At the same time, we haven’t really tried.  
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